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We present new observations on the distribution of sentence-final 'then'. We
develop an analysis which reveals the need to distinguish between times which
are explicitly mentioned and those which are merely implicit in the description
of events. The account is expressed formally in DRT (Kamp and Reyle 1993),
and involves restricting the introduction of temporal discourse referents to cases
where an explicit temporal referent is present.
We discuss possible problems with the DRT account in extending to larger frag¬
ments, and suggest that incorporating ideas from situation theory (Barwise and
Perry 1983), along the lines of Cooper's situation-theoretic DRT (STDRT) (Coo¬
per 1993b, 1993c) may overcome these problems. We present an alternative for-
malisation expressed in a version of Cooper's situation theoretic grammar (STG)
(Cooper 1991). In this fragment, the distinction between explicit and implied
temporal referents is made in terms of information about the utterance.
Observations are made concerning 'at the time' and 'at the same time'. In order
to develop an account, we look at related non-temporal observations involving
'the X' and 'the same X' in discourse sequences, where X is a relational noun such
as 'colour'. We develop an account in STDRT using the notion of generalised
role, which we show is related to notions of thematic roles/relations used in the
literature. Applying this account to the temporal data, we show how this explains
the distribution of 'at the time' and 'at the same time' and allows us to formalise
the discourse relation known as backgrounding.
We show how the incorporation of situations allows us to give a treatment of
aspectual class and aspectual composition expressed in terms of event structure.
We develop such an account and indicate how it may be incorporated into a
grammar such as the STG one given earlier.
We conclude that there is a need to distinguish between information which is
explicitly described by an utterance and information which is only implicitly
present. In order to explain certain natural language observations, this distinc¬
tion must be clearly made in the semantic representation. We demonstrate that
situation theoretic DRT is a suitable framework for making the distinction.
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This thesis aims to use linguistic data to reveal the kind of theory of events that
is needed for natural language semantics.
Two alternative approaches to such an enterprise are often taken in the litera¬
ture. The first is what might be called sentence-based and looks at such features
as aspect, aspectual class and aspectual composition, which are often regarded
as sentence-internal. From these, conclusions are drawn about the ontology and
structure of events that are needed in the theory. The second approach is more
discourse-oriented, being concerned with the progression of time through discourse
and its interaction with features like aspectual class. This approach regards tem¬
poral progression as a variety of anaphora and models it in a way that shares some
similarities with pronominal anaphora.
In this thesis we follow the latter, discourse-based type of approach. We begin
with some new observations on the distribution of sentence-final 'then',1 which we
view as expressing explicit temporal anaphora. We study sequences like:
(1.1) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Gareth was a boy then
and:
1Although some of these observations have recently been made independently by others, we
were not aware of these at the time of our investigations.
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(1.2) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. * Gareth climbed Snowdon then
and:
(1.3) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon then
From these we develop an account which puts certain constraints on the kinds of
events required by the theory and their identity criteria and part relations. Our
analysis takes us into the area of discourse structure and how discourse conveys
relations such as "elaboration" and "background" between events and/or states.
We show how sentence-final 'then' both interacts with and helps to determine
discourse relations such as these. We argue that it is necessary to distinguish
between two uses of sentence-final 'then': one which refers back to an explicit
temporal referent (ETR) such as 'in July' in (1.1a), and one which expresses
discourse relations between eventualities. We develop an account which embodies
this distinction and show how it may be expressed in a semantic theory, using
discourse representation theory (DRT, Kamp and Reyle 1993) as our example.
After pointing out some potential problems with the DRT account, we develop a
second fragment in situation-theoretic DRT (Cooper 1993b, Cooper 1993c), and
show how this overcomes the problems we identified.
We move on (in Chapter 4) to look at sentence-final 'at the time' and 'at the same
time' and their distribution in sequences similar to the ones with 'then'. In order
to account for our observations we step aside from temporal matters and look
at sequences involving relational nouns like 'the colour' and 'the same colour'.
Having developed an account of these, we apply it to the temporal examples and
show how it can explain the distribution of 'at the time' and 'at the same time'.
Once we have laid the foundations of our theory of events in Chapters 1-4, we
turn in Chapter 5 to investigate how those temporal phenomena traditionally
analysed at the sentence level (aspectual classes, aspectual composition, etc.) can
be incorporated into the theory. In particular, we show how previous accounts of
event structure, such as that of Moens (1987), can be expressed in it, allowing us
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to capture formally the distinctions between the aspectual classes. We also give
an account in our theory of aspectual composition which is closely based on those
of Verkuyl (1989) and Krifka (1992).
Thus we aim to show that the theory of events that we developed in earlier chap¬
ters to express discourse temporal phenomena can be extended to cover more
traditionally sentence-internal phenomena in a way which throws some useful il¬
lumination on these.
The breakdown of material into chapters is as follows:
Chapter 2
We begin by presenting the observations concerning sentence-final 'then' in two-
sentence discourse sequences. On the basis of these we develop an analysis which
distinguishes between two uses of 'then' described above: the use which conveys
reference to a previously-mentioned time and the use which expresses a particular
discourse relation. We show how this distinction may be formalised in DRT by
restricting the introduction of temporal discourse referents into the universe of
discourse of the current discourse representation structure (DRS) to cases where
explicit reference to a time is made. We call such references explicit temporal
referents (ETRs). ETRs include frame adverbials (e.g. 'in July') and instanta¬
neous adverbials (e.g. 'at 2pm') but not 'for'-adverbials such as 'for two hours'.
When there is no explicit mention of a time (i.e., no ETR is present) such as in
(1.2a), an event discourse referent but no time discourse referent is introduced
into the DRS.
We develop a grammatical fragment on the above lines that is an extension and
modification of the DRT fragment of (Kamp and Reyle 1993, Chapter 5), and show
how the grammar and construction rules give the required readings for sequences
containing sentence-final 'then'.
However, we point out, too, that the DRT account may be too restrictive in that
in larger fragments there may be problems with allowing a temporal discourse
referent only to be introduced when an ETR is present. In particular, our analysis
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of 'at the time' and 'at the same time' in Chapter 4 will show that it is very
useful to allow temporal referents to be introduced by what we call 'inferred' (as
opposed to explicit) times. But the distinction motivated by our analysis of 'then'
still needs to be made somehow. We address this problem in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3
In this chapter we show how situation-theoretic DRT (STDRT) (Cooper 1993b,
1993c) may be used to make the distinction we require while avoiding the potential
problem with the DRT version discussed above.
We begin by introducing the basic ideas of STDRT and the notation employed.
This includes a brief introduction to situation theory (Barwise and Perry 1983,
Barwise 1989) followed by a discussion of the situation theoretic grammar (STG)
developed in (Cooper 1991). We show how Cooper's STG may be extended to
cover the processing of a range of tense and aspect constructions. This involves
us in a consideration of how best to incorporate temporal information into STG.
We consider how spatial information should be represented and conclude that
'place' should be treated in a similar way to time. We show too how STG may
be extended to process discourse, following Cooper's STDRT and incorporating
ideas from (Johnson and Klein 1986).
Next we build in our account of 'then'. This differs from the DRT account in
the way that we make the distinction between explicit and inferred times. In
the new fragment we make use of the possibility afforded by STDRT of including
information about the utterance in our semantic representations. This allows
us to introduce temporal discourse referents corresponding to both explicit and
inferred times, but to record whether a particular temporal referent was introduced
"directly" by an ETR or "indirectly" by inference. This information is thereby
made available for the processing of 'then'.
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Chapter 4
Here we consider in more detail some observations made in Chapter 2 about the
distribution of sentence-final 'at the time' and 'at the same time' in discourse
sequences. In order to obtain some insight into the behaviour of these temporal
constructions we turn to some related non-temporal sequences involving phrases
like 'the colour' and 'the same colour', such as (1.4a,1.4b-1.4d):
(1.4) a. Emily has a new coat
b. Fiona's scarf is the same colour
c. * Fiona's scarf is the colour
d. Fiona likes the colour
We develop an analysis of 'the X'/'the same X' (where X is a relational noun
such as 'colour') in terms of discourse Roles, which are based on the idea of role
anaphora (Garrod and Sanford 1990). We introduce the notion of generalised Role
(GR), which we suggest has interesting connections to the notion of thematic role
widely used in the literature (see, for example, Dowty 1991). In addition, we show
that the constraints on the use of 'the same X' in examples like:
(1.5) a. Emily watched a film
b. Fiona videoed the same film
are very similar to the constraints on coordination in single-sentence examples
like:
(1.6) Emily watched and Fiona videoed the same film
where thematic roles are involved in both sets of cases.
The GR analysis allows to return to our observations on the distribution of 'at
the time' and 'at the same time' and to explain them. This leads to a proposal
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for the formalisation of the discourse relation often called 'backgrounding' in the
literature, which is widely used but has not in our view been adequately formalised
in previous work.
Chapter 5
In Chapter 5 we address some issues that were given a rather perfunctory tre¬
atment in developing our DRT and STDRT fragments for 'then'. These include
phenomena which, as we said earlier, are generally treated at the "sentence level",
such as aspectual class and aspectual composition.
We begin by looking at how aspectual class distinctions may be expressed in
STDRT. Building on work by Cooper (1985), we show how modelling eventuali¬
ties as situations allows us to express distinctions such as the homogeneous/non-
homogeneous property of eventualities. We show too how Moens' nucleus theory
of event structure and his proposal that aspectual distinctions concern which parts
of the nucleus are described (Moens 1987, Moens and Steedman 1988) may be for¬
mally expressed in our framework. The situation-theoretic notion of constraint
allows us to distinguish clearly between those parts of the nucleus that are directly
described by an utterance and those parts of the nucleus which may be inferred
by the hearer on the basis of constraints. Making this distinction allows us to
clear up some problems regarding Moens' aspectual network by formalising the
notion of "focusing" on a particular part of an event.
We then turn to aspectual composition and begin with a discussion of various
approaches that have been taken in the literature — in particular those of Moens
(1987), Verkuyl (1989) and Krifka (1992). We consider the relative merits of
these accounts and argue in favour of an information-preserving approach that
incorporates Moens' insights about event structure. We show how such an account
may be developed and expressed in our STDRT framework. In this account, the
aspectual class of an eventuality described by a discourse is built up from lexical
information about the verb/relation together with information about the nature
of subject and object NPs and various kinds of temporal adverbials. Once again
situation theoretic constraints prove useful in expressing these interactions.
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Chapter 6




An Analysis of Sentence-Final
'then'
Note: Sections 2.1-2.9 of this chapter are based on a paper which appeared in a
recent issue of Natural Language Semantics (Glasbey 1993c).
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will make some observations concerning the distribution of
sentence-final 'then', and carry out a detailed analysis. This will lead us to the
conclusion that it is necessary to distinguish between two uses of sentence-final
'then', these being:
1. As a temporal anaphor referring back to a previously established explicit
temporal referent (ETR).
2. As a means of expressing relations between states/events, where no ETR is
required.
A way of making this distinction in Discourse Representation Theory (DRT)
(Kamp and Reyle 1993) is proposed. This involves restricting the introduction
of temporal referents into the universe of discourse to cases where certain types
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of temporal adverbials are present. In other cases, event or state referents but
not temporal referents may be introduced. This contrasts with previous DRT
accounts of temporal phenomena, which employ no such distinction.
We will formalize our account by developing a fragment which extends Kamp and
Reyle's DRT treatment of temporal reference so as to incorporate our analysis.
2.2 Some Observations About 'then'
We begin by observing that it is possible to follow sentence (2.1a) with (2.1b):
(2.1) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon then
where the sequence (2.la,2.lb) is interpreted as conveying that both Daniel and
Gareth climbed their respective mountains at some time in the July in question.
This meaning is distinct from the interpretation favoured by placing 'then' at the
beginning of the sentence, as in (2.1c):
(2.1) c. Then Gareth climbed Snowdon
The only interpretation of the sequence (2.la,2.1c) seems to be that Gareth's
climb took place after Daniel's climb.
We seem to have a clear distinction here between what we might provisionally
call a cotemporal use of 'then', (2.la,2.lb), which could perhaps be paraphrased
'at that time', and an update use of 'then', (2.la,2.1c), paraphrased roughly by
'next' or 'afterwards'. The generalisation we are making at this point applies to
simple past accomplishments only. We will extend our analysis to the other
Vendler classes in Section 2.5.1
xIt is important to note that our claim does not necessarily hold in cases where we can get a
non-narrative interpretation for consecutive events (e.g., where the events occur as a temporally
unordered list) or where both sentences describe the same event. Such cases are dealt with in a
later section.
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In these examples there appears to be a syntactic correlation between the meaning
of 'then' and the position of 'then' in the sentence. Sentence-initial 'then' is
updating; sentence-final 'then' is cotemporal. However, it may also be possible
(for some speakers at least) to get an update reading for sentence-final 'then',
perhaps especially if 'in July' is removed from (2.1a), giving:
(2.2) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon then
Sequence (2.2a,2.2b) illustrates first of all that the syntactic correlation is not
watertight - but it also brings out a point of greater interest: The cotemporal
reading does not appear to be available at all for (2.2a,2.2b). There seems to be
no way we can interpret this sequence to mean that Gareth's climb took place
cotemporally (or even approximately cotemporally — overlapping, perhaps) with
Daniel's climb. For some speakers, (2.2a,2.2b) simply sounds unacceptable; for
others, the update reading is available but the sentence is judged to be stylistically
poor (it would be much better with sentence-initial 'then').2
Note that if we replace 'then' by 'at that time' we get a similar result:
(2.1) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
d. Gareth climbed Snowdon at that time
(2.la,2.Id) forms an acceptable sequence, whereas (2.2a,2.2c):
(2.2) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
c. Gareth climbed Snowdon at that time
2A third position for 'then' is available — as in 'Gareth then climbed Snowdon'. We have
chosen to leave aside pre-verbal 'then'. In many cases it appears to be a rather literary or formal
version of sentence-initial 'then'. Perhaps it conveys rather more in the way of contingency or
consequence than sentence-initial 'then'. However we do not consider it further here.
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does not sound completely acceptable. Replacing 'at that time' with 'at the time'
does not yield an acceptable sequence in either case, as shown by (2.1a,2.1e) and
(2.2a,2.2d):
(2.1) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
e. Gareth climbed Snowdon at the time
(2.2) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
d. Gareth climbed Snowdon at the time
Let us consider first why (2.la,2.lb) and (2.la,2.Id) are acceptable, while (2.2a,2.2b)
and (2.2a,2.2c) are not. The difference is that (2.1a) makes mention of a particular
"time" — it contains what we will call an explicit temporal referent (ETR).
Sentence (2.2a) contains no such temporal referent. In (2.1a) the ETR is a tem¬
poral 'frame' adverbial. Note that other types of temporal adverbials can also
work in this way (e.g., an 'at'-adverbial if the sentence describes an instantaneous
event), but that certain types of temporal adverbials do not work as ETRs; e.g.,
completive 'in'-adverbials or 'for'-adverbials. Thus:
(2.3) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis (in four hours / for four hours)
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon then
is not acceptable.
The behaviour of 'then' in (2.1b) and (2.2b) might be described as anaphoric
with respect to time. Its use seems to refer back to some previously introduced
temporal referent. On encountering 'then', we look for such a referent, and find it
in (2.1a) ('in July') but not in (2.2a) — hence the unacceptability of (2.2a,2.2b).
In other words, the sequence (2.2a,2.2b) sounds odd unless we already have a
particular time in mind — one that was established earlier in the discourse or is
somehow present in the context (e.g., suppose that the month of July was somehow
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highly focused in the preceding discourse). Thus, it appears that mention of an
event in (2.2a) does not automatically make available the time of that event for
future anaphoric reference. Perhaps we can reason our way to an interpretation
of (2.2a,2.2b), but the process seems to be a laboured one, and we are left with
the feeling that the speaker has not been cooperative in the Gricean sense. One
can imagine the hearer's response to (2.2a,2.2b) being "When?".
2.3 The Distinction Between Events and Times
An intuitively appealing way of expressing these observations is to make a distin¬
ction between events and times. This would involve saying that (2.1a) makes
reference to both an event and a time. The time can be referred to anaphorically
by 'then' in (2.1b). However, (2.2a) introduces an event but not a time, and this
makes 'then' inappropriate.
The problem with this is that we have not defined what we mean by an event and
a time. We need at least an informal definition of this distinction if our account
of 'then' is to be explanatory. One way we might do this is as follows:
Informal definition:
An event is associated uniquely with a corresponding predicate or
relation, one or more participants, and a time.3 A time, on the other
hand, is an instant or interval on some scale of measurement often
referred to as the timeline. We do not think of times as being uniquely
associated with participants and relations.
Although the above characterisation is an informal one, it goes some way towards
identifying the concepts we have in mind when we use the terms 'event' and 'time'.
The distinction referred to above needs to be made in whatever semantic frame¬
work we choose to operate. First, however, we need to be clear as to what extent,
if at all, the distinction has been made in previous work.
Montague (1973) represents time "instants" using the temporal index't', and does
3We will be more precise later about exactly how events relate to times.
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not consider events as such. Montague (1974)) discusses how to treat events and
proposes that they be regarded as properties of times. Thus events are not given
the status of basic entities in his theory, and the distinction between events and
times in the sense we are using it does not apply there.
In the neo-Davidsonian approach adopted in (Parsons 1990), events are taken as
primitives of the theory, and verbs are considered to stand for "kinds of events".
E.g., use of the verb 'hit' means that the event described is a "hitting" event.
Time is regarded as a property of events — e.g., the expression cul(e,t) means
that the event e culminates at time t. In his treatment of tense and temporal
reference, Parsons expresses temporal relations between times but not between
events, thus making a clear distinction between the two. However, he does not
cover temporal anaphora, so the distinction is not made for the reasons we give.
In early work on temporal reference in DRT, Partee (1984) and Hinrichs (1986)
both use event entities rather than temporal entities in order to express tem¬
poral relations. Partee does not appear to consider this choice particularly signifi¬
cant. She explains how the two may be regarded as in some sense interchangeable
(Partee 1984, p.255), employing Kamp's proposal that times may be "reconstruc¬
ted" from events in the manner described in (Kamp 1979).
In more recent work on temporal reference in DRT, both temporal entities and
event entities have been used. For example, Ogihara (1990) employs a system of
three "reference times" to express the temporal relations corresponding to various
English tenses. These reference times are temporal entities in the universe of dis¬
course, and Ogihara expresses temporal relations between them and event entities.
However, there are no temporal adverbials and no direct reference to "times" in
his fragment. Thus, although there are "times" in the discourse representation
structure (DRS), there is no notion of these times being referred to. Hence, Ogi¬
hara does not make the distinction between event entities and temporal entities
for the reasons we have argued, and the distinction does not seem to have any
particular significance in his approach. In later work, Ogihara (1991) extends his
fragment to include temporal adverbials. He continues to introduce both event
entities and temporal entities into the DRS, again without apparently attaching
any significance to this distinction.
Eberle and Kasper (1991), in their analysis of tense and aspect in English and
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French, also employ both events and times in the DRS, without comment on the
distinction.
Ivamp and Reyle similarly use both events and times in their treatment of tem¬
poral reference in DRT (Kamp and Reyle 1993) without attaching any theoretical
significance to the distinction. In Section 2.10 we present our modification of
Kamp and Reyle's temporal fragment, which incorporates our analysis of 'then'.
Work by Lascarides and Asher (1991) on temporal reference in a DRT frame¬
work also uses both event entities and temporal entities, but not in a way that
corresponds with our observations on 'then'.
So we see that, although recent DRT treatments of temporal reference have em¬
ployed both event entities and temporal entities (in contrast to earlier DRT treat¬
ments where only event entities were used), it appears that no principled distinc¬
tion is being made between them — or, at least, no authors are explicit about their
reasons for making the distinction. In contrast, our analysis of 'then' suggests that
there is a principled reason for making the distinction between events and times.
In particular, it justifies restricting the conditions under which temporal entities
can be introduced into the universe of discourse.
An interesting question raised by this discussion is that of whether all these aut¬
hors are referring to the same thing when they talk about events on the one hand
and times on the other. This question is very difficult to answer. One way to ad¬
dress it is to examine what use they make of what they call 'event referents' and
'time referents'. Some differences can be identified here, as discussed above. Thus
it seems that they are not using the terms in exactly the same way. However, this
does not weaken our claim that none of these authors make a distinction among
discourse referents between those that can be referred to anaphorically by 'then'
and those that can't. This is our main point, irrespective of whether or not they
are all using the terms in exactly the same way.
One way of expressing our observations about 'then' would be to say that sen¬
tence (la) establishes a temporal entity in the current discourse representation
structure (DRS), which is subsequently available for anaphoric reference by 'then'.
Such a temporal entity might be regarded as being in some ways equivalent to
the other types of discourse entities used in DRT to model pronominal anaphora.
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We would expect, for example, an event entity to be established by (2.4a). This
is shown by the acceptability of (2.4a,2.4b).
(2.4) a. Gareth climbed Ben Nevis
b. It surprised all his friends
'It' in (2.4b) presumably refers to the event of climbing Ben Nevis. Thus, (2.4a)
makes available an event entity but not a temporal entity for future anaphoric
reference. If it were possible for temporal entities to be constructed from event
entities in the way that Partee (1984), following Kamp (1979), suggests, then
surely we could construct a temporal entity from the event entity, and have no
trouble in getting a cotemporal reading for (2.2a,2.2b).
So it becomes clear that a distinction must be made between temporal entities
and event entities, and we will need to decide what conditions license the esta¬
blishment of the former. The evidence that we have considered so far suggests
that an explicit temporal referent, in the form of a temporal frame adverbial
or an 'at'-adverbial, is required in order to establish a temporal referent. We
will shortly examine this suggestion more thoroughly, in particular by considering
Vendler classes other than accomplishments. Before doing so, we will look at some
interesting parallels between the temporal entity / event entity distinction and the
difference between individual anaphora and role anaphora.
2.4 Parallels with Role Anaphora and Indivi¬
dual Anaphora
Although the temporal entity / event entity distinction seems a reasonably in¬
tuitive one to make, it is important to explore what it means for events to have
temporal relations expressed between them. We will shortly see what the notions
of individual anaphora and role anaphora can offer us in this respect.
Note first that (2.2a,2.2b) and (2.2a,2.2c) sound unacceptable in a way that is
very similar to the unacceptability of (2.5a,2.5b).
18
(2.5) a. Emily has a new coat
b. Fiona's coat is that colour
The sequence (2.5a,2.5b) sounds odd unless we already have a particular colour
in mind — one that was either established earlier in the discourse or is somehow
present in the context (visible to both speaker and hearer, say). Thus, it appears
that mention of an object (a coat) in (2.5a) does not automatically make available
the colour attribute of the coat for future anaphoric reference. Just as in the case
of the temporal example (2.2a,2.2b), it seems possible for us to reason our way to
an interpretation of (2.5a,2.5b), but the process is difficult, and we are again left
with the feeling that the speaker has not been cooperative. The hearer's response
to (2.5a,2.5b) might well be "What colour?" just as her response to (2.2a,2.2b)
was "When?" We see a clear parallel here with the temporal examples discussed
in the previous section.
Observe that it is possible to follow (2.5a) with (2.5c):
(2.5) c. The colour is blue
and that (2.5a,2.5c) may be followed by (2.5b). We can explain this in terms of
the distinction between individual anaphora and role anaphora discussed in the
psycholinguistics and AI literature. See (Garrod and Sanford 1990) for discussion.
Individual anaphora involves explicitly mentioned entities which are subsequently
available for anaphoric reference by pronouns. Role anaphora involves entities
which are not explicitly mentioned but can nevertheless be referred to (using a
definite noun phrase) by the succeeding discourse.
An example of individual anaphora is in the sequence:
(2.6) a. John bought a new car
b. It is a BMW
where the pronoun 'it' co-refers with the NP 'a new car'. An example of role
anaphora given by Garrod and Sanford is:
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(2.7) a. John drove to London
b. The car broke down on the motorway
where 'the car' clearly refers to the car that John drove to London, although a
car is not explicitly mentioned in the first sentence. What appears to happen is
that mentioning a 'drive' makes available a role 'the car' associated with the verb
'drive'. It is not possible to follow (2.7a) directly with:
(2.7) c. It is a BMW
but once the role has been explicitly focused by referring to 'the car' in (2.7b),
the role attains the status of an individual and can subsequently be referred to
by the pronoun 'it'.4 Thus, on this account, (2.5a,2.5c) is acceptable because the
definite NP 'the colour' in (2.5c) is picking out the "colour" role of the coat.
Let us consider how this analysis could be applied to the temporal entity / event
entity distinction we drew above. We could say that the explicit mention of a
"time" (e.g., by a temporal frame adverbial or an 'at'-adverbial) creates a time
individual. Suppose we regard this as corresponding to a DRT temporal referent.
Such an entity/referent appears to be available for subsequent reference by 'then',
just as nominal referents are available for pronominal anaphora.
By contrast, mentioning an "event" (with no explicit reference to its time) makes
available a time role associated with that event. We would expect to be able to
refer to this time role using a definite NP, as in the non-temporal examples. For
instance, we can say:
(2.8) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. The month was July
4It is interesting to note that from (2.7a) we cannot infer that the particular role 'car' is
available. For example John could have driven a bus. It seems that all we can infer from (2.7a)
is the involvement of some "vehicle". This is in contrast to (2.5a), from which we can infer
that a 'colour' role is present — because a material object must have a colour. However this
distinction does not seem to affect the way in which we can refer to these roles.
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and we can follow (2.8a,2.8b) with:
(2.8) c. Gareth climbed Snowdon then
whereas we have already seen that (2.8a) cannot be followed directly by (2.8c).
What seems to be happening here is that 'the month' in (2.8b) is picking out a
time role, thereby giving it the status of a time individual, so that it can henceforth
be referred to by 'then'.
We can construct a similar example where 'the time' seems to pick out the time
role associated with an event, as in:
(2.9) a. Daniel reached the summit
b. The time was 5pm
We might expect the phrase 'at the time' to behave in a similar manner. It may
thus be surprising to note that the sequence:
(2.10) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon at the time
is not acceptable. 'At the time' shows the same behaviour as 'then' in this respect.5
Why is it not possible to use 'at the time' in (2.10b) to refer to the time role
associated with the event in (2.10a)? We will offer an explanation for this after
broadening the scope of our analysis of 'then' beyond accomplishments to the
other aspectual classes.
5The reader may have noticed that 'at the same time' behaves differently from 'at the time'.
This is considered further in Section 2.6. For a detailed analysis of 'at the time' and 'at the
same time' see Chapter 4.
21
2.5 Extending the Analysis of 'then' to the Other
Aspectual Classes
In Sections 2.1-2.3 we drew a distinction between the cotemporal use of 'then',
which requires a previously-established explicit temporal referent, and the update
use of 'then' which does not. We saw that sentence-initial 'then' normally (or
perhaps always) has the update function, whereas sentence-final 'then' is often
(but not always) cotemporal. Our analysis up to this point has been restricted to
accomplishment sentences.
Now we turn our attention to a range of examples involving statives.6 Some of
the following observations about sentence-final 'then' with statives have also been
reported recently in (Spejewski and Carlson 1993) and (Schiffrin 1992). We will
discuss these accounts and how they relate to the work reported here in Section
2.8.
First, consider the following:
(2.11) a. Gareth climbed Everest
b. He was happy then, battling against the elements
The above sequence is perfectly acceptable, and the latter part of (2.11b) makes it
clear that Gareth's happy state can be interpreted as cotemporal with the climbing
event.7
So here we have an example of cotemporal 'then' which does not need an ETR.
Why should this be possible in (2.11a,2.lib) but not, as we saw earlier, in (2.2a,2.2b)?
The obvious difference between (2.11b) and (2.2b) is that (2.11b) is a state whereas
6Note that we use the terminology of (Vendler 1967) in the following discussion.
7We do not necessarily have to interpret 'then' cotemporally in this type of example. It is
possible to follow (2.11a) with (2.11c), for example.
(2.11) c. He was happy then, having achieved a lifelong ambition
where the latter part of (2.11c) forces the update reading. However our point is simply that the
cotemporal reading is possible in (2.11a,2.lib), whereas it is not in (2.2a,2.2b).
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(2.2b) is an accomplishment. Many examples like (2.11a,2.11b) can be construc¬
ted, where the 'then'-sentence contains a state and cotemporal 'then' is possible
with no ETR. E.g.:
(2.12) a. John lived in London
b. He was unhappy then
and:
(2.13) a. John taught Fred to swim
b. Fred was a boy then
In the latter sequence it is clear that the temporal relation being expressed is one
of temporal inclusion (of the event in (2.13a) by the state in (2.13b)) rather than
one of cotemporality. The state acts in some way as a background for the event.
Because of this, it is perhaps better to refer to 'cotemporal/background 'then' '
rather than 'cotemporal 'then' '.
The notion of a state acting as 'background' to an event is one that we will develop
further as this chapter proceeds. In Chapter 4, we will give a formal definition of
the discourse relation backgrounding. Here, we will start by identifying back¬
grounding with temporal inclusion.
Informal Definition:
We will say that an eventuality ei 'acts as background to' or 'backgro¬
unds' an eventuality e2 if e\ temporally includes e2 and if e\ is stative
and e\ is non-stative. This latter requirement is in order to distin¬
guish 'background' from 'elaboration' (see below), which also involves
temporal inclusion.
We will say much more about backgrounding, events and states in Chapter 4.
We need to ask why it is that states behave differently from events in this respect.
A line of investigation that suggests itself is to look at some Vendler activities
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(known in the accounts of several others as 'processes' — the term we will use
from now on), which can be thought of as intermediate between states and ac¬
complishments.
Consider:
(2.14) a. Daniel played football
b. Owen swam in the pool then
We judge sequence (2.14a,2.14b) to hover on the verge of acceptability. Notice
how much better (2.14a,2.14c) sounds:
(2.14) c. Owen was swimming in the pool then
Presumably this is because (2.14c) is a progressive — a construction regarded by
many as stative (see Carlson 1977, Vlach 1981 and Moens 1987, for example).
We suggest that (2.14a,2.14b) sounds acceptable to the extent that we can regard
(2.14b) as describing a state rather than an event — and can thus see the state
as a background to the event. So we see that processes appear to lie somewhere
between states and accomplishments as regards 'then'. States allow cotempo-
ral/background 'then' with no ETR; accomplishments do not. Processes occupy
some middle ground between the two.
One distinction between states and events which may be relevant here involves
the notion of "temporal updating" (by which we mean the forward movement of
narrative time which is often induced by sequences of telic events). Let us consider
how the different Vendler classes behave as far as updating is concerned.
Hinrichs (1986) made the following claims about sequences of sentences in the
simple past tense:
1. If both sentences are accomplishments/achievements we get updating.
2. If either sentence is a process or a state the sequence can be either updating
or temporally overlapping.
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3. If both sentences are processes/states, the sequence is temporally overlap¬
ping.
It is not difficult to think of exceptions to Hinrichs' proposed "updating" rule for
accomplishment/achievement sequences. A sequence of two telic events need not
be interpreted as updating if, for example, the second event can be seen as some
kind of elaboration of the first. However, (1) might still be seen as a "default" rule
which applies in the absence of world knowledge mitigating against the update.8
Possible interpretations for an event-event sequence include:
• A list of events, in which nothing is conveyed about the temporal order of
those events.
• A sequence of events occurring in the order of presentation.
• A single event, with subsequent "elaborations" of it, which may provide
further information about the event as a whole, or may pick out a single
part of it.
Any of these interpretations may be ruled out by world knowledge.
Although Hinrichs' first statement is not true without exception, his second sta¬
tement, which says that if either sentence is a process or a state then the sequence
can be either updating or temporally overlapping, appears correct. It simply al¬
lows the possibility of a non-update reading if one of the sentences is not a telic
event.
Here we have a potential explanation for cotemporal/backgrounding 'then' being
acceptable without an ETR for a stative 'then' sentence but not for a non-stative
one. Let us look for a moment at the possible interpretations of the sequences
with 'then' removed. If the second sentence is a state, we need not update — thus
we can read:
8Recent work by Caenepeel and Moens (1994) suggests that the notion of temporal updating
for event-event sequences should be restricted to a particular type of context, namely "narra¬
tive context". This excludes non-narrative intepretations such as temporally unordered lists,
elaborations of the same event, etc.
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(2.15) a. John lived in London
b. He was unhappy
as non-updating. Correspondingly, the sequence (2.15a,2.15c):
(2.15) c. He was unhappy then
is acceptable, and 'then' gets its cotemporal/background meaning. Similarly the
sequence:
(2.16) a. Gareth climbed Everest
b. He was happy
is not necessarily updating — and (2.16a,2.16c):
(2.16) c. He was happy then
is acceptable for cotemporal/background 'then'. However the telic event se¬
quence:
(2.17) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon
may allow, we have said, a "list" reading, an "update" reading or an "elaboration"
reading. It seems that we may eliminate the elaboration reading because world
knowledge makes it very unlikely. This leaves us with the list and the update
readings for the sequence. The important point is that a background/cotemporal
interpretation is not available.
Now suppose we add 'then' to (2.17b), to give:
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(2.17) c. Gareth climbed Snowdon then
The presence of 'then' seems to rule out the "unordered list" interpretation, be¬
cause by introducing 'then' we are making some claim about the times of the
events. This leaves us with only the update interpretation. We suggest that it is
the absence of a background/cotemporal interpretation which precludes the inter¬
pretation of 'then' as referring to the time of the event in (2.17a). The availability
of a background/cotemporal interpretation of the sequence is the crucial criterion
for the possibility of 'then' referring to the time of the event in the first sentence.
The background/cotemporal criterion also accounts for the borderline cases in¬
volving processes. Processes can be interpreted as updating or not, depending on
contextual factors.
E.g.:
(2.18) a. Daniel played football
b. Owen swam in the pool
Here, the swimming event could be regarded as occurring after the playing event,
or as cotemporal (or temporally overlapping) with it — or the times could be
irrelevant. The possibility of (just about) being able to interpret the sequence as
a background/cotemporal one explains why:
(2.18) a. Daniel played football
c. Owen swam in the pool then
is (just about) acceptable. Now let us consider an example with achievements:
(2.19) a. Daniel reached the summit of Ben Nevis
b. Gareth reached the summit of Snowdon then
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The sequence (2.19a,2.19b) is unacceptable in what seems to be the same way
as the sequence (2.2a,2.2b) involving accomplishments. This is what we would
expect, given that achievement-achievement sequences give rise to temporal up¬
dating in narrative discourse. Consider, however, the sequence (2.19a,2.19c):
(2.19) c. He achieved his ambition then
This sequence is acceptable. Why should this be, and what makes the diffe¬
rence between (2.19a,2.19b) and (2.19a,2.19c)? What distinguishes the sequences
(2.19a,2.19b) and (2.19a,2.19c) is that (2.19a,2.19b) must be read as involving two
separate events, whereas (2.19a,2.19c) can be read as two descriptions of the
same event.9
But of course this ties in with the update/non-update distinction. If we read
(2.19c) as referring to the same event as (2.19a), then there is no updating —
(2.19c) is simply an elaboration of (2.19a). The fact that there is no updating
explains in turn the possibility of 'then' referring to the time of the event in (2.19a).
Cotemporal 'then' is acceptable because a non-update reading is available. It is
also interesting to note that if we say:
(2.20) a. Daniel reached the summit of Ben Nevis on Saturday
b. He achieved his ambition then
we interpret 'then' as referring to the event time in (2.20a), rather than to the
ETR 'on Saturday'. Similarly, in the sequence:
(2.21) a. Emily went to the zoo last week
b. She saw some flamingoes then
the natural interpretation is one in which we see 'then' as referring to the time of
the event in (2.21a), not to 'last week'. Compare this with (2.21a,2.21c):
9We are using the term 'event' in an intuitive and non-technical sense here.
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(2.21) c. Gareth climbed Snowdon then
where we interpret 'then' as referring to the ETR 'last week'. It seems clear
that the different interpretations relate to our world knowledge about the possible
connections between events. We readily see the event in (2.20b) as being a part
of the event in (2.20a) (i.e., as an elaboration of (2.20a)). Similarly, we readily
see (2.21b) as an elaboration of (2.21a). However, it is next to impossible to see
(2.21c) as an elaboration of (2.21a). Note too that the sequence:
(2.22) a. Emily went to the zoo
b. She saw some flamingoes then
is (at least marginally) acceptable, even though there is no ETR. Although the
degree of acceptability of (2.22a,2.22b) may be disputed, it is undoubtedly more
acceptable than (2.2a,2.2b).
It appears, then, that we must view elaborative sequences as some kind of special
case. We can account for the (near) acceptability of (2.22a,2.22b) using a similar
explanation to the one we gave for (2.19a,2.19c).10 We readily perceive the event
in (2.22b) as a sub-event of the event in (2.22a).11 So no temporal updating takes
place between (2.22a) and (2.22b), and it is therefore possible to interpret 'then'
in (2.22b) as referring to the time of the event in (2.22a).
The fact that 'then' in (2.22b) refers to the time of the event in (2.22a) explains
why (2.21a,2.21b) has a reading where 'then' refers not to the ETR 'last week'
but to the time of the event in (2.21a). However, this does not explain why the
ETR reading for (2.21a,2.21b) is not readily available. But perhaps we can rely
on world knowledge and context to do this for us. Indeed, it is easy to construct
parallel examples where the ETR reading clearly is available. For instance:
10Although we have not explained why (2.22a,2.22b) is, at least for some speakers, only
marginally acceptable.
11 It is interesting to consider why this is so, although we will not investigate the matter further
here. Of course world knowledge is involved, and will influence which events can readily be seen
as forming parts of other events. Discourse context and background information will have an
effect here, too. It seems probable that we get other clues from the form of the discourse,
including factors like the repetition of pronouns (as in (2.22a,2.22b)).
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(2.23) a. John went to France last month
b. Mary crashed her car then
In (2.23a,2.23b), both the ETR and the non-ETR readings can be obtained, with
context presumably favouring one or the other. For example, if the hearer knew
that Mary was on holiday with John in France, this knowledge might well favour
the non-ETR reading. On the other hand, if there were no known connection
between the two events, the ETR reading would become easier to obtain.
So we see that, in principle, both readings are available in this type of example.
This leads us to posit an ambiguity in the interpretation of sentence-final 'then'
in cases where both the ETR and the non-ETR readings are available.
Let us summarise our observations so far. We have identified a three-way distin¬
ction in uses of 'then'.
1. The use in which 'then' is anaphoric to a previously established explicit
temporal referent.
2. The update use.
3. The cotemporal/background use.
(1) occurs where an explicit temporal referent, established earlier in the discourse,
is available. Temporal frame adverbials and 'at'-adverbials may both establish
such a referent.
(2) occurs in cases where, if 'then' were removed from the second sentence, the
sequence would be interpreted as non-backgrounding. The update reading is often
difficult or impossible to get for sentence-final 'then', which predisposes the cotem¬
poral/background reading. Thus, sequences which cannot be interpreted as back-
ground/cotemporal (or elaborative — see (3) below) sound odd with sentence-final
'then', unless the presence of an explicit temporal referent makes interpretation
(1) possible.
(3) occurs in cases where, if 'then' were removed from the second sentence, the
sequence would be interpreted as non-updating (e.g., the second sentence has a
background or elaborative role with respect to the first).
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Let us group (2) and (3) together and refer to their union as the use of 'then'
which is responsible for expressing temporal relations between eventualities.12
Such temporal relations can involve cotemporality, precedence, temporal overlap
and so on.
By contrast, we could refer to (1) as the use of 'then' as a temporal anaphor.
This gives us a two-way distinction, between:
1. The use of 'then' as a temporal anaphor referring back to a previously
established ETR.
2. The use of 'then' as a means of expressing temporal relations between
eventualities.
Having clarified this distinction, we are in a position to return to our discussion of
role anaphora in Section 2.4. We show below how we can now explain why 'then'
and 'at the time' cannot always refer to time roles in the way we might expect.
Our explanation will employ a relation between events and states which we call
the PART-OF relation, to be explained shortly.
2.6 Role Anaphora and the PART-OF Relation
Suppose we have an updating sequence such as:
(2.24) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon
We have seen that adding sentence-final 'then' to (2.24b) to give the sequence
(2.24a,2.24c) is not acceptable.
(2.24) c. Gareth climbed Snowdon then
12We use this term to cover 'events' and 'states', as in (Bach 1986).
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This was explained in terms of sentence-final 'then' (with no ETR present) giving
the background/cotemporal reading, which "clashes" with the updating nature of
the sequence of events. By contrast, the sequence (2.24a,2.24d):
(2.24) d. Gareth was climbing Snowdon then
is acceptable because of the non-updating nature of the sequence:
(2.24) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
e. Gareth was climbing Snowdon
We discussed in Section 2.4 the parallel between this use of 'then' (expressing
temporal relations between events) and role anaphora. In order to pick out a
role in role anaphora, a definite NP is used. Thus, we might expect 'at the time'
to pick out a time role. However, we noted that:
(2.24) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
f. Gareth climbed Snowdon at the time
is unacceptable, as is (2.24a,2.24c), whereas (2.24a,2.24g):
(2.24) g. Gareth was climbing Snowdon at the time
is acceptable, as is (2.24a,2.24d). Thus 'then' and 'at the time' behave identically
in this respect.13 But why is their ability to pick out time roles restricted in this
way?
From now on, we will adopt the abbreviations 'SI-'then' ' for sentence-initial
'then', and 'SF-'then' ' for sentence-final 'then'. Also, we ignore from this point
13We also noted in Section 2.2 that the behaviour of 'at that time' is similar to that of 'at
the time'. This observation seems to merit further study, but we do not consider 'at that time'
further here.
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in the discussion the ETR use of SF-'then', so that when we speak of SF-'then'
as acceptable or otherwise, we refer to its non-ETR use only. Finally, let us refer
to the non-ETR use of 'then' as the PART-OF use.
We have already seen that if the eventuality described by the second sentence has
a background or elaborative function (i.e., it is non-updating) with respect to
that described by the first sentence, 'at the time' and SF-'then' are both accepta¬
ble. If, on the other hand, the second sentence is updating with respect to the
first, 'at the time' and SF-'then' are not acceptable.
What makes the difference between updating and non-updating sequences? We
saw earlier that what is going on involves the hearer being able to infer a time
role from the mention of an eventuality. In some cases, 'then' or 'at the time' may
be used to pick out the time role, and in some cases this is not possible.
We propose that the difference between what we have been calling updating
and non-updating sequences is in fact a more fundamental distinction, involving
whether or not one eventuality can be seen as part of another eventuality. In
this chapter, we will simply introduce an intuitive relation PART-OF which is
not made formally precise but which is intended to cover (at least) the notions of
backgrounding and elaboration. In Chapter 3, when we develop a situation
theoretic fragment, we will make the PART-OF relation precise by identifying it
with situation theoretic PART-OF (<), which holds between situations and is
defined in terms of infon support.
Now consider again a sequence of two sentences, each of which describes an even¬
tuality. We propose that if the second sentence is in a background or elaboration
relation to the first, the eventuality described by the second sentence is PART-OF
the eventuality described by the first. Thus in (2.25a,2.25b):
(2.25) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. He was happy
the state S2 described by (2.25b) is PART-OF the event ei described by (2.25a).
Similarly, for an elaborative sequence:
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(2.26) a. Daniel went to the zoo
b. He photographed some penguins
we can say:
e2 PART-OF ex
where ej is the event described by (2.26a) and e2 is the event described by (2.26b).
Now consider a sequence where the relation between the sentences is neither back¬
ground nor elaboration.
(2.25) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis (ei)
c. Gareth climbed Snowdon (e2)
Here we would want to say that
-i(e2 PART-OF ei)
That is, e2 is described as a separate event from ei.14
To make our proposal clearer and show how it could be incorporated into a DRT
analysis, we will now present DRSs corresponding to the three sequences discussed
above. Using Kamp and Reyle's notation for DRSs, we can draw the DRS for
(2.25a,2.25b) as:
ei s2 u v
Daniel(u)
Ben Nevis(v)
ei: u climb v
happy(u)S2:
s2 PART-OF ei
14Of course, that is not to say that if (2.25a,2.25c) were embedded in some larger piece of
discourse, ei and e2 could not be seen as both being part of some bigger situation/event.
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Note that we do not allow either sentence to introduce a temporal discourse
referent. This is because neither sentence contains a temporal adverbial, and
we argued earlier that temporal referents may only be introduced by a temporal
adverbial of appropriate type.
It should be noted, too, that when we analyse 'at the time' in Chapter 4 we will
develop a refined definition of backgrounding, where the backgrounding eventu¬
ality does not correspond to a new situation (in the situation-theoretic sense —
see Chapter 3), but instead adds more information to the situation described by
the previous sentence. This is different from our account here, where we treat
backgrounding as an instance of the PART-OF relation. At this point, we have
no way of getting to the Chapter 4 conclusion, firstly because this is based on the
analysis of 'at the time', and secondly because we have not yet introduced a formal
notion of situation. Our conclusions here about backgrounding should therefore
be seen as provisional. The findings of Chapter 4 will not overturn the general
conclusion that what we have called PART-OF 'then' conveys either an elabora¬
tion or a background relation. All that will change is our way of characterising
the background relation.
It will be observed that we have not directly expressed any temporal relation
between ex and S2. Information about temporal relations is seen as only implicitly
present. It is possible for the hearer to infer various pieces of information from
the information in the DRS above. She may infer that there is a time role tx
associated with ex, and a time role t2 associated with s2. In addition, she may infer
information about the temporal relation between tx and t2. But the important
point is that such information is not directly expressed by the utterance, and
should not, for reasons argued earlier, go into the DRS. Thus, we are advocating
making a clear distinction between information directly conveyed by a statement
(described information, in situation theoretic terms), and information inferred
by the hearer (carried or inferred information, in situation theoretic terms).
We will be making use of the distinction between described and inferred infor¬
mation a great deal in what follows. At this stage, a useful way to envisage the
distinction is to see described information as information that cnnot be overrid¬
den or cancelled by a later statement without the speaker making it clear that
she is "going back on" what was previously said. Inferred information, on the
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other hand, can be seen as information derived by the hearer in addition to the
information that was explicitly given by the statement. Such inferences, can, at
least in principle, be cancelled by a later statement. We will see in Chapter 5
how such inferences can be made by means of channels and constraints, using the
channel theoretic notions of (Barwise and Seligman in press).
It is interesting to note that this analysis also covers the reading of (2.25a,2.25b)
where Daniel becomes happy after climbing Ben Nevis — that is, his happiness is
a result of his climb. But notice that this is just another way that the state can be
seen as part of the total or compound event. In other words, (2.25a,2.25b) on this
reading describe a compound event ei, of which s2 is a part. The compound event
comprises the climb and what we might call, in the terminology of Moens and
Steedman (1988), its consequent state. This concurs with Moens and Steedman's
proposed nucleus structure for events, where an event consists of a preparatory
process, a culmination and a consequent state. And because our DRS says nothing
about temporal relations, but merely allows us to infer them, this DRS covers both
readings of (2.25a,2.25b). Information about whether s2 follows ei or overlaps with
it is merely inferred information. Which of the alternative inferences the hearer
makes will depend on context and world knowledge.
For (2.26a,2.26b) we require the DRS:
ei e2 u v w
Daniel(u)
zoo(v)
ep u go-to V
penguins(w
e2: u photograph w
e2 PART-OF ei
(No attempt is made here to deal with the semantics of the quantifier 'some', the
plural 'penguins', the determiner 'the', the preposition 'to' or the past tense, none
of which are relevant to our present purposes.)
Finally, for (2.25a,2.25c) we require:
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ei e2 u v w x
Daniel(u)
Ben Nevis(v)
ex: u climb v
Gareth(w)
Snowdon(x)
e2: w climb x
i(e2 PART-OF ei)
Here, the PART-OF relation is explicitly stated not to hold between ex and e2.
We will see the motivation for this shortly, when we turn to 'then', 'at the time'
and 'at the same time'.
How does this help us with 'then'? Suppose we restrict the (non-ETR) use of
SF-'then' to cases where the second eventuality can be seen as part of the first.
This would explain why we can add 'then' to (2.25b) in (2.25a,2.25b) and to
(2.26b) in (2.26a,2.26b), but not to (2.25c) in (2.25a,2.25c). We could restrict
the distribution of 'at the time', which we noted appears to behave similarly to
(non-ETR) 'then', in exactly the same way.15
In other words, we are claiming that (non-ETR) SF-'then' expresses a discourse
relation between two eventualities, namely that the second eventuality is a part
of the first. But the nature of the sequence must make the PART-OF relation
possible. It appears to be possible if the second eventuality can be seen as being
in a background relation or an elaboration relation to the first. The former is
made possible, it appears, if the second eventuality is a state (or a progressive,
which as we have already noted has often been characterised in the literature as a
state). The elaboration relation requires supportive context or world knowledge.
We can also explain the distribution of 'at the same time' this way. We remarked
earlier that this expression behaves differently from 'then'. Note that:
(2.25) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
15Except that, for some reason, 'at the time' appears not to be completely acceptable after
(2.26b). In general, we note that 'at the time' appears not to be felicitous after an elaborative
sequence. We will discuss this further below and in Chapter 4.
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can be followed by:
(2.25) d. Gareth climbed Snowdon at the same time
That is, 'at the same time' is acceptable in a sequence where 'then' (and 'at the
time') are not. Note also that:
(2.25) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
e. Gareth was a boy at the same time
is not acceptable. These observations suggest that 'at the same time' is in com¬
plementary distribution with the PART-OF reading of 'then'. Suppose we say
that in order to add 'at the same time' to the second sentence of a sequence, it is
required that the second eventuality is not a part of the first. This allows us to
explain why (2.25a,2.25d) is acceptable but (2.25a,2.25e) is not. It does not seem
possible to see the relation between (2.25a) and (2.25e) as anything other than
background. Thus we are forced to see the state in (2.25e) as part of the event in
(2.25a) — and 'at the same time' is therefore inconsistent.
The case of (2.26a,2.26b) is interesting.
(2.26) a. Daniel went to the zoo
b. He photographed some penguins
Here, it is possible to add 'at the same time' to (2.26b), but there is an intuition
that by so doing we are forced into seeing (2.26a) and (2.26b) as describing "se¬
parate" events. This fits well with the proposal that 'at the same time' is only
allowed in cases where the second eventuality is not part of the first. We can also
explain why:
(2.25) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
38
can be followed by either:
(2.25) f. Gareth was climbing Snowdon then
or:
(2.25) g. Gareth was climbing Snowdon at the same time
We do this by supposing that the progressive may convey either a background
or a non-background relation. If the relation is background, then the second
eventuality is part of the first, making 'then' appropriate and ruling out 'at the
same time'. If, on the other hand, the relation is non-background (and there is
no reason to infer an elaboration reading), the second eventuality is not part of
the first, which rules out 'then' and makes 'at the same time' appropriate. This
explanation is supported by the intuition that in (2.25a,2.25d), Gareth's climb
goes on for much longer than Daniel's, while in (2.25a,2.25e) the two climbs may
well occupy comparable amounts of time. A more detailed account of 'at the same
time' with the progressive will be given in Chapter 4.
Before we move on we will briefly discuss the distribution of 'at the time'. Again,
a fuller account will be given in Chapter 4.
We noted in Section 2.2 that (2.2a,2.2d), repeated here as (2.25a,2.25h), is not
acceptable.
(2.25) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
h. Gareth climbed Snowdon at the time
We noted too that (2.27a,2.27b) is unacceptable.
(2.27) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon at the time
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This latter observation shows that 'at the time' does not have a reading corre¬
sponding to the ETR reading of 'then'. But it behaves like 'then' in (2.25a,2.25f)
by being unacceptable in a case where the PART-OF relation does not hold. This
suggests that perhaps 'at the time' has the same semantics as PART-OF 'then',
i.e. that it conveys a PART-OF relation between the two eventualities.
In order to check this, let us see how 'at the time' behaves with an elaborative
sequence.
(2.28) a. Emily went to the zoo
b. She photographed some penguins at the time
(2.28a,2.28b) sounds odd, whereas the corresponding sequence with 'then' as we
saw earlier, is acceptable. Thus it appears that 'at the time' does not convey an
elaboration relation, but is only acceptable where the relation is one of backgro¬
unding. We will consider this further in Chapter 4.
Now let us look briefly at sentence-initial 'then' (which we will abbreviate to SI-
'then'). We noted earlier that Sl-'then' appears always to cause updating — i.e.,
to convey that the first eventuality temporally precedes the second. In order to
explain this, we propose that Sl-'then' imposes the requirement that the second
eventuality is not part of the first, and, in addition, that the first eventuality
temporally precedes the second. This analysis is supported by examples such as:
(2.29) a. John pushed Peter
b. Peter fell
as compared with:
(2.29) a. John pushed Peter
c. Then Peter fell
Sequence (2.29a,2.29b) readily invites us to infer that the pushing caused the
falling. This is consistent that with the analysis that the second eventuality is
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part of the first — the fall is the consequence of the push. Introducing SI-'then' in
(2.29c) makes this interpretation less likely by effectively saying that the fall is not
part of the first eventuality. This is what removes the strong sense of consequence
that is present in (2.29a,2.29b).
We also noted earlier that for some speakers:
(2.30) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon then
is at least marginally acceptable on an update reading. We can explain this by
proposing that SF-'then' can, with some difficulty, take on the function of ST'then'
characterized above.
The analysis we give for Sl-'then' appears satisfactory for the examples we have
investigated. However, the primary purpose of this chapter is to investigate SF-
'then', and we have not looked at Sl-'then' in anything like the same detail.
Therefore we offer our analysis of Sl-'then' more tentatively than our analysis of
SF-'then'.
Finally, we should point out that the PART-OF analysis is also supported by the
examples in Section 2.5, which we discussed in terms of an intuitive notion of
events being part of other events.
An independently-developed account that has some interesting similarities with
our PART-OF proposal for sentence-final 'then' is given in by Spejewski and
Carlson (1993). We discuss this in Section 2.8.
2.7 Examples
Let us at this point draw together the results of our analysis so far. Our overall
proposal is that sentence-final 'then' is potentially ambiguous between two rea¬
dings, which we call the ETR reading and the PART-OF reading. Each reading
is only available under certain conditions, which are summarized below. If both
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sets of conditions are fulfilled, then both readings of 'then' are available, and the
sequence is ambiguous.
The conditions for the two readings are as follows:
• ETR reading
In order to get this reading, an ETR must be present in the discourse con¬
text. In the two-sentence sequences we have been looking at, the ETR must
have been introduced by a temporal frame adverbial or 'at'-adverbial in the
previous sentence. However, in a longer piece of discourse the ETR may well
have been introduced by an earlier sentence. One possibility would be to
impose the requirement that ETR 'then' refer to the most recently introdu¬
ced ETR. However it is possible that this is not always the case, especially,
perhaps, where embedded discourses are concerned. Further discussion of
this would, however, take us well beyond the scope of this chapter.
• PART-OF reading
The availability of this reading requires that the second eventuality be part
of the first. This requirement is made formal by introducing the situation
theoretic relation PART-OF. The condition is fulfilled at least in cases where
the second eventuality is in a background or elaboration relation with the
first. 'At the time' appears to require similar but not identical conditions
(it is not acceptable with an elaboration relation).
We now show how this analysis works for the key examples we considered earlier.
We give the DRS for each sequence, but we do not show at this point how these
DRSs are derived. In Sections 2.10-2.11 we present a grammatical fragment and
corresponding construction rules which produce the required DRSs, together with
an explanation of how the derivation works in each case. Here, we merely present
the results.
Turning to the sequence (2.31a,2.31b):
(2.31) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon then
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we see that the conditions for the ETR reading are fulfilled — there is an ETR,
introduced by the frame adverbial 'in July' in (2.31a). The requirements for the
PART-OF reading, on the other hand, are not met, because the second eventua¬
lity cannot be seen as part of the first. (There is no background or elaboration
reading.) Hence, only the ETR reading is available. We represent this as in the
DRS below.
ej ti e2 u v w x
Daniel(u)
Ben Nevis(v)





e2: w climb x
e2 O ti
The relation C holds between an eventuality and a time if the eventuality takes
place within that time. The DRS expresses the information that Gareth's climb
takes place within the time referred to by 'July'.
Now consider (2.32a,2.32b):
(2.32) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Gareth was climbing Snowdon then
Here, the conditions for the PART-OF reading but not those for the ETR reading
are met. Thus only the PART-OF reading is available. The DRS is:16
16Note that here we analyse the progressive as stative. This is not important to our analysis
and we are by no means committing ourselves to this analysis of the progressive. Our chief
reason for doing it this way is because Kamp and Reyle (1993) treat progressives as statives,
and our fragment is based on theirs. We present an alternative analysis of the progressive in
(Glasbey 1994a).
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ei S2 u v w x
Daniel(u)
Ben Nevis(v)
ei: u climb v
Gareth(w)
Snowdon(x
S2: w PROG (climb) x
s2 PART-OF ei
The above DRS expresses the PART-OF relation between eventualities, which we
motivated earlier. Here, the second eventuality s2 is related not to a time as in the
previous example, but to an event. This brings out the symmetry in our analysis of
the two uses of 'then': the ETR use involves a relation with a previously mentioned
time, and the PART-OF use involves a relation with a previously mentioned event.
Now consider (2.33a,2.33b):
(2.33) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon then
Here, neither set of conditions is met — there is no ETR, and no PART-OF
relation. As a result, 'then' cannot have either an ETR or a PART-OF reading
and no DRS can be constructed.
Finally, in the case of (2.34a,2.34b):
(2.34) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
b. Gareth was climbing Snowdon then
both sets of conditions are fulfilled, and thus both the ETR and the PART-OF
readings are available and the sequence is ambiguous. It can be interpreted either
on the ETR reading (which states that Gareth's climb took place in July) or
on the PART-OF reading (where Gareth's climb is in a background relation to
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Daniel's climb). Of course, as we observed earlier, contextual information might
well favour one interpretation or the other.
Perhaps we should point out here that the ETR reading does not say anything
about the temporal relation between the two eventualities, other than what can
be inferred from the frame adverbial. In other words, on the ETR interpretation
for 'then', no information is given about the temporal ordering between the two
eventualities.
Two DRSs may be obtained for (2.34a,2.34b), corresponding to the ETR and
PART-OF readings respectively.
(1) ETR reading:
ei ti s2 u v w x
Daniel(u)
Ben Nevis(v)





S2: w PROG (climb) x
s2 E ti
(2) PART-OF reading:
ei ti s2 u v w x
Daniel(u)
Ben Nevis(v)





s2: w PROG (climb) x
s2 PART-OF ex
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2.8 Related Work on 'then'
Since we carried out our analysis of 'then', two recent accounts have appeared:
those of Spejewski and Carlson (1993) and Schiffrin (1992), which cover some
of the same ground. Both examine the contrast between sentence-initial and
sentence-final 'then', point out the existence of sequential and cotemporal rea¬
dings and discuss how these relate to the aspectual categories of the eventualities.
Neither considers the way that 'then' behaves in relation to an explicit temporal
referent. However, it is interesting to see that some similar conclusions to ours
have been reached with regard to what we call PART-OF 'then'. We present a
brief summary of the two accounts below.
2.8.1 Spejewski and Carlson's analysis of 'then'




and choose to focus on the first two of these. They observe that sentence-initial
'then' predisposes a sequential reading and sentence-final 'then' a cotemporal rea¬
ding, and show how these can be explained in terms of discourse relations between
clauses. Two discourse relations are postulated, these being:
1. Subordination ('daughter' relation). Here, one eventuality is tempo¬
rally dependent on (or subordinate to) the other. Spejewski and Carlson
include both what we have called 'background' and 'elaboration' relations
in this. Thus, subordination is similar to what we have called the PART-OF
relation.
2. Temporal distinctness ('sister' relation). Here, there is no temporal
dependency of one eventuality upon the other.
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The authors show how 'then' serves to specify one or other of these discourse
relations. Sentence-initial 'then' conveys the temporal distinctness / sister relation
and rules out subordination. Sentence-final 'then' conveys subordination. The
discourse relations are defined in terms of reference time intervals as used in
(Partee 1984). However, unlike Partee, Spejewski and Carlson allow states to
introduce new reference times of their own rather than continuing the reference
time introduced by a previous event. They adopt the treatment of (Hinrichs 1986),
where a state surrounds its reference interval, in contrast to an event, which is
contained within its reference interval. This allows them to explain why sentence-
final 'then' generally conveys temporal overlap.
Thus, Spejewski and Carlson's analysis is similar to our account of the PART-OF
reading of 'then'. It is particularly interesting that they have also come up with a
bipartite distinction between one discourse relation: 'subordination' and another
one: 'distinct'.
2.8.2 Schiffrin's analysis of 'then'
Schiffrin (1992) identifies three distinct uses of 'then', which are:
1. Local anaphoric
2. Global anaphoric or textual
3. Epistemic
The local anaphoric use is the one that pertains to our work, so we will restrict
ourselves to discussion of this. The global anaphoric use concerns a contrastive
now/then distinction in discourse which may lie outside the confines of individual
clauses (what Schiffrin calls a global contrast). Schiffrin shows how all three uses
of 'then' — local anaphoric, textual and epistemic — can be viewed in terms of
proximal/distal oppositions of various kinds.
Within the local anaphoric use she identifies two functions:
1. Shifting reference time
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2. Continuing reference time
from the prior text. Schiffrin shows that, in general, sentence-initial 'then' in¬
dicates a shift in reference time and sentence-final 'then' a continuation of the
reference time established in the previous discourse. This use of reference times
is similar to that of Spejewski and Carlson, except that the latter argue that a
new reference time should be introduced for every eventuality irrespective of its
aspectual category. Schiffrin notes that because of the effect on reference times,
sentence-initial 'then' is normally associated with a following event, and sentence-
final 'then' usually modifies a state. She presents a wide range of data, taken
from personal interviews, to demonstrate this association. She also considers the
"exceptions", where sentence-final 'then' modifies not a state but an event, and
sentence-initial 'then' precedes a state. In these cases, she observes, 'then' can
override the normal aspectual meanings of clause/clause sequences. For example,
if an event is followed by a state (in the absence of 'then') we normally interpret
this as the state temporally overlapping the event. However, if the state is pre¬
ceded by sentence-initial 'then', this effect is overridden and we read the state
as non-overlapping. Schiffrin explains this in terms of sentence-inital 'then' cau¬
sing us to focus on the event that marks the beginning of the state. Similarly, if
sentence-final 'then' is preceded by an event, this can cause the "opening" up of
a state following the event. Schiffrin's explanation is rather informal at this point
and would perhaps benefit from the inclusion of an account of event structure —
for example that of (Moens 1987), which would enable her to speak of an event
and its consequent state.
Schiffrin does not consider any examples of sentence-final 'then' with elaborations,
and it is not clear how her account would deal with these. Nor does she consider
progressives or explicit temporal reference.
2.9 Summary and Conclusion
We have identified a two-way distinction in the use of 'then':
1. As a temporal anaphor referring back to an explicit temporal referent.
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2. As a means of expressing discourse relations such as PART-OF between
eventualities.
In order to express this distinction in DRT we have suggested using:
1. Temporal referents, which may only be introduced by explicit reference to
"times". Such explicit reference to times is provided (at least) by temporal
frame adverbials and 'at'-adverbials, but not by 'for'-adverbials, for example.
2. Event or state referents, which are introduced when an eventuality is descri¬
bed. Although it may be possible for the hearer to infer information about
the times corresponding to these eventualities, the crucial point is that such
inferred times are not introduced into the universe of discourse of the DRS.
Making such a distinction allows us to account for the data involving 'then', 'at
the time' and 'at the same time'. The distinction brings out the need for semantic
representations of natural language discourse to reflect not only truth conditions
in the world, but the way that the information contained in the discourse is
structured.
We are not claiming that the formal account presented below is the only way that
the necessary distinction can be made. In Chapter 3 we will present an alternative
way of formalizing the distinction, cast in the framework of DRT and situation
theory developed in (Barwise and Cooper 1993).
2.10 Fragment
2.10.1 Introduction
We present here a more formal version of our analysis of 'then'. We take as our
starting point the DRT fragment developed in Chapter 5 of (Kamp and Reyle
1993). Kamp and Reyle's fragment covers a range of simple English sentences
with past, present and future tense, simple and progressive aspect and temporal
adverbials — but there is no treatment of 'then'. They present phrase structure
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rules, rules for DRS construction, and a model theory for the fragment. We
have added extra phrase structure rules so as to include a syntactic analysis of
sentence-initial and sentence-final 'then'. We have also added further construction
rules which reflect our semantic analysis of 'then' and build the correct DRSs for
the sentences of our fragment. In addition, we have modified several of Kamp
and Reyle's construction rules for our purposes. No modifications to Kamp and
Reyle's model theory were required.
In the interests of simplicity, we have reduced the size of the fragment by excluding
some constructions that are not relevant to the analysis of 'then'. These include
the perfect, negation, tenses other than the past, definite and indefinite articles,
and pronouns. We do not foresee any problems with putting these constructions
back into the fragment.
After presenting our fragment, we will illustrate how our rules generate the ap¬
propriate DRSs for the key examples discussed earlier.
2.10.2 Phrase Structure Rules
The following rules are adapted from Kamp and Reyle (1993). We have reduced
the size of the fragment by removing some constructions and the corresponding
rules, and we have added new rules to deal with 'then'. Accordingly, some features
are now redundant and have been removed, and several new features have been
added. All features are explained below.
We replace Kamp and Reyle's feature TENSE with the feature Past which can
take values {+, —} and indicates past tense or otherwise (all sentences in our
fragment are past tense).
The feature Stat indicates stative/non-stative and can take values {+,—}.
The feature Fin can take values {+, — ,prog}, and indicates finite/infinite and
progressive.
The feature Trans indicates transitivity and can take the values '+' (transitive)
and '—' (intransitive).
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The feature Ocat can take value oref (indicating reference to an object) or tref
(indicating reference to a time).
The feature Unit indicates the unit of temporal measurement, and is intended to
coordinate pronouns like 'July' with prepositions like 'in'. Unit can only take the
value month in this fragment.
We introduce a new feature Init, which can take the values {+, —}, to distinguish
sentence-initial and sentence-final 'then'.
We have added two new features: Ana and Etr, at AdvP level. Ana takes the
value '+' if the AdvP is anaphoric (as is the case with 'then') and ' —' if it is
non-anaphoric, as is the case with the temporal frame adverbials in the fragment.
Etr takes the value '+' if the AdvP makes explicit reference to a time (as is the

































17In fact for the purposes of this fragment Ana and Etr are complementary and could be
condensed into one feature. However for a larger fragment this may not be the case. For













































































































































































—> Ger(d), where d G V -
Trans = alpha
Stat = (3
Past (climb) = climbed
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Past (like) = liked





We give here the complete set of construction rules needed to generate DRSs for
the sentences of our fragment. Some of the rules have been taken unchanged from
(Kamp and Reyle 1993), and we indicate below the rule where this is the case.
Most of the rules have been modified to incorporate our analysis, and some new
rules have been added to deal with 'then'.
CR.PN, which deals with the processing of proper names, is taken unchanged
from (Kamp and Reyle 1993). We have simplified it slightly by removing features
which are not required in our fragment.
Note that:
Triggering configuration: 7 G Conk
is used in our rules, as in Kamp and Reyle's, to express the requirement that the
syntactic structure 7 be among the conditions of the DRS K. If the configuration
7 may either be a proper subtree of the condition or the condition as a whole, we
write:
Triggering configuration: 7 C 7 G Conk.
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CR.PN











Introduce into the universe of the main DRS: new discourse referent u
Introduce into the condition set of the main DRS: new condition a{u)




We have modified K&R s S rule CR.SyA=:<; tense,stat,neg>
(where TA = < TENSE, STAT, NEG > is a shorthand way of representing
the tense/aspect features of S and indicates the values of the features TENSE,
STAT and NEG) to give three rules. The first is
CR-StA=<+i/3> ,
which applies to sentences with no temporal adverbial and indicates that Past =




which applies to sentences with temporal adverbials where Past = +, Stat = /3,
Ana = — and Etr = +.
The third is:
CR-STA=<+,/3,+,->
which applies to sentences with temporal adverbials where Past = +, Stat = (3,
Ana = + and Etr — —.
For reasons of simplicity, we have removed Kamp and Reyle's temporal perspective
point and reference point, which are not required by our fragment. They concern
temporal updating in discourse and embedded narrative, and could be restored
to the rules if required. Our new rules make reference to the features Ana, Etr,
and Init which we added to the fragment.



























As we said, the first rule for the case where no temporal adverbial is present in
the sentence. Under these conditions, an event or state referent but no temporal
referent is introduced.
CR.StA=<+ d>
Triggering configuration: 7 G Conk
for 7 = (i) above.
If Stat = +, then:
Introduce into Uk: new state discourse referent s
Replace 7 by
If Stat = —, then:
Introduce into Uk: new event discourse referent e
Replace 7 by
The next rule applies when there is a temporal adverbial with the features —Ana
and +Etr (i.e., a frame adverbial, in this fragment). Under these conditions, a
temporal referent is introduced in addition to the event or state referent.
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CR-Sxa=<+./3,-,+>
Triggering configuration: 7 £ Conk
for 7 = (ii) or (iii) above.
If Stat = +, then:
Add to Conk: AdvP(s,t)
Introduce into Uk: new state discourse referent s
and new time discourse referent t
Replace 7 by
If Stat = —, then:
Add to Conk: AdvP(e,t)
Introduce into Uk: new event discourse referent e
and new time discourse referent t
Replace 7 by
The next rule applies when there is a temporal adverbial with the features -\-Ana
and —Etr (i.e., 'then', in this fragment). Under these conditions, an event or
state referent but no time referent is introduced. (The work of processing 'then'
is done by the rules CR.SF-then, etc., which will be given shortly.)
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CR-Sta=<+,/3,+,->
Triggering configuration: 7 £ Conk
for 7 = (iii) above.
If Stat — +, then:
Add to Conk: AdvP(s)
Introduce into Uk: new state discourse referent s
Replace 7 by
If Stat = —, then:
Add to Conk: AdvP(e)
Introduce into Ur: new event discourse referent e
Replace 7 by
In order to deal with progressives, we use K&R's construction rule CR.BE exactly
as it stands.
CR.BE













Note: Square brackets around the NP indicate that it is optional — to enable the
rule to deal with both transitive and intransitive cases.
We introduce a rule CR.July corresponding to K&R's rule CR.Suiiday. Both
'Sunday' and 'July' are frame adverbials so the rules are similar. However, we
have made some modifications.
Our rule for events introduces the condition (in the non-stative case):
e □ t
which is to be interpreted, as explained earlier, as the event e occurring within
time t. (The rule for statives introduces a slightly different condition, shown
below.)
We have also removed information, as explained earlier, concerning the temporal
perspective point.
CR.July
















Introduce into Conk: july(t)
If Stat = +, introduce into Conk: sot
If Stat = —, introduce into Conk: eCt
Note: s/e is to be interpreted as's or e, whichever is appropriate'. The relation o
is to be interpreted as "temporally overlaps".
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Finally, we give our construction rules for 'then'. The first of these, CR.SI-then,
is for sentence-initial 'then'. It introduces a condition to the effect that the current
eventuality cannot be PART-OF the previous eventuality (as argued in the text),
and a condition which says that the previous eventuality temporally precedes the
current one.
CR.SI-then








Replace 7 by new conditions:
Sj—i/ej_ 1 S Si/ei,
—>(sj/ei PART-OF Si_i/ei_i)
Note: -< is to be interpreted as "temporally precedes".
The subscripts of e;_i and S;_i refer to the event/state discourse referent introdu¬
ced by the previous sentence. We assume that the construction algorithm assigns
numerically increasing subscripts to successive eventuality and time referents in¬
troduced by the discourse.
CR.SF-then-ETR is our new rule corresponding to the ETR reading of sentence-
final 'then'. It chooses the most recently introduced temporal referent and intro¬
duces a condition relating the event/state in the current sentence to this.
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CR.SF-then-ETR








Choose a suitable antecedent tj, such that j is maximal.
If [Stat = +]: Replace 7 by new conditions: tj o s
If [Stat = —]: Replace 7 by new conditions: e C tj
By 'choose a suitable antecedent tj, such that j is maximal' we mean that the
antecedent with the maximum value of j should be chosen. Recall that j is the
index for the utterance, and is incremented by one for each new utterance. Thus
the idea is that the rule selects the most recently introduced temporal referent.
CR.SF-then-PART is our rule corresponding to the PART-OF reading of sentence-
final 'then'. We argued earlier that this reading of 'then' requires that the current
eventuality can be seen as PART-OF the previous eventuality. This is possible if
there is either a background or an elaboration relation. Deciding whether an ela¬
boration relation is possible requires world knowledge, and we have not attempted
to build this into the fragment (though there is no reason why this could not be
done). So in our fragment we ignore the elaboration relation, and our rule only
allows the PART-OF reading of SF-'then' if a background relation is possible. As
it appears that a background relation is always possible if the current eventuality
is a state, we impose the condition here that the current eventuality is stative.
Thus, our rule is correct but not complete.
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CR.SF-then-PART








If previous sentence was stative, replace 7 by new condition:
Si PART-OF Si 1
If previous sentence was non-stative, replace 7 by new condition:
s; PART-OF ei_!
Note that this rule requires us to keep track of the Stat value for the previous
sentence. We do not consider here the precise means for doing this, but assume
that some relatively straightforward way of maintaining this information could be
found.
2.11 Examples of DRS Construction
We show here how the rules given above generate the required DRSs for the key
examples in the text.
We begin with sequence (2.la,2.lb), reproduced here as (2.35a,2.35b).
(2.35) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon then



































causes rule CR.Sta=<+,/3,_,+> to be invoked. This causes an event discourse
referent e\ to be introduced into the DRS. It also introduces a temporal discourse




The AdvP is processed as follows.
CR.July introduces the conditions:
ei E ti
july(ti)




The rule CR.PN, which introduces nominal discourse referents, will also be invo¬
ked by the syntactic structure. This will cause discourse referents to be introduced
corresponding to the proper names 'Daniel' and 'Ben Nevis'.
After processing the whole parse tree the completed DRS will be as follows:





ex: u climb v
Now let us consider the second sentence of the sequence, (2.35b):
(2.35) b. Gareth climbed Snowdon then















Rule CR.Sta=<+,/?,+,-> is invoked, causing an event discourse referent e2 to be
introduced into the universe of discourse. However, in this case no temporal
discourse referent is introduced. The condition:
AdvP(e2)
is added.
Nominal discourse referents w and x, corresponding to 'Gareth' and 'Snowdon'
respectively are also added. At this point our DRS would be (simplifying slightly
to remove details of syntactic structure):
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ei: u climb v
Gareth(w)
Snowdon(x)
AdvP r -J (e2)Init — —
then
However, we still have not processed 'then'. Recall that we have two construction
rules to deal with sentence-final 'then'. CR.SF-then-ETR deals with the ETR
reading and CR.SF-then-PART deals with the PART-OF reading.
CR.SF-then-ETR can only be invoked if a time discourse referent is available.
As such a referent is available here, and the requisite features are present on the
AdvP, the rule is invoked, and the condition
e2 E ti
is added. (In this case, only one time discourse referent is present. If, as might
be the case in a longer discourse, there were more than one such referent present,
the most recently introduced one would be chosen. This is doubtless an oversim¬
plification, and a theory of discourse structure would be required in order to do
it properly.)
Thus our completed DRS for (2.36a,2.36b) would be as follows:
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ej: u climb v
Gareth (w)
Snowdon (x)
e2: w climb x
e2 C ti
Note that rule CR.SF-then-PART is not invoked here. This is because this
rule requires that the sentence containing 'then' be stative. Thus in the case of
(2.36a,2.36b) only the ETR reading is obtained, which is what we require.
Now let us consider the sequence (2.36a,2.36b).
(2.36) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Gareth climbed Snowdon then




















Rule CR.S^a=<+/3> is invoked, which causes an event discourse referent ex but
no temporal discourse referent to be introduced into the universe of discourse.
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From this point, DRS construction proceeds in a similar way as for (2.36a), and




ei: u climb v
Now consider (2.37b). This is identical to (2.36b), so the same construction rules
will be invoked apart from those involving 'then'. Thus we obtain the intermediate
DRS:
ei u v e2 w x
Daniel(u)
Ben Nevis(v)









At this point, a rule is required to reduce the AdvP. However, it will be seen
from looking at the two rules for SF-'then', that neither of them can be invoked.
CR.SF-then-ETR requires that there be a temporal referent in the universe of
discourse, and no such referent is present. And CR.SF-then-PART requires
that the sentence containing 'then' be stative, which is not the case for (2.37b).
Thus no further rules can be invoked at this point and there is no analysis for
(2.37a,2.37b), which is precisely what we require.
Now suppose (2.37b) were replaced by (2.37c):
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(2.36) c. Gareth was climbing Snowdon then



















The difference here is that (2.37c) is stative. This means that the conditions
for invocation of CR.SF-then-PART are met, so this rule is triggered and the
condition:
s2 PART-OF ex
is added to the DRS.
The final DRS for (2.37a,2.37c) is:
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ei u v S2 w x
Daniel(u)
Ben Nevis(v)
ei: u climb v
Gareth(w)
Snowdon (x)
S2: w PROG(climb) x
S2 PART-OF ei
Finally, consider the sequence (2.36a,2.36c):
(2.35) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
c. Gareth was climbing Snowdon then
We have already given the DRS for (2.36a), and (2.36c) is identical to (2.37c).
Combining the two DRSs, at the point where we are looking for a rule for 'then',
we will have the DRS:















We can see from this that both CR.SF-then-ETR and CR.SF-then-PART
can be invoked at this point. Thus, we can produce two alternative final DRSs,
one by adding the condition:
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ti o S2 (which corresponds to the ETR reading)
and one by adding the condition:
s2 PART-OF ei (which corresponds to the PART-OF reading).
Thus we have shown how DRSs are constructed for our key examples in accordance
with our analysis.
2.12 A Potential Problem with the DRT Ac¬
count
Our analysis of 'then' motivated the need to distinguish between cases where
an explicit temporal referent (ETR) is present and cases where a time is merely
inferred from the mention of an eventuality. We showed how this can be done in
DRT by allowing a temporal discourse referent only to be introduced into the DRS
when an ETR is present. This worked well for the fragment given and gave us
the required readings for sentence-final 'then'. At first glance it does not appear
that there would be any significant problem in extending this treatment to larger
fragments. One problem that suggests itself is that in a larger fragment we might
well want to use reference points and temporal perspective points in a way
similar to that of Kamp and Reyle (1993) in order to give a fuller account of
temporal relations in discourse. If reference points and the like are taken to be
"times" (as is traditional in accounts based on Reichenbach 1947), there will be
difficulties, as of course reference times are not always explicitly realised in the
discourse. However, if we follow Kamp and Reyle in regarding reference points
and temporal perspective points as corresponding to events, then we will have
no trouble.
However, on further consideration a deeper problem suggests itself. It is perhaps
assuming too much that we will always be able to limit temporal discourse refe¬
rents to being introduced by ETRs. There may well be cases where it is necessary
or at least extremely convenient to allow a temporal discourse referent to be intro¬
duced into the DRS even when no corresponding ETR is present in the discourse.
Certainly, it appears to be an inherent disadvantage to limit ourselves in this way,
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even though we have not yet encountered any cases where this becomes necessary.
In fact, to move ahead of ourselves a little, we will find in our analysis of 'at the
time' and 'at the same time' in Chapter 4 that we need to talk about time roles
associated with eventualities, where these time roles are considered to be present
in the discourse context and must therefore appear in the DRS. But of course we
will not be able to do this if we limit temporal discourse referents to being intro¬
duced by ETRs. What we need is to find a way to distinguish between times that
we call "time roles" (which are inferred from the description of an eventuality) and
times that we call "time entities" (which are introduced by ETRs). Conventional
DRT does not give us any obvious way to do this. We would need to introduce
information about the utterance into the DRS, and although we do not claim that
doing this would be impossible (e.g., perhaps we could modify the DRS to retain
the required syntactic information, or perhaps we could introduce some kind of
partitioning of discourse referents) it would be potentially complicated and would
take us away from standard DRT.
We need our semantic representations of discourse to specify whether a particular
temporal discourse referent is a "time role" or a "time entity" — or, in other
words, whether it was introduced by an ETR in the utterance or by inference
from an eventuality. A way of specifying such information about an utterance is
provided by combining ideas from situation theory and DRT along the lines of
Cooper's situation-theoretic DRT (STDRT) (Cooper 1993b, 1993c). In Chapter 3
we will develop a fragment in our extended version of STG (known as discourse-
STG or DSTG), which is inspired in part by the intuitions underlying STDRT.
We will show how DSTG can be used to develop an alternative formulation of the






Note: An earlier version of some of the material described in this chapter and in
Chapter 5 has been reported in (Glasbey 1993c).
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we presented a DRT fragment which embodied our theoretical ana¬
lysis of sentence-final 'then'. The fragment consisted of an extension to that given
in (Kamp and Reyle 1993, Ch.5). We made the necessary distinction between
explicit and implied "times" by allowing temporal discourse referents to be intro¬
duced into the DRS only in cases where a "time" was referred to by an explicit
temporal referent (ETR). Making this distinction allowed us to generate the
required readings for sentence-final 'then'.
At the end of Chapter 2 we pointed out a potential problem with the way that
our DRT fragment for 'then' made the distinction between explicitly mentioned
times and inferred times. We suggested that there might be cases where it is
very convenient or even essential to allow temporal discourse referents/markers
to be introduced even where there is no explicit temporal referent. In the present
chapter we will describe an alternative way of making the requisite distinction.
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We will work within a framework that embodies ideas from situation theory (ST)
and DRT, using insights from (Cooper 1993b, 1993c) as to how these theories can
be brought together. Our notation will be the Extended Kamp Notation (EKN)
developed in (Barwise and Cooper 1993). We will develop a fragment which is
similar in scope to the DRT fragment described in Chapter 2, but which uses a
different means of obtaining the correct readings for sentence-final 'then'.
Although the work described here is related to and partly inspired by the situation
theoretic discourse representation theory (STDRT) described in (Cooper 1993b,
1993c), the grammar we develop is different in some significant respects from the
one presented by Cooper. For this reason, in order to avoid confusion we will
refer to our framework as Discourse Situation Theoretic Grammar (DSTG). The
name reflects the fact that our grammar was derived from the situation theoretic
grammar (STG) presented in (Cooper 1991), by extending STG to deal with
temporal expressions and the processing of discourse.
In our new fragment, we will make use of the fact that situation theory allows us
to represent information about the utterance in a way that conventional DRT does
not. Rather than restricting the introduction of temporal discourse referents to
cases where an explicit temporal referent (ETR) is present, we will allow temporal
discourse referents to be introduced even when there is no ETR. We will mark
the difference between "explicit" and "inferred" temporal referents by indicating
in the representation whether or not a referent was introduced by an ETR. This
will enable us to obtain the correct readings for 'then' in a way which we believe
will lend itself better to extension to larger fragments. For example, we will
demonstrate in Chapter 4 when we look at 'at the time' and 'at the same time'
that it is very useful to allow temporal discourse referents to be introduced even
where no time is explicitly mentioned.
The incorporation of information about the utterance is very natural in a frame¬
work which treats utterances as situations. Of course, it may well be possible
to extend DRT to include utterance information as well, but it would not be so
easy to "background" the utterance information in the way that situation theory
allows. Also, the resulting version of DRT would be significantly different from
the standard version.
There are other reasons why using a combined situation theory / DRT framework
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seems advantageous. One is that situation theory gives us a natural and precisely
defined semantics for the notion of PART-OF that we used in our analysis of
'then'.
A second advantage is that situation theory gives us a natural semantics for ex¬
pressions in DRT like:
e : climb (x,y)
where climb(x,y) is a condition. In situation theory, e is a situation, and we can
then say:
e |= climb(x, y)
where climb(x, y) is an infon. We will discuss this further below.
Thirdly, using situations to model events will allow us to express notions of event
structure which we will need when we look at aspectual classes and aspectual
composition in Chapter 5.
The syntax of the fragment given here is based roughly on the syntactic rules for
the DRT fragment presented in Chapter 2. The difference is that in the DRT
fragment, based on (Kamp and Reyle 1993), a full syntactic analysis is carried
out first, followed by the application of construction rules to the syntax tree. By
contrast, in this fragment the syntactic and semantic analyses are carried out in
tandem. This is done by having the grammar rules make reference to semantic as
well as syntactic features. We base our rules on those of Cooper's STG as described
in (Cooper 1988a, Cooper 1991), which we will briefly describe in Section 3.5.1
below. We have extended STG to deal with (1) tense and aspect, and (2) discourse.
We will discuss in detail these modifications and the theoretical motivation for the
way we have chosen to represent temporal information in DSTG.
Before presenting the DSTG fragment we will give a brief introduction to some of
the key ideas and terminology of situation theory. Following this we will introduce
Barwise and Cooper's Extended Kamp Notation (EKN) and some relevant ideas
from Cooper's STDRT.
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3.2 Situation Semantics and Situation Theory
Situation semantics was originally proposed as a theory of natural language se¬
mantics by Jon Barwise and John Perry in (Barwise and Perry 1983).1 Since that
time, alongside the development of situation semantics, much work has been done
on the mathematical theory of information underlying situation semantics. The
underlying theory has become known as situation theory.
The basic (semantic) objects of situation theory include situations,with infons,
relations and individuals. A situation is characterised by the set of infons it
supports. An infon has internal structure, as shown by the specimen infon below:
((eat, e, d; 1))
This infon can be thought to correspond to the sentence "Emily ate dinner".2
The relation is 'eat', 'e' is a relevant individual named 'Emily', 'd' is an object
referred to as 'dinner', and '1' is the polarity. The polarity of an infon may be '1'
or '0'. Zero polarity would correspond to the equivalent "negative" sentence —
i.e. 'Emily did not eat dinner' in this case. In this infon, the individuals 'e' and
'd' fill the argument roles of the relation 'eat'. The number of argument roles
depends on the arity of the relation. Whether a particular relation has a fixed
number of argument roles, or whether the number can vary, is a question not yet
determined by the theory. Cooper (1991) introduces the notion of a minimal
appropriateness condition which is associated with each argument role of a
relation. This is a condition (not necessarily a sufficient one) which must be
fulfilled in order for an object to be appropriate to that role (e.g. the condition
'human' or 'animate').
Note that the above infon does not contain any argument roles corresponding to
time or place. Various suggestions have been made as to how spatial and temporal
1Many of the basic intuitions underlying the original version of situation semantics discussed
in (Barwise and Perry 1983) remain unchanged, but the formalism and some key notions have
changed considerably. The brief description that follows is based on recent versions of situation
semantics and situation theory, such as (Barwise 1989) and (Barwise and Cooper 1993).
2We ignore information regarding tense and temporal reference here. We chose to put the
above sentence in the past tense because the English present tense with simple aspect for non-
stative verbs conveys a habitual sense, and we wish to avoid this complication here. We will
discuss matters of tense and aspect later.
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information should be incorporated in infons (see, for example Cooper 1985, Crow
1990, Macken 1990, Glasbey 1990, Devlin 1991). In Section 3.5.2 we will discuss
this issue in more depth.
The argument roles of a relation may also be filled by other situation-theoretic
objects, e.g. infons and situations.
A situation is said to support a collection of infons. Thus the following expression:
s \= ((eat, e, d; 1))
means that a situation s supports the infon shown. We may also say that s is
classified by the infon as being of the type corresponding to that infon.
Situations are individuated by the infons they support.
The argument roles of relations may also be filled by parameters, which are another
kind of situation theoretic object. Parameters are similar to variables in conven¬
tional logics, except that parameters are semantic objects of the theory rather
than varying over such objects. An infon which has one or more of its argument
roles filled by a parameter is known as a parametric infon. For example:
((eat, X, Y; 1))
Until fairly recently the notion of a restricted parameter was in common use
(see, for example, Gawron and Peters 1990).3 Recently, however, an alternative
has been developed (see Barwise and Cooper 1993) where it is objects such as
infons and propositions (see below) that have restrictions associated with them.
We will discuss this in more detail in the following section. We will also discuss
there the notion of abstraction over parameters.
We mentioned above that situation theory also gives us a precise semantics for the
informal notion of PART-OF which we used in Chapter 2. In situation theory, <
(pronounced 'PART-OF') is a relation between situations. Barwise (1989) defines
< as follows:
Definition:
3A restricted parameter is formed by taking a parameter X and a parametric proposition
p(X) and combining them to give a new "restricted parameter" which ranges over objects y for
which the proposition p(y) is true. See (Barwise and Cooper 1993) for further explanation.
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A situation S2 is PART-OF (<|) a situation Si iff all the infons sup¬
ported by S2 are also supported by Si.
For the purpose of our analysis, we take eventualities to be situations. This allows
us to express PART-OF relations between eventualities.
To take an example of the PART-OF (<1) relation between situations; suppose
that:
S2 h ((climb, d, bn; 1))
and:
S2< Si
Then we can conclude that:
Si (= ((climb, d, bn; 1))
3.3 Extended Kamp Notation
Barwise and Cooper (1993) present a graphical notation for situation theory
known as Extended Kamp Notation (EKN).4 This is based upon the box notation
developed by Kamp (1981) for the discourse representation structures (DRSs) of
DRT. One important difference between EKN and DRT is that in the former the
boxes directly represent semantic objects such as infons, propositions and types,
whereas DRSs in DRT are expressions of a language which require interpreta¬
tion in a model. Nevertheless, EKN boxes look rather like DRSs and share their
representational perspicuity.
Boxes are used in EKN to group together one or more items of the same sort in
order to express conjunction of those items. The resulting conjunctive item will be
of the same sort as the separate conjuncts. For example, the following represents
the conjunction of the infons a and r.
4The following brief account of EKN is based on (Barwise and Cooper 1993), which should




For clarity, single expressions of EKN are often placed in boxes too, e.g.:
a
The traditional notation used for infons is replaced by a simplified notation which




and its dual (the corresponding infon with zero polarity) as:
->eat(X, Y)
One kind of proposition in situation theory is that some infon holds in some
situation. This is represented in EKN by tagging the infon box with the name of
the situation, to give a proposition box such as:
s
eat(X,Y)
Another form of proposition in situation theory is X:T ("X is of type T"). This




As we said above, situation theoretic objects can have restrictions placed upon
them. An infon or a proposition (either parametric or otherwise) is paired with
one or more propositions to yield a restricted object. Such an object is denoted
as below, where U is the original object and P is a proposition that restricts it.
U






represents a parametric proposition where the parameter X must range over in¬
dividuals named Emily and the parameter Y must range over objects that are
apples.5
An important point to note about restrictions is that they distribute over ope¬
rations such as conjunction (Barwise and Cooper 1993). This means that, for
example:
5sb is a background situation that supports the relevant infons. We assume here for simplicity
that the same situation supports both infons, but this is not necessarily the case. Also, it should
be pointed out that we are not attempting to give a semantics for the indefinite determiner here.
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is identical to:
This "floating to the top" of the restrictions will be seen to be important when
we look at compositional interpretation.
It is possible to abstract over one or more parameters in any kind of situation
theoretic object. The notion of abstraction in situation theory is based on work
in (Aczel and Lunnon 1991) and (Lunnon 1991). It is similar to abstraction in
the A-calculus, with the important difference that parameters may be abstracted
over simultaneously, as well as serially as in the A-calculus.
Absracting over one or more of the parameters of a parametric infon gives an
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abstract called a relation (or, if it is unary, a property). For example:
X,Y
eat(X,Y)
Abstracting over one or more of the parameters of a parametric proposition gives
an abstract called a type. For example:
X,Y
eat(X,Y)
Infon abstracts (relations or properties) and proposition abstracts (types) can




For simplicity, we will consistently use the latter notation for infon abstracts and
proposition abstracts in this thesis.
The possibility of simultaneous abstraction means that it is necessary to identify in
some way the argument roles of the abstracts. The argument roles may be indexed
simply by the natural numbers, depending on the order of the parameter symbols
in the box. Alternatively, if we are thinking of an abstract as corresponding to
a natural language utterance, we may wish to index the argument roles by, for
example, thematic roles such as 'agent' and 'patient'. Such indexing is shown as
follows:
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Agent —> X, Patient —> Y
eat(X,Y)
If the roles in an abstract are unlabelled in the notation, this indicates that they
are indexed by the natural numbers (1, ..., n).
Infon abstracts (relations) and proposition abstracts (types) can be predicated of
assignments. In the case of an abstract with argument roles which have indices
other than natural numbers, an assignment is indicated as follows:
Agent —> a
Patient —> b
The predication of an assignment by a relation forms an infon, and is shown as
follows:
Agent —> X, Patient —» Y
3.4 Situation-Theoretic Discourse Representa¬
tion Theory
3.4.1 Introduction
The EKN presented in (Barwise and Cooper 1993) is a graphical notation for
situation-theoretic objects, based on the graphical notation of DRT. Thus one of
the things that EKN does is to lay a foundation upon which a theory that combines
insights from both situation theory and DRT could be built. In (Cooper 1993c),
a proposal is made for combining situation theory and DRT in this way. We
like(X,Y)
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will now briefly describe some features of this proposal that are relevant to our
fragment.
Cooper proposes that DRSs are viewed as situation-theoretic predicates. The
reader will recall from the previous section that both types and relations can be





is an expression of a language, which must be interpreted in a model. In situation
theory, the above DRS is not a syntactic object but a semantic object: a situation-
theoretic relation just like the ones we obtained by abstracting over the parameters
of an infon in the previous section. Thus discourse referents in DRT correspond
to abstracted parameters (or, more precisely, to the roles obtained by abstracting
over parameters).
Situation theory also provides the option of introducing situations into DRSs.
Modelling DRSs not as relations but as types gives greater expressive power which
Cooper uses in his treatment of the attitudes. We will use it here to allow us to
deal with time and events.
In (Kamp and Reyle 1993) a treatment of tense and temporal reference in DRT
is given, which uses both event and time referents. (See Chapter 2 for discussion
of Kamp and Reyle's temporal fragment.) In their fragment, event referents are
related to conditions using the following notation:
e: write(x,y)
where x and y are discourse referents corresponding to individuals, and e is an
"event" discourse referent. Kamp and Reyle explain that this is an alternative
notation for the condition:
climb(e,x,y)
where e is an event argument as proposed by Davidson (1967) and adopted since
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by others.6
Kamp and Reyle explain that their notation:
e: write(x,y)
is intended to reflect the fact that e has a different status from the other discourse
referents, x and y, in the condition. They suggest that it may be right to see
conditions like write(x,y) as specifying the type of the event e (see Kamp and
Reyle 1993, p.111). However, this idea that e is of type write(x,y) is not captured
in their semantics. The interpretation of the condition:
e: write (x,y)
is the same as that of:
write(e,x,y)
— that is, the model interprets the verb 'write' as having an extension which is a
set of triples (E, a, b), where E is an event and a and b are individuals (see Kamp
and Reyle 1993, p.665). Thus the idea — which is a very intuitive one — that an
event is of a certain type is not given a semantic interpretation in DRT.
Introducing situations via STDRT allows us to give a precise semantics for the
notion of an event being of a certain type. In situation theory, if a situation s
supports an infon a then we say that s is of type a. Thus, if we model events
(and states) as situations, and see conditions as corresponding to infons, we can
interpret:
e: write(x,y)
as meaning that the situation e supports the infon write(x,y), i.e.:
e |= write(x,y).
Thus the use of situations gives us a very natural and straightforward semantics
for Kamp and Reyle's intuition about the meaning of conditions involving events.
6Kamp and Reyle differ from Davidson's proposal, however, in that Davidson proposed that
only event predicates, not states, should have an event argument, whereas Kamp and Reyle
follow Parsons (1990), for example, in giving an eventuality argument to all predicates.
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The STDRT framework allows us to use DRT's treatment of anaphora (as we did
in the fragment presented in Chapter 2) together with the notion of events (and
states) as situations provided by situation theory. The latter allows us to incorpo¬
rate information about event structure, aspectual class and discourse relations into
our grammar. In other words, DRT's facility for handling anaphora will allow us
to capture the behaviour of 'then' as a temporal anaphor, while situation theory's
rich ontology of situations, infons, etc. will allow us to express information about
event structure that will allow us to give a treatment of aspectual composition
and the like.
3.4.2 Discourse processing in DRT
In conventional DRT, the processing of a new sentence (or clause) builds on the
pre-existing DRS by adding new condition(s) and (possibly) new discourse refe¬
rents to the pre-existing DRS. Thus, for example, the sequence:
(3.1) a. A boy bought a donkey
b. He fed it
would be processed as follows. Sentence (3.1a) would be parsed according to
syntactic rules and the resulting parse tree would be subject to the operations of





(Note: we ignore matters of tense for the time being.)
The processing of (3.1b) would add new conditions to the DRS to give:
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3.4.3 Discourse processing in STDRT
In STDRT however, each sentence corresponds to the introduction of a new pro¬
position. The DRS for a discourse is the type formed by combining7 the types
corresponding to each individual sentence. In EKN, the representation for the
above discourse would be (again, ignoring tense):









We noted earlier that restrictions distribute over conjunction and other closure
7In a way that we will discuss below
89
operators that do not abstract over or substitute for parameters (see Section 3.3).
This means that the above type is identical to:





We should explain here how the current DRS is incremented by adding to it
the type corresponding to the latest sentence to be processed. Cooper defines
an operation of predicate conjunction, ©, which increments a DRS with another
DRS. This is best illustrated by the following example, taken from (Cooper 1993c,
page 23]:
i —> X, j —> Y
r(x,y)
©
i -> X, k ->■ Y
r'(X,Y)
The idea is that if two predicates are conjoined by ©, any roles that have the same
index in the two predicates will end up being assigned to the same parameter in
the conjunction. Thus anaphora can be captured by the sharing of roles, which
results in the sharing of parameters.
Consider the two conjuncts above. Abstraction over a parameter means of course







represent the same situation-theoretic object. In attempting to conjoin the two
abstracts in our example, what is taken into account is thus not the names of the
parameters but the names of the roles. Because the i-role is shared across the
two conjuncts, this role will end up being assigned to the same parameter in the
conjunction. And because the j- and A;-roles are distinct, these will be assigned
to different parameters, giving:
i -> X, j ->• Y, k -> Z
r(X,Y)
r'(X,Z)
The formal definition of © given by Cooper (1993c) is as follows:
Definition:
If £ is a predicate with role indices r^i,..., r^n, £ is a predicate with
role indices ,..., r^m and / is an assignment whose domain
{ri,...,rk} = {ra,..., rCn} U {ra,..., rfm}
which assigns a unique parameter Xi to each rj in its domain then:
ri —■> Xi, . ■ > rk Xfc
C©£ = a
u
We will now go on to describe how our grammar was developed by incorporating
ideas from Cooper's STDRT into STG (Cooper 1991) and by extending STG to
include temporal information.
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Before we do this, it should be noted that there is an important difference between
Cooper's STG and his STDRT as described in (Cooper 1993b, 1993c). In STG,
syntactic and semantic information are placed side by side in the grammar rules,
and processed in parallel. Rather than produce a syntactic parse and then go on
to interpret this using rules of interpretation (as, for example, do the grammars
of (Kamp and Reyle 1993)), syntactic and semantic information are processed
together to give the interpretation of the utterance. In this respect STG is similar
to, for example, HPSG (Pollard and Sag 1987). In STDRT, on the other hand,
Cooper is attempting to recreate Kamp and Reyle's fragments where syntax and
sematics are treated sequentially. The interpretation rules of STDRT therefore
presuppose a complete syntactic parse, just as do the construction rules of Kamp
and Reyle's fragment.
In our grammar, DSTG, we are making a preliminary attempt to build discourse
processing into STG. For this reason, our rules will look rather like those of STG
and will contain a mixture of syntactic and semantic features. We will, howe¬
ver, make use of one of the central ideas of STDRT, which is that DRSs can be
thought of as situation-theoretic types. We will also use the notion of "threading"
information through a sentence (which was originally suggested by Johnson and
Klein (1986)) in a way similar to that used in STDRT. But our rules will look
much more like STG rules than STDRT ones.
3.5 Situation Theoretic Grammar
3.5.1 Introducing STG
Our grammar is based on the situation theoretic grammar (STG) developed in
Cooper 1988a and Cooper 1991. In (Cooper 1988a) a grammar is defined to be:
"A partial characterization of a relationship between utterance situati¬
ons and other situations, about which they carry partial information."
(Cooper 1988a, p.23).
Cooper expresses this relationship as:
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gr(u, 7r, env)
where 'gr' is the grammar relation, u is the use of a linguistic expression, n is a
parametric infon (that is, an infon whose arguments are parameters) and env is
an environment which provides anchors for the parameters of the infon.8
Cooper also divides the grammar relation 'gr' into a group of more specific gram¬
mar relations including 's', 'vp', 'np' etc., corresponding to the relevant gram¬
matical categories. He defines phrase structure rules in terms of these grammar
relations. Each constituent is associated with partial information about an infon
and an environment. Constituent combination requires identity or compatibi¬
lity between the infons and environments of the combining constituents and the
resulting constituent.
For example, Cooper's top-level "sentence" rule is as follows:
s([NP VP]s, 7r, env) if
np (NP. subj, 7r, env)
vp (VP, 7r, env)
NP [= [case : nom]
This rule is to be interpreted as follows. As mentioned above, the 'gr' relation (in
this case the's' relation) holds between an utterance situation corresponding to
the use of a linguistic expression, a parametric infon, and an environment. Uses
are represented by underlining; thus VP is the use of the verb phrase. The relation
'np' has an extra argument corresponding to the grammatical function "subject".
Utterance situations corresponding to uses of linguistic expressions support infor¬
mation about, for example, case, number and gender. Here, the use of the NP
supports the information that its case is nominative. Such information allows the
rules to incorporate syntactic features such as agreement among constituents. As
such features are functional (single-valued), the representation is in the form of
sets of feature:value pairs.
8An anchor in situation theory assigns values to parameters. It thus differs from an assig¬
nment, which assigns values to roles of an abstract. The idea is that parametric objects are
seen as generalisations over classes of non-parametric objects. The parameters of a parametric
object could be associated with objects called anchors. Replacement of a parameter in a pa¬
rametric object by its anchor would yield an object belonging to the class that the parametric
object abstracts over. (This explanation is based on the one in (Cooper 1991), which should be
consulted for further details.)
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Cooper's grammar consists of a lexicon and a set of phrase structure rules. The
lexical entry for 'likes' is given below:
likes:
v(m, <C R, X, Y; 1 ^>, env
use-of: 'likes'
category: V
env 1= [[u, pred] : R/li
U\ 1= [ person: third ]
u f=
if
<e, [wi, subj] : X/x, [n2,obj] : Y/y]
Lexical entries for verbs introduce the structure of the infon. Because 'likes' is
transitive, there are parameters X and Y corresponding to the first and second
arguments of the relation.
u is the utterance situation corresponding to a use of the verb. It supports the
information that there is a use of the word 'likes' and its category is V. The
information supported by env is to be interpreted as follows. The notation:
[u,pred]: R/like
signifies that the parameter R of the infon is labelled by the utterance situation u
and also by the grammatical function 'pred' (predicate). The notion of labelling is
a precursor of the idea of role indexing, introduced above. An anchoring environ¬
ment in Cooper's STG supplies not only anchors for parameters but labels which
are used to point at a particular parameter. In principle, any kind of situation-
theoretic object could be used to label a parameter. In Cooper's grammar both
utterance situations and grammatical relations are used for this purpose.




is actually an abbreviation for:
< anchor, <R,X,Y;1»,R, {u, pred}, like; 1 »
where 'anchor' is a relation that holds between a parametric infon, a parameter,
one or more labels for that parameter, and exactly one anchor for that parameter.
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In Cooper's STG, the environment may support information other than the pro¬
vision of labels and specific anchors. For example, restrictions may be placed on
the objects to which a parameter may be anchored. This is best illustrated by the




u |= category: N
person: third
env f= [[u,gr] : X/z],
env \= <C named, x,'Anna';l3>
env 1= < female, x;l
Note that there is an argument place here for the grammatical function 'gf', which
is unspecified as 'Anna' may be used as either the subject or object of a sentence.
Env supports information to the effect that X may only be anchored to an indi¬
vidual named 'Anna' who is female.
Our DSTG grammar rules for intra-sentential processing are based upon those of
Cooper's STG described above. However, in addition to extending the rules to
process discourse and include temporal information, we have introduced modifi¬
cations in the light of recent developments in situation theory that have occurred
since Cooper's original grammar was developed. For example, the notion of ab¬
straction over parameters in parametric objects was not well developed in the
version of situation theory used by Cooper for STG. We have modified the 'infon'
(tt) argument of the grammar relation to be a type instead of an infon.9
Restrictions are also treated rather differently. Rather than having a single situa¬
tion env to support restrictions on anchors for parameters, a restricted object is
now formed (as described in Section 3.3) by combining restrictions with an object
such as an infon or proposition. The restrictions consist of a set of propositions,
and may involve more than one situation. A restricting proposition may, as we
discussed earlier, place restrictions on the kind of objects over which a parame-
9It was suggested in (Cooper 1991) that ultimately it might be preferable to use a proposition
rather than an infon to represent the interpretation of a sentence.
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ter may range. Thus current notions are intuitively similar but formally rather
different from those used in (Cooper 1991).
In our grammar, which uses EKN, the restrictions form part of the 'type' argument
and may involve more than one situation. Thus we do not need the env argument
to support information, say, about names. We still, however, need to express
information about the labelling of parameters, or some similar notion. But by
using a type rather than an infon, we can index the roles of the type with utterance
situations and grammatical functions. We therefore use role indexing instead of
parameter labelling, and this allows us to dispense entirely with the argument
env.
The above changes do not actually make a great deal of difference to the way that
the grammar works. The phrase structure rules and lexical entries are expressed in
a similar format to those of Cooper's STG. Grammatical processing once again is
based upon compatability between information associated with the constituents
and their combined use. Processing of an individual sentence produces a type
which includes restrictions on, for example, the objects to which roles of the type
may be assigned. Processing of a discourse composed of one or more sentences
produces a DRS/type derived from the conjunction of types derived from the
individual sentences. We will describe this in detail shortly.
We have extended the STG rules to deal with both temporal constructions and
the processing of discourse. Before discussing these extensions we will address
in detail some issues concerning the representation of temporal information in
situation theory.
3.5.2 The extension ofCooper's STG fragment to include
temporal information
Introduction
Cooper's original STG did not cover temporal reference. The verbs were all present
tense and no temporal information was present in the rules. An extended version
of Cooper's grammar was developed by Glasbey (1990). Here, the implemented
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version of STG (known as ProSit) was expanded to include past and future tenses,
perfects, progressive aspect, various aspectual classes, aspectual modification and
temporal adverbials. This grammar was, however, limited to single sentences
and did not process discourse. Temporal information was incorporated by giving
each relation an extra argument I corresponding to spatiotemporal location. The
idea of using a single argument for spatiotemporal location rather than separate
arguments for time and place was prompted by early work in situation semantics
(Barwise and Perry 1983) and by the treatment of aspectual classes in situation
semantics in (Cooper 1985) and (Cooper 1986).
The motivation for using / rather than separate time and place arguments has been
questioned by Crow (1990). Crow argues that there is little linguistic evidence
supporting the need for four-dimensional space-time "chunks" in the ontology of
situation theory. She argues (as have others, such as Devlin (1991)), that natural
language constructions almost always apply to either temporal or spatial regions
but not both. Crow discusses a few examples where spatiotemporal locations
might possible be needed, such as events, trips, holidays and so on, including the
example from (Cooper 1985):
(3.2) It did not snow on the trip from Madison to Chicago
Crow points out, however, that spatiotemporal locations may not even be neces¬
sary in these cases. For example, as Cooper (1985) suggests, the semantics for an
NP such as 'the trip' could involve seeing the denotation of the NP as a set of
space-time pairs.
Crow argues in favour of regarding time and place roles as (separate) argument
roles of relations. This does not, however, presuppose that every relation will
necessarily have a time role, a place role, or both.
It seems there is a need for more detailed investigation here. One approach that
might be taken is to look at which relations possess which argument roles. If it
could be shown, for example, that there are some relations which have time roles
but not place roles, then this would suggest that we should consider time and
place roles separately. Of course, this raises the question of how we are to tell
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which relations possess which roles. One way of answering this might be to look
at temporal and spatial anaphora. We will consider this issue further below.
Another issue worth investigating might be that of whether time, place or spatio-
temporal locations should be considered as argument roles of relations at all. An
alternative would be, for example, to regard infons not as unary types of situations
but as binary types of situations and times, or as ternary types of situations, ti¬
mes and places. There would be no problem in expressing this in situation theory,
which can remain neutral on this issue. The question appears to depend, rather,
upon the particular application. We simply wish to note that it should not be
taken as a foregone conclusion that times are argument roles of relations, but that
linguistic evidence may well be relevant in making this decision. The topic is one
that may be taken up in future work.
Since we have decided to stick with relations having time and place roles for the
present, we now need to consider whether or not every relation actually has such
roles. In the following section we will consider various pieces of linguistic evidence
that bear on this.
We will consider for simplicity here that if a relation has a time (or place) role,
then an eventuality involving this relation will also have a time (or place) role,
and vice versa. Thus we will speak about testing for the presence or otherwise of
time and place roles associated with eventualities.
Thus, T can be thought of as the eventuality time of S. If the relation has a
time role, then the eventuality will also have a time role. If the relation lacks a
time role, the eventuality will lack one too. If on the other hand we use timeless
relations, then the question becomes one of whether a given infon is a binary type
of situations and times, or a unary type of situations. So whichever option we
take, the question is really one of whether the eventuality in question is associated
with a time, or not. We will thus rephrase our initial question and ask which
eventualities have time (and place) roles and which do not.
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Linguistic tests for which eventualities have time and/or place roles
Testing for time roles
One obvious test for the presence of a time role associated with an eventuality is
whether or not it is possible to specify the time at which the eventuality occurred
or held. For example:
(3.3) Daniel liked rugby last year
(3.4) Emily played football yesterday
(3.5) John climbed Snowdon last week
(3.6) Mary finished her chapter at 5pm
Here we have a state, an activity, an accomplishment and an achievement respec¬
tively, each of which is modified by a temporal adverbial. Thus it seems clear that
each of these eventualities has a time role. Of course, we say above that we will
need more than one time role for a given type of eventuality, and we will need
further tests to determine exactly which time roles are needed. However, we do
not propose to do this here. Our purpose here is simply to establish that time
roles seem to be ubiquitous to eventualities. It is difficult to imagine this being
other than the case.
Testing for place roles
Now let us try to do the same thing for place.
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(3.7) Daniel liked rugby in Wales
(3.8) Emily played football in the park
(3.9) ? John climbed Snowdon in Wales
(3.10) Mary finished her homework in the study
At first glance, (3.7) seems to confirm that the described state has a place role.
But we need to be careful here. It is possible that the meaning of (3.7) is something
akin to:
(3.11) Daniel liked rugby when he was staying in Wales
or perhaps:
(3.12) Daniel liked watching rugby that was played in Wales
In (3.11), rather than being a spatial modifier, 'in Wales' appears to be acting
as a kind of hidden temporal modifier. Cooper (1985) introduces such cases in a
discussion of whether stative relations have place arguments.
The uncertainty here suggests that we should look for other tests. One possibility
is to use spatial anaphora. If it is possible to use 'there' to refer back to a spatial
location established by a previous sentence, then the eventuality described in that
sentence must surely have a place role.
However, an investigation into 'there' as spatial anaphor reveals that it requires




(3.13) a. Jane made a parachute landing
b. Bill landed there (too)
sounds extremely odd. Yet if we add an ESR:
(3.14) a. Jane made a parachute landing in the middle of a field
b. Bill landed there too
the sequence becomes perfectly acceptable. Thus it seems that 'there' is not a
test for place roles in general, because it can only refer back to explicit spatial
referents.10
We can, however, use 'at the same place'.
(3.15) a. Jane made a parachute landing
b. Bill landed at the same place
The acceptability of (3.15a,3.15b) strongly suggests that the event described in
(3.15a) has an associated place role. 'Nearby' appears to work in the same way
as 'at the same place' by not requiring an ESR.
Now consider:
(3.16) a. Daniel liked rugby
b. Owen liked rugby at the same place
It appears that (3.16a,3.16b) can only be interpreted if we take the reading where
Daniel liked rugby when he was staying at a certain place, and that Owen liked
10More work is required on 'there'. We will say a little more about this in Chapter 6.
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rugby when he was at that same place. Or perhaps, that Daniel liked watching
rugby played at Murrayfield, and Owen like watching rugby played at Murrayfield
too. But of course in this latter case it is the playing events that are located at
Murrayfield, not the states of liking. This issue clearly relates to that of PP-
attachment — whether the PP 'at the same place' attaches to the NP 'rugby' or
to the VP (or to S), for example.
Thus we have some evidence here that some states, at least, do not have place
roles. We do not, however, consider the evidence to be conclusive. It may not
be possible to generalise over states in this way, and we should remain open to
the possibility that some states have place roles while others do not. This issue is
considered further in (Glasbey 1994a).
Example (3.17) is interesting.
(3.17) ?John climbed Snowdon in Wales
The reason we marked (3.17) with a question mark is that it sounds rather odd
unless we take it to mean that John climbed Snowdon when he was in Wales, or
alternatively, that we take 'in Wales' to modify 'Snowdon'. This, of course, is
similar to the stative case and suggests that the event described here does not
have a place role. But it seems very odd to think of a climbing event not having
a place role. Intuitively, a climb must be spatially located, while a 'liking', one
feels, need not. Note that:
(3.18) John climbed in Wales
is perfectly fine.
Let us examine the sequences with 'at the same place'.
(3.19) a. John climbed Snowdon
b. Owen climbed Snowdon/it at the same place
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Once again, this sounds very odd, while:
(3.20) a. John climbed
b. Owen climbed at the same place
sounds fine.
What seems to be happening here is that the argument labelled 'Snowdon' is
somehow getting in the way of being able to specify the place role. This makes
sense if we see the direct object argument 'Snowdon' filling the place role itself
and thus making it impossible to fill it again. Presumably this is possible because
'Snowdon' names an object that is also a place.
Conclusion
Our brief excursion into the evidence for time and place roles has led us to the
conclusion that while all eventualities appear to have time roles, it is at least
possible that states do not have place roles. Thus our findings suggest that it
is preferable to use separate time and place roles rather than a single role for
spatiotemporal location.
We therefore propose to give separate time and place roles to eventualities.
Before we introduce the grammar there is one further issue we must consider —




allows us to say about the temporal properties of S. Can we, for example, associate
S in some way with T? Clearly, this depends on what other infons S supports.
Remember that S may be a "big" situation which supports many more infons







Here, S may be the situation we might call "Daniel's climbing Ben Nevis" — that
is, it supports the infon climb(X,Y,T) and (perhaps) little or nothing else. But S
could also be a much larger situation — for example, the situation that comprises
Daniel's school trip to Fort William, or even the much larger situation we might
call "Daniel's life". Obviously T does not give us any information about the
duration of these latter two situations. But it seems correct to say that T tells us
something about the temporal duration of the situation we can think of as Daniel's
climb of For example, S' may be required to support the infon walk(X,T") , if we
consider it impossible for someone to climb a mountain without walking.
One way around this problem is to use the notion of "key infon" introduced in
(Cooper 1985). Cooper defines a key infon of a situation S as follows:
Definition:
A key infon is an infon (supported by a situation S) whose temporal
duration includes those of all the other infons supported by S.
Cooper allows there to be more than one key infon for a given situation, in which
case the key infons would have the same temporal durations. We could express
this as a binary type KEY holding between a situation S and an infon cr(T), where
the notation o[T) indicates that the infon a contains the parameter T.
Then we can say:
S, a{T) : KEY -> S, T : TIME-OF
where TIME-OF is a type of a situation S and a time T such that T can be
thought of as the temporal duration of S.
We define an eventuality (or a situation of type EVENTUALITY) as follows:
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Definition:
An eventuality is a situation that has at least one key infon. We say
that such a situation is of type EVENTUALITY.
3.6 DSTG: The Extension of STG to Discourse
3.6.1 Coverage of the fragment
Our grammatical fragment generates the discourse sequences (3.21a,3.21b), (3.21a,3.21c),
(3.21a,3.21d) and (3.21a,3.21e).
(3.21) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
b. Owen climbed Snowdon then
c. Owen was climbing Snowdon then
d. Owen liked Daniel then
e. Then Owen climbed Snowdon
It also generates the sequences (3.22a,3.22c), (3.22a,3.22d), (3.22a,3.22e), but di¬
sallows (3.22a,3.22b), just as in the DRT fragment we gave in Chapter 2.
(3.22) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Owen climbed Snowdon then
c. Owen was climbing Snowdon then
d. Owen liked Daniel then
e. Then Owen climbed Snowdon
The coverage is thus the same as that of the DRT fragment of Chapter 2. For
simplicity, we have retained the syntactic form of the rules from the DRT frag¬
ment. However our rules are written in the form of Cooper's STG (Cooper 1991),
and thus contain both syntactic and semantic features. DSTG, like STG, does
105
syntactic and semantic processing concurrently, which means that processing of a
sentence or sequence of sentences results directly in the construction of a semantic
representation expressed in EKN notation. As we explained earlier, this is unlike
Kamp and Reyle's DRT and Cooper's STDRT, where a complete syntactic parse
is obtained first, followed by semantic interpretation. DSTG differs from STDRT
in another important way: in STDRT, Cooper uses Montague-style application
to combine interpretations of constituents, whereas in DSTG we use Cooper's ©
operator (see Section 3.4.3) in order to combine interpretations. We will explain
how this works shortly.
We will first present the phrase structure rules in simplified form in order to show
the basic syntax of the fragment. Then we will explain some of the complete rules
and lexical entries in detail and show how discourse processing is achieved.
3.6.2 Syntactic rules
In order to process sequences of sentences, we introduce a top-level recursive
discourse rule:
Dis —>■ S', Dis
The introduction of such a rule is equivalent to assigning a "tree structure" to
discourse, along the lines of, for example, (Polanyi and Scha 1984). The decision
to assign this kind of structure to discourse was made for reasons of processing
simplicity, as the required recursive rule is easily introduced into a definite-clause
grammar (DCG). The grammar was designed with implementation in Prolog in
mind, along the lines of Cooper's implementation of STG called ProSit, descri¬
bed in (Cooper 1988b) In fact, a grammar similar to the one we present here
but containing some additional features including aspectual composition has been
implemented in Prolog, and is described in (Glasbey 1993c).
We do not consider here the alternative possibilities for discourse structure, alt¬
hough we do not intend to rule them out of consideration.
We make our top-level sentence category S' rather than S in order to deal with
sentential adverbials (see below). We follow Kamp and Reyle (forthcoming) in
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treating all the adverbials in this fragment as sentential. This treatment of ad-
verbials as sentential appears to be appropriate for 'then' but of course would not
be appropriate for all adverbials. In a larger fragment, a rule such as:
V' -> V', AdvP
would need to be added. The recursive nature of this rule allows the grammar to
parse sequences of adverbials.11
The base of the recursion is covered by the rule:
Dis S'
Thus our grammar will parse (or generate) discourse sequences containing an
indefinite number of sentences.
Moving down the parse tree, the next rule we require is:
S' S, AdvP
This will, of course, only deal with sentences containing just one sentence-final
adverbial. In order to deal with sentence-initial 'then' we need the rule:
S' AdvP, S
and, for sentences without adverbials:
S' -> S
We will analyse 'S' as being composed of 'NP' and 'VP', i.e.:
S ->• NP, VP'
Although our fragment does not include the future 'will' or other modals, we
will design the grammar in order to allow these to be added if the fragment is
extended. Thus we will use the rule:
VP' -> VP
which leaves us room to add modals if we require, by adding a rule such as
11The syntax and semantics of sequences of temporal adverbials is by no means straightfor¬
ward, however, and we do not mean to suggest that the addition of this rule would solve all the
problems.
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VP' -* Mod, VP
In order to analyse the progressive we will follow Kamp and Reyle in using a
recursive rule:
VP ->• Aux, VP
and for transitive verbs:
VP ->■ V, NP
and intransitives:
VP -> V
The only kind of NPs we have in our fragment are proper names, so we will simply
need the rule:
NP —» N
Our AdvP rule for 'then' is:
AdvP —> Adv
and for 'in'-adverbials we require:
AdvP —» Prep, NP (temp)
Our modification of STG for discourse processing involves the idea of "threading"
discourse referents from left to right through the discourse. This notion is taken
from (Johnson and Klein 1986), where the authors use it to deal with pronominal
anaphora in a declarative implementation of DRT. We are concerned here only
with temporal anaphora and do not attempt to deal with pronouns. However,
our rules could be extended in a reasonably straightforward manner to deal with
pronominal anaphora.
We use a pair of arguments in and out which are passed from NP to VP' in a
given sentence and also passed on to successive sentences in the discourse, in is
a set whose members are the discourse referents introduced by the parsing of the
discourse so far. Parsing of the current constituent may cause modification of
in to give an updated list of referents out which will be the input to parsing of
the next constituent. This left-to-right flow of information is based on that used
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by Johnson and Klein (1986) and is also employed in (Cooper 1993c), where it
is referred to as the 'Pereiran flow' of information, after the work of Fernando
Pereira (Pereira 1982).
At the beginning of a discourse, in will be the empty set. If we are in the middle
of a sequence of sentences, in will consist of the set of discourse referents that have
been introduced by processing the discourse up to this point. Thus the processing
of a given constituent takes place with reference to the value of in at that point.
By this means we can keep track of temporal referents introduced by the discourse
so far in a way that is necessary for the processing of temporal anaphora with
'then'. Of course, we could also keep track of other, non-temporal discourse
referents in this way if we wanted to, but we do not treat pronominal anaphora
in this fragment. Note, too, that our approach allows a temporal anaphor to refer
back to a temporal referent introduced earlier in the same sentence. Although
our fragment does not contain any such examples, this means that it could be
extended relatively simply if we wanted to introduce such sentences.
3.6.3 Summary of syntax
For convenience, we present here the set of rules of the grammar, stripped of most
of their features.
Dis —> S', Dis
Dis -> S'
S' -> S, AdvP
S' AdvP, S
S' S
S -> NP, VP'
VP' -► VP






AdvP —> Prep, NP (temp)
Adv —> {then}
N —>• {Daniel, Owen, Emily, Fiona, BenNevis, Snowdon, July}
V -4 {climbed, liked, ran, climbing, running}
Prep —>• {in}
Aux —>■ {was}
3.6.4 Lexical entries and grammar rules
We begin by presenting our lexical entry for the verb 'liked'. For comparison, we
will repeat the entry for 'likes' from Cooper's STG in (Cooper 1991).
likes:
v(u,{(R, X,Y; 1 )),env) if
use-of: 'likes'
category: V
env |= [[u, pred] : R/li
U\ |= [ person: third ]
u (=
<e, [«i,subj] : X/x, [u2,obj] : Y/y]
We explained the meaning of this entry in Section 3.5.1.
Our entry for 'liked' looks rather different. This is partly because we have used
the situation-theoretic notions of type, abstraction and role-indexing which were
not available when STG was developed. However, DSTG rules are closely related
to STG rules, as will become clear when we explain them below.
First, a note about notation. In all the lexical entries and rules below, variables
are denoted by italics (e.g. x), parameters in uppercase Roman font (e.g. X) and
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constants in lowercase Roman (e.g. c).
Our lexical entry for 'liked' is as follows:
liked:
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):v
where ty is:
[subj, Ui] —»• X, [obj, u2\ —>■ Y, [pred, u] —y R, [ev, «3, utt] —»• S, [time, utt] —>■ T
R(X,Y,T) STATE
if:













out = in U {[ev,us,utt], [time,utt]}.
In place of Cooper's grammatical relations (s, vp, np, v, n, etc.) in STG, which
hold between an utterance (situation) of a constituent, an infon and an environ¬
ment, we use a 6-place type (e.g. v) to express this information. The lexical entry
above states that type v holds of the 6-tuple comprising an utterance of a consti¬
tuent (u), the utterance of the whole sentence (utt), a type (ty), an assignment
(/) and the sets of ingoing and outgoing discourse referents for that constituent
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(in, out), provided that certain specified conditions hold. These include a specifi¬
cation of the type ty introduced by the verb 'liked' (which replaces the infon used
in STG, and contains additional aspectual information), a specification of what
information is supported by utterances of other constituents of the sentence (u\,
U2, etc.), information about the assignment, and a specification of how out relates
to in.
The information that was supported by env in STG is now expressed in other
ways. Information about the labelling of parameters by constituent uses and
grammatical functions is expressed by the indexing of the roles of ty. For example,
this role-indexing tells us that the role obtained by abstracting over parameter X is
indexed by the grammatical function 'subj' and by the utterance u\. Env in STG
also supported information about restrictions on the objects to which parameters
could be anchored. This information is now incorporated into the restrictions of
ty.
Note that while the roles corresponding to parameters X, Y, R are indexed firstly
by a grammatical function and secondly by an utterance of a constituent, the
roles corresponding to S and T are slightly different. Let us consider T first. T
is meant to represent the "eventuality time" of the state described by the whole
utterance. But we have seen that such an eventuality time is never phonologically
realised in an utterance (see Section 3.5.2). This means that there is no constituent
corresponding to T. We therefore choose to index this role with the utterance of
the whole sentence, utt. We will show how such indexing is useful when we look
at the grammar rules below. It makes intuitive sense to do things this way, as
we can readily think of the eventuality time being provided not by a particular
constituent but by the sentence as a whole.12 The role corresponding to S is
thrice-indexed: by the grammatical function ev13, by a constituent utterance and
by the utterance utt of the whole sentence. We will find this indexing with utt
useful when we come to the rule for PART-OF 'then', which requires the role for
12We are dealing with simple sentences here, where it is assumed that only one eventuality
time is involved. In a bigger fragment, more complex sentences might well introduce more than
one eventuality and eventuality time. Thus what we refer to here as a 'sentence' would be better
described as a 'clause'.
13Actually it is perhaps not quite right to think of ev as a grammatical function, but we use it
for consistency and for want of a better term. If preferred, a term such as 'sat-pred' (saturated
predicate) could be used.
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the previous eventuality in the discourse to be identified.
The information supported by the various constituent utterances, ui, u2, etc., is
given in the form of feature structures as in STG. The notation:
u h use-of: 'liked'
for example, is shorthand for:
u 1= ((use-of, u, 'liked')).
The use of feature structures means that the feature is functional (single-valued).
In DSTG we also allow some features to take values which are sets. This is denoted
by feat:{val}, for example:
u4 |= cat: {np}
This means that the 'cat' feature of u4 is multivalued, and the above expression
signifies that 'np' is among the values that it takes. This is useful because we
want to regard the utterance of a proper-name such as 'Daniel' as being the same
situation as the utterance of the corresponding NP. We can then say that the 'cat'
value of this utterance is {n,np}. The notation:
u4 \= cat: {... ,np}
signifies that 'np' is the highest14 category value in the set of category values for
u4 at this stage in the parse. In this case, for example, u4 might support
cat: {n,np}
It should be noted that in all these rules there is implicit universal quantification
over all variables on the left hand side, and implicit existential quantification over
any new variables introduced on the right hand side (i.e., after the 'if'). The rules
are essentially presented in Horn clause format.
14That is, the highest in the parse tree, where s' is at the top.
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Finally, a note about in and out. In a lexical entry for a verb, such as the one
above, the discourse referents corresponding to parameters S and T are added to
in. Note that the time role is added even though this does not correspond to an
explicit temporal referent. It is perhaps not quite right to think of this role as
a referent, but nevertheless it is useful to add it here for bookkeeping purposes.
When we discuss the rules for temporal adverbials below, we will show how explicit
temporal referents are distinguished from eventuality times in in and out. The
referents corresponding to the subject and object roles are not introduced by the
verb but by the subject and object constituents (see the lexical entries for proper
names, below). The fact that set union, U, is used to add new referents to in
means that if a referent is already a member of in it will not be added again.
We will now give the lexical entry for 'climbed'. It is very similar to the one for
'liked', the only important difference being that in this case the described situation
is of type EVENT.
climbed:
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):v
where ty is:





[[pred,tt] —t climb] C /
use-of: 'climbed'
cat: {v}
u ]= trans: pos
aspect: simple
time-ref: past
til H ca^: {■ • • TP}
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U2 |= cat: {... ,np}
«3 h ev-type: event
out = in U {[ev,u3,utt], [time,idt]}.
The lexical entry for the present participle 'climbing' is as follows:
climbing:
(■u, utt, ty, /, in, out):v
where ty is:

















out = in U {[ev,u3,utt], [time,«ft]}.
In this fragment we treat progressives as stative: thus S is of type STATE. We
also use the relation 'climbing', but we leave the relationship between 'climb' and
'climbing' unanalysed here. We are aware that this is a rather perfunctory and
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unsatisfactory treatment of the progressive, but analysing the progressive is not
a chief aim of this fragment. We give a detailed analysis of the progressive in
(Glasbey 1994a).
Our DSTG fragment also includes the intransitive 'ran' and 'running'. In these
cases, ty contains the infon run(X,T). Otherwise the entries are essentially the
same as for 'climb' and 'climbing'. We will not be concerned here with the diffe¬
rences between activities and accomplishments. Aspectual class distinctions such
as these will be dealt with in Chapter 5.
ran:
{u, utt, ty, f, in, out):v
where ty is:












U\ f= cat: {... ,np}
U2 [= ev-type: event
out = in U {[ev,u2,utt], [time,uft]}.
running:
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):v
where ty is:
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out — in U {[ev,U2,utt], [time,utt]}.
We will now consider lexical entries for proper names, including temporal ones
like 'July' and non-temporal ones like 'Daniel'. The lexical entry for 'Daniel' is:
'Daniel':
(■u, utt, ty, /, in, out):n
where ty is:
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U m inoun-class: proper
noun-type: nominal
gf: gf
out — in U {[gf,u]}.
Note that the grammatical function for the role corresponding to X is a variable,
gf. This is because 'Daniel' may be used as either the subject or object of a
sentence. It is thus necessary to leave the gramatical function unspecified in the
lexical entry. When constituent combination occurs according to one of the rules of
the grammar, gr will become instantiated to either 'subj' or 'obj', as appropriate.
Observe, too, that the roles corresponding to the background situation B and the
resource situation Rs are indexed with the utterance u. It is necessary to identify
resource and background situations with constituent utterances in this way for
the following reason. We sometimes need more than one resource situation for an
utterance of a single sentence, because of cases like:
(3.23) The dog chased the dog
where a separate resource situation is needed for each utterance of 'the dog' in
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order to identify a unique referent in each case. Such examples are discussed in
(Cooper 1993a).
The lexical entries for 'Owen', 'Emily' and so on are very similar to the one for
'Daniel'. The entries for 'Ben Nevis' and 'Snowdon' differ slightly in that of course
there is no gender specification here. We give the entry for 'Ben Nevis' below.
'Ben Nevis':
{u, utt, ty, f, in, out):n
where ty is:











= in U {\gf,u]\.
In this fragment, the only type of nouns are proper nouns and temporal proper
nouns. For the temporal noun 'July' we have the following lexical entry:
'July':
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):n
where ty is:
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out = in U {[time,utt], [etr,u,utt]}.
Here, an additional time parameter T' has been introduced. This is because 'July'
is an explicit temporal referent. The role corresponding to T' is indexed with 'etr',
the utterance of 'July' (u), and utt. This indexing with utt will be needed when
we come to the rule for ETR 'then', which requires us to identify the ETR role
most recently added to in.
The feature information supported by u conveys that u is of noun-type 'temporal'
(as opposed to 'nominal'), that it is of adverbial-type 'frame' (meaning that it
may combine with a preposition to give a frame adverbial like 'in July') and that
it is an ETR use. This latter information will again be used in the rule for ETR
'then'.
The lexical entry for the auxiliary 'was' (required for the progressive) is given
below. No updating of in takes place here, so we set out to equal in.
was:
(u, utt, ty, /, in, out):aux
where ty is:
120






u |= cat: {aux}
time-ref: past
«3 H person: third
out = in.
We now give the lexical entry for the preposition 'in',
in:
(it, tiff, fy, /, m, owf):prep
where is:












Note that □ denotes temporal inclusion and o denotes temporal overlap.
Thus ty for 'in' introduces a parameter T' corresponding to an explicit temporal
referent (the ETR will be whatever 'in' combines with to form an AdvP — such
as 'July').
u is of prep-type 'frame', signifying that it combines with another constituent (a
temporal NP) to form a frame adverbial.
The information supported by B depends on whether S is of type EVENT or
STATE. The appropriate information will be added to the restrictions of ty.
No referents are added to in.
We now come to the lexical entries for 'then'. These are based on the theoretical
analysis of 'then' that we gave in Chapter 2, and therefore reflect the two readings
for 'then' that we called ETR 'then' and PART-OF 'then'.
First, we give the entry for ETR 'then'. We showed in Chapter 2 how this reading
of 'then' depends upon the presence in the discourse context of a temporal dis¬
course referent corresponding to an explicit temporal referent (ETR) such as
'July' or 'Thursday' or '2pm'. ETR 'then' is anaphoric in the sense that it relates
the time of the eventuality in the current utterance to this previously-introduced
temporal referent. Thus, the rule for ETR 'then' must identify such a temporal
referent — one that was introduced by an ETR earlier in the discourse. We make
the simplifying assumption here that the rule for ETR 'then' finds the most re¬
cently introduced temporal referent of this kind. As discussed in Chapter 2,
things may be more complicated than this, and we suspect that discourse struc¬
ture may have a part to play here, in which case a full analysis would require
a detailed theory of discourse structure. Here, we will simply allow the rule for
ETR 'then' to seek out the most recently introduced temporal referent. If no such
referent is available, the rule will fail.
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We must be careful to distinguish between temporal referents that were introdu¬
ced by explicit mention of a time (an ETR) and those which are inferred from
the description of an eventuality. Recall that our lexical entries described above
express this distinction. A time referent not introduced by an ETR is added to
in in the form:
[time,u£t]
whereas a time referent introduced by an ETR is added to in in the form:
[etr ,u,utt\
In the latter case, the lexical entry also tell us that:
u (= adv-class: etr
Note: This distinction is crucial in obtaining the correct readings for 'then'. It
replaces the distinction made in Chapter 2 between event referents (introduced
by all sentences) and time referents (introduced only by sentences with explicit
temporal referents).
We will therefore require the rule for ETR 'then' to find from in the most recently
added temporal referent of form [etr,u,utt\, and to check that:
u h adv-class: etr
In order to find the most recent temporal referent, we will need to make sure that
we can identify the most recent utterance. One way of doing this would be to mark
each utterance situation with the time of utterance. Another would be to index
each utterance with a natural number in ascending order. We will not attempt
to spell out the details of this here, but assume that it is possible somehow to
identify the most recently-uttered referent of the kind we want.
The rule for ETR 'then' therefore looks as follows:
ETR then:
(u, utt, ty, /, in, out):adv
where ty is:
123





then B f= T C T'
if S:STATE
then B f= T o T'
if:
[etr, U2, utt1] E in













As explained above, this rule identifies the most recent utterance of an ETR, from
in. The background situation B for the utterance of 'then' is made to support
information about how the parameter T' corresponding to this ETR relates to the
time T of the eventuality described by the current utterance. The exact nature
of this information depends on whether the current eventuality S is an event or a
state, just as in the lexical entry for 'in', above.
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The requirement that Ui supports the fact that the adverbial class is 'etr' checks
that the identified referent was introduced by an ETR.15
Now let us look at the lexical entry for PART-OF 'then'.
In Chapter 2 we showed how PART-OF 'then' conveys that the current eventuality
is part of (using the informal notion PART-OF) the previous one. We showed that
this may be the case if the discourse relation is elaboration or backgrounding.
Testing for a possible elaboration depends on world knowledge, and we have not
attempted to encode this in our fragment. There is no reason, however, why
this could not be done. In this fragment we deal only with the backgrounding
instance of PART-OF. We saw in Chapter 2 that the backgrounding relation
requires that the current eventuality is stative (which, in this fragment, means
that we have either a lexical stative or a progressive). The rule for PART-OF
'then' will therefore need to check that the current eventuality is a state. In
the current fragment, we replace the informal PART-OF of Chapter 2 with the
situation theoretic PART-OF relation < (see Section 3.2).
In this case, we will need to identify the previous utterance, uttp. The background
situation B is made to support the information that the current eventuality S is
PART-OF the eventuality S' described by the previous utterance.
The rule is as follows:
PART-OF then:
(u, utt, ty, /, in, owt):adv
where ty is:
15Although, in fact, we are double-checking here because the form of the referent [etr, u?,utt']
in in ensured that the referent was introduced by an ETR. ft is possible that in a bigger fragment
we might want to index the parameter by something more general than 'etr' — for example,
if we had temporal adverbials that are not ETRs, such as 'for'-adverbials. The check that U2
supports the fact that the adverbial class is 'etr' would then be required.
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[ev, u2, uttp] G in,









If there is no previous eventuality (i.e., if the current eventuality is the first in the
discourse), or if the current eventuality is not a state, the rule for PART-OF 'then'
will fail. This allows us to rule out unacceptable sequences of the kind discussed
in Chapter 2. We will give some examples of the rules for 'then' in action in the
next section.
Now let us look at the lexical entry for sentence-initial 'then'. We saw in Chapter
2 that sentence-initial 'then' conveys that the current eventuality is temporally
preceded by the previously-described eventuality. There were no requirements
here on whether the current eventuality is an event or a state. The lexical entry is
therefore comparatively straightforward. It requires the time of the previous even¬
tuality to be identified, and makes B support the information that T' temporally
precedes T.
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The lexical entry is as follows:
SI then:
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):adv
where ty is:
time, utt] —> T, [ev, u\, utt] —> S, [time, uttp] —>• T', [bg, u\ —> B
<r(T)
B
T ' -< T
if:
[time, uttp] € in,






out = in U {[time,«££]}.
This completes the set of lexical entries for our fragment. We will now move on
to look at the grammar rules for constituent combination, which are of a similar
form to the lexical entries.
We precede each rule with its number and an abbreviated form of the rule to show
its essential structure (in bold type).
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Gl. NP -» N
(u, utt, ty, /, in, otd):np
if:
u : [np n]
(n, utt, ty, f, in, out):n
. cat: {n,np}
u \= noun-class: proper
Rule Gl says that a 6-tuple is of type np provided that the same 6-tuple is of type
n and various other conditions hold. The notation;
u : [np n]
means that u is an utterance of a noun phrase and also an utterance of a noun,
where np dominates n in the phrase structure tree. It seems intuitively correct
to say that an utterance of, say, 'Emily' is an utterance of both a noun and a
noun-phrase, rather than to require separate utterance situations for the n and
the np. Of course, this rule only applies if the noun is a proper noun, and so we
require this information to be supported by u. Gl applies to both nominal and
temporal proper nouns.
The following rule is of similar form:
G2. AdvP —» Adv
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):advp
if:
f • [advp adv]




then-type: init OR etr OR pt-of
posn: si OR sf
Now we come to a binary branching rule. Here, things are slightly different in
that the constituent (daughter) uses are not the same situation as the combined
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(mother) use. Also, we have different types (tyi and ty2) corresponding to the
two constituents. We have departed from STG here. In STG, the infons for the
two combining constituents are denoted by the same variable, and information
is combined by unification. We cannot proceed this way here, as we no longer
have simple infons with no restrictions as we had in STG. Instead, we have more
complex types with restrictions, so unification would not be possible. Thus we
require a way of "combining" the types of the daughter constitents to give the
type for the mother constituent. We achieve this by using ©. This operation
ensures that any roles which have the same set of indices will be assigned to the
same parameter in the mother type. We also require that partially-specified infons
denoted by cr(T), a(X,T), etc. will be unified with a fully-specified infon such as
run(X,Y,T). We will assume such unification in the following rules.
G3. AdvP —> Prep, NP
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):advp
if:
u ■ [advp prep np]













ty = tyx ® ty2
fi U fi Q /•
We should explain the notation u : [advp prep np] in the above rule. This is
intended to convey that u is of category 'advp' and has constituents u\, u2 of
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categories 'prep' and 'np' respectively, where u\ precedes u2. In general, if:






where U\ (= cat: {y}
and u2 (= cat: {z}
We will adopt this notational convention in all the rules that follow.
The rule also specifies that the union of the assignments f\ and f2 for the daughters
is a subset of the assignment / for the mother.
The following unary branching rule for intransitives is straightforward:
G4. VP —> V(intrans)
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):vp
if:
u : [vp v]




The corresponding rule for transitive verbs is:
G5. VP V(trans), NP
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out)\wp
if:





(u\, utt, tyi, /i, in,mid):\
U\ |=
(■u2, utt, ty2, /2, raid, out):np
cat: {... ,np}






ty = tyi © ty2
/iU/2C/.
In this rule, instantiation of the grammatical function, gf for the NP takes place
— gf is given the value 'obj'.
The following rule is for progressives.
G6. VP —^ Aux, VP
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):vp
if:
u : [vp aux vp]













ty = tyi © ty2
/1U/2C /.
The next rule, as we explained earlier, is introduced in order to allow expansion
of the fragment to include modals.
GT. VP' -4 VP
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):vp'
if:
u : [vp/ vp]
(it, utt, ty, f, in, out):vp
u (= cat: {• • ■ ,vp,vp'}
We now give the s-rule. In this rule, the grammatical function, gf for the NP is
instantiated to 'subj'.
G8. S NP, VP'
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):s
if:
u : [s np vp']





(«2, utt, ty2, /2, mid, out):vp'
ty = tyi © ty2
/1U/2C/.
We now come to the S' rules. The first of these corresponds to a sentence with no
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adverbial (recall that all adverbials are sentence-level in this fragment).
G9. S' -* S
(utt, utt, ty, /, in, out):sbar
if:
utt : [s/ s]
(utt, utt, ty, f, in, out):s
utt f= cat: {... ,s,sbar}
Note that the first two arguments are identical here. This is because we have
reached the top of the tree and the utterance situation for the utterance as a
whole is the same as that for S'.
After S' has been parsed, the overall DRS for the discourse so far is updated
with the type ty obtained from the parsing of S'. We explained earlier that
the DRS/type for a discourse consisting of a sequence of utterances is the type
obtained by combining with © the type from each utterance. This means that we
"update" the overall DRS, which we will call odrsjnew, by combining ty obtained
from parsing S' with the DRS for the previous discourse. Thus:
odrs-new = odrsjold © ty
Notice that in DSTG we can no longer deal with anaphora in the same way as
in STDRT. In STDRT, anaphora was captured by role-indexing. When the types
are combined and new parameters are assigned by ©, roles that have the same
indices are assigned to the same parameter. We will see this working in a number
of examples in Chapter 4. However, in DSTG we have indexed some of the roles
with utterance situations. Because the utterance situations will be different, the
set of role indices for the anaphor and its potential referent will be different too,
and therefore a common parameter will not be assigned. We could get around this
by redefining © so that it "ignores" utterance indexing. Note, however, that we
have also indexed the roles with their grammatical functions or something similar.
This would mean that an anaphor indexed as "subject" would not be identified
with a referent whose grammatical function was "object". In order to get around
this, © would have to ignore indexing by grammatical function, too.
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Rather than introduce all these complications, it is simpler to find an alternative
way to deal with anaphora. Instead of capturing anaphora by having 0 assign
the same parameter to anaphor and referent, we will allow 0 to assign different
parameters, but will introduce a restriction that sets the two relevant parameters
to be equal.
The above remarks apply to both nominal and temporal anaphora, although we
have no nominal anaphora in this fragment. In fact, this is the way that we




which express the relation between parameters. We are suggesting that prono¬




We also need S' rules for combining s with sentence-initial and sentence-final
adverbials. In this fragment, the only sentence-initial adverbial is 'then'. Sentence-
final adverbials include 'then' and 'in July'.
We give the rule for sentence-final adverbials first:
G10. S' ->■ S, AdvP
(it, utt, ty, f, in, out):s'
if:
u : [s/ s advp]
(iti, utt, tyi, /i, in, mid):s
U\ f= cat: {... ,s}
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ty = tyi © ty2
/iU/2C/.
Once again, updating of the discourse DRS is carried out by means of © — i.e.
odrs-new = odrs-old © ty
And now the rule for sentence-initial adverbials:
Gil. S' -> AdvP, S
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):s'
if:
u : [s/ advp s]




{u2, utt, ty2, f2,mid, out):s
U2 h cat: {... ,s}
ty = tyx © ty2
/1U/2C /.
And, once again:
odrsmew = odrs-old © ty
Finally, we need some discourse rules. We need to thread the sets in and out
of discourse referents through the discourse. There is no need, however, for the
assignment / for a particular utterance to be threaded to the next utterance.
The type ty does not need to be threaded either, as, after an utterance has been
parsed, ty is combined by means of © with the DRS for the whole discourse so far
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disc : [dis s']
{disc, disc, ty, f, in, out):s'
disc |= cat: {... ,s',dis}
G13. Dis —f S', Dis
{disc, in, out):dis
if:
disc : [dis s' dis]
{u\, Ui, ty, f, in, mid):s'
Ui [= cat: {... ,s'}
{U2, mid, out):dis.
This concludes the grammar rules. In the next section, we will look at some
examples.
3.7 Processing of Sentence-Final 'then' by the
Grammar Rules
We will now show how the grammar rules give the required readings for discourses
containing sentence-final 'then'.
We have already seen that the processing of an utterance of a sentence according
to the grammar constructs a type corresponding to the sentence meaning. At the
end of processing an utterance, the type for that sentence is added by means of
© to the overall DRS/type obtained from processing the discourse so far.
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For example, the DRS/type obtained from processing the single-sentence dis¬
course:
(3.24) Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
is shown below in {!}.
[subj,«i] -> X, [obj,rt2] —» Y, [pred,u] —> R, [ev,us,utt\ —> S,












The result of parsing (3.24) will also include the information:
[[pred,w] —> climb] C /.
The processing of (3.24) gives rise too to syntactic information supported by the
utterance situations corresponding to the various constituents, but we do not
include that information here. Also, as described in the previous section, a list of
discourse referents is built up as the discourse is processed, and passed from NP
to VP' within an individual sentence and from one sentence to the next in the
discourse. The value of out after processing the single-sentence discourse (3.24)
is:
{[subj,ui], [obj,M2], [ev,u3,utt], [time,utt]}
Now compare {1} with the DRS/type obtained from processing the single-sentence
discourse:
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(3.25) Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
shown in {2} below:
[subj,wi] —» X, [obj,w2] -> Y, [pred,w] —> R, [ev,U3,utt] —> S, [time,uW] -> T, [res,«i] —>■ Rsi,

















[[pred,?/] —> climb] C /
and:
out = {[subj,«x], [obj,it2], [ev,U3,uft], [time,«tt], [etr,«4,«tt]}
In {2}, we have a second temporal parameter T', corresponding to the explicit
temporal referent 'July'. The role obtained by abstracting over T' is indexed 'etr',
indicating that it was introduced by an explicit temporal referent.
Now let us look at the representation obtained by processing the single-sentence
discourse:
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(3.26) Emily liked Fiona
In this case, we get the DRS/type shown in {3}.
[subj,ui] -» X, [obj,w2] -» Y, [pred,u] R, [ev,u3,utt] -> S, [time, utt] -> T,










[[pred,u] -A like] C /
and:
out = {[subj,Mi], [obj,«2], [ev,U3,utt], [time,tttt]}
And for:
(3.27) Owen was climbing Snowdon
we get the DRS/type shown in {4}:
{3}
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[subj,uj] —» X, [obj,w2] -> Y, [pred,w] —> R, [ev,ti3,utt] -» S, [time, utt] —» T,













[[pred,u] —> climbing] C /
and:
out = {[subj,«i], [obj,M2], [ev,u3,Mtt], [time,«tt]}
This contains the information that S is STATE, because we treat progressives as
stative in this fragment.
Now let us consider the representations for some discourse sequences involving
'then'. Consider first:
(3.28) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
b. Owen climbed Snowdon then
After processing (3.28a) the discourse DRS is {2}, and the value of out (which, of
course, is in for processing (3.28b)) is:
{[subj,iti], [obj,w2], [ev,u3,utt], [time,utt], [etr,U4,utt]}
(3.28b) is processed as far as 'then'. At S level, the type is similar to {1}, shown
in {5}:
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[subj,u5] -4 X, [obj,u6] -> Y, [pred,u7] -»■ R, [ev,M8,uff2] -» S,













[[pred,u7] —)■ climb] C /
Now we come to the
S' —> S, AdvP
rule. We need to parse 'then' as an AdvP. In order to do this, we must first parse
'then' as an Adv. There are two rules in the grammar for sentence-final 'then':
one for ETR 'then' and one for PART-OF 'then'. These are tried in turn. If both
succeed, (3.28a,3.28b) will have two readings, in accordance with the ambiguity
we observed for some sequences with 'then'. If both rules fail, the whole parse
will fail and no representation for the discourse will be obtained.16
First, let us consider the rule for ETR 'then'. This requires that [etr,u,utt'] £ in.
That is, in must contain a referent indexed [etv,u,utt'], where utt' is a previous
utterance. Ifmore than one such referent is available, the most recently introduced
one is chosen, as discussed in Section 3.6.4.
Looking at in (which, of course, is out for (3.28a)), we see that such a referent is
16An alternative would be to allow the sequence to be parsed but to indicate in some way
that no referent has been found for 'then'. We consider this to be a reasonable alternative but




Thus the rule for ETR 'then' succeeds, giving the DRS/type {6} for the utterance
of the adverb 'then':







When {6} is combined by means of © with the type {5} for the S parse, we get
the type {7} for S':
[subj,u5] -» X, [obj,u6] ->■ Y, [pred,U7] ->■ R, [ev,u8,utt2\ —>• S, [time,utf2] T,














Now if we combine {2} with {7} using © we get the overall DRS/type for (3.28a,3.28b),
{8}:
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[subj,mi] -> Xi, [obj,u2] ->• Yi, [pred,u] -» Ri, [ev,u3,utt\ -> Si, [time,utt] -» Ti,
[res,Mi] -> Rsi, [bg,ui] ->• Bi, [res,u2] -» Rs2, [etr,u4,utt] ->■ T2, [bg,u4] -4 B2, [res,u4] -» Rs3,
[subj,m5] -> X2, [obj,m6] -> Y2, [pred,m7] -»• R2, [ev,m8,utt2] -> S2, [time,utt2\ -> T3,
































where [[pred,w] —>• climb, [pred,w7] —> climb] C /.
The rule for PART-OF 'then' is also tried, but since it requires that the eventuality
in the current sentence is of type STATE, this will fail here as S2 is of type EVENT.
Thus no reading for PART-OF 'then' is obtained for (3.28a,3.28b), which is what
the analysis of Chapter 2 requires.
Now consider the sequence:
143
(3.29) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Owen climbed Snowdon then
Processing of (3.29a) gives the DRS {1}. Processing of (3.29b) up to S level (i.e.,
as far as 'then') gives the DRS {5}, as in the previous example. Now, once again,
we come to the rule:
S' -)• S, AdvP
which means that we must parse 'then' as an AdvP. This in turn means that we
must parse 'then' as an Adv, as before. We must therefore parse 'then' according
to either the ETR 'then' or the PART-OF 'then' rule (or both).
The rule for ETR 'then' requires that:
[etr,u,utt'] E in
where utt' is an earlier utterance of an ETR. But after parsing (3.29a), out is
equal to:
{[subj,«i], [obj,tf2], [ev,u3,utt], [time,utt]}
and this, of course, is in for the processing of (3.29b). But there is no referent
here of the form [etr,u,utt'], and so the rule for ETR 'then' fails.
Next we try to parse 'then' using the PART-OF rule. This rule requires that the
eventuality described by the current utterance is a state, i.e. that:
Ui (= ev-type: state
But in (3.29b) the described eventuality is an event, i.e.
«i 1= ev-type: event
where tq is the utterance of the eventuality in (3.29b). Therefore the rule for
PART-OF 'then' fails too.
Thus both rules for sentence-final 'then' have failed and there is no parse for
(3.29a,3.29b).
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Now suppose we replace (3.29b) with a state, to give the sequence:
(3.30) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Emily liked Fiona then
The rule for ETR 'then' will still fail as there is no ETR, but since (3.30b) is
stative:
Ml |= ev-type: state
where u\ is the utterance of the eventuality in (3.30b).
The rule for PART-OF 'then' requires that:
[ev,u,utt'] G in
where utt' is the utterance of the previous sentence. Now in for (3.30b) is equal
to:
{[subj,«i], [obj,M2], [ev,u3,utt\, [time,w£t]}
where utt is the utterance of (3.30a) — i.e., the utterance of the previous sentence.
The requirement is therefore fulfilled and the rule for PART-OF 'then' succeeds.
The information that the eventuality described by (3.30b) is PART-OF the one
described by (3.30a) is added to the overall DRS, giving {9}:
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[subj,ui] ->Xi, [obj,it2] -> Yi, [pred,u] ->• Ri, [ev,u3,utt\ ->• Si,
[time, utt] -> Ti, [res,ui] -> Rsi, [bg, «i] Bl5 [res, u2] -> Rs2,
[subj, rt4] ->■ X2, [obj,u5] -» Y2, [pred,u6] ->■ R2, [ev,U7,nff2] -> S2, [time,itrt2] -» T2,
[res, it4] -> Rs3, [bg,rt4] -» B2, [res,M5] ->■ Rs4, [bg,u5] ->• B3, [bg,u8] -» B4
Ri (Xx, YijTj)
EVENT

























[[pred,u] -> climb, [pred,M6] like] C /.
A similar result is obtained for (3.31a,3.31b):
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(3.31) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Owen was climbing Snowdon then
Here, the rule for PART-OF 'then' succeeds once again, in this case because
(3.31b) is progressive, and progressives count as stative in this fragment. Hence,
if u is the utterance of the eventuality in (3.31b):
u |= ev-type: state
The overall DRS for (3.31a,3.31b) is {10}:
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[subj,ui] —> Xi, [obj,u2] ->• Yi, [pred,w] -> Ri, [ev,u3,utt] ->■ Si,
[time,utt] —> Ti, [res, iti] -> Rsi, [bg,iti] —^ Bi, [res,u2] -+ Rs2,
[subj,u4] -»■ X2, [obj,w5] -> Y2, [pred,u6] ->■ R2, [ev,u7,«tt2] S2, [time, uii2] -> T2,



























[[pred,u] —>■ climb, [pred,«6] —> climbing] C f.
Finally, consider the sequence:
(3.32) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
b. Owen was climbing Snowdon then
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This time, there is an ETR, 'July', in (3.32a), and so the rule for ETR 'then'
succeeds, giving the overall DRS {11}:
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[subj,ui] ->• Xi, [obj,u2] -> Yi, [pred,u] ->• Ri, [ev,u3,uW] ->• Si, [time,utt] -> Ti,
[res,ui] ->■ Rsi, [bg,«i] ->• Bi, [res,u2] ->■ Rs2, [etr, u4, irft] -> T2, [bg,u4] ->■ B2, [res,w4] -> Rs3,
[subj,u5] -> X2, [obj,uq] ->• Y2, [pred,u7] -> R2, [ev,u8,tRf2] -4 S2, [time,u«2] -> T3,
































[[pred,rt] -» climb, [pred,u7] —>• climbing] C f.
The rule for PART-OF 'then' also succeeds, as (3.32b) is progressive (stative).
Parsing by this rule gives the overall DRS {12}:
151
[subj,Mi] -> Xi, [obj,M2] ->• Yi, [pred,u] -» Ri, [ev,u3,utt] -> Si, [time,uM] Ti,
[res,mi] -»• Rsi, [bg,ui] ->■ Bi, [res,u2] -» RS2, [etr,m4,u«] -» T2, [bg,m4] ->• B2, [res,u4] -> Rs3,
[subj, m5] -> X2, [obj,m6] ->■ Y2, [pred,m7] ->■ R2, [ev,u8,utt2] -» S2, [time, utt2] -> T3,
































[[pred,u] —> climb, [pred,u7] —>• climbing] C f.
Thus two readings are obtained for (3.32a,3.32b), in accordance with our obser¬
vations and analysis of Chapter 2. The first corresponds to ETR 'then' and the
second to PART-OF 'then'.
We have therefore demonstrated that our DSTG grammar generates the required
readings for sequences containing sentence-final 'then'.
3.8 Conclusion
We have presented a grammatical fragment expressed in a situation theory / DRT
framework (DSTG), and have demonstrated how it generates the readings for
sentence-final 'then' in accordance with the observations and analysis of Chapter
2. The DSTG grammar relies crucially on the ability of situation theory to encode
and make use of information about the utterance. The grammar allows temporal
discourse referents to be introduced both in cases of explicit temporal reference
and in those where temporal reference is merely implicit. In addition, we encode
whether or not a particular temporal referent was introduced by means of an
ETR. This gives us added flexibility over our DRT fragment in Chapter 2, where
we allowed a time referent to be introduced only in the case of an ETR. We
argued earlier that this kind of flexibility may well be useful in larger fragments.
In Chapter 4 we will develop an account of 'at the time' and 'at the same time'
in STDRT where we rely on being able to introduce temporal discourse referents
even in cases where there is no ETR.
The addition of situations to the fragment allows us to use formally defined
situation-theoretic notions such as '<' to express relations between eventuali¬
ties. The notion of situations supporting infons also gives us a natural semantics
for the proposal in (Kamp and Reyle 1993) that the type of an event is specified
by conditions in the DRS.
In Chapter 5 we will show that situations are also useful in allowing us to develop
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'The same X' and 'the X': an
STDRT account
Note: Material from this chapter was presented at the ASL/LSA Conference in
Logic and Linguistics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, July 1993 (see
Glasbey 1993b). Further developments of some of the work in this chapter were
presented at the conference 'Events and Grammar' held at Bar-Ilan University,
Israel, November 1993, and at the Ninth Amsterdam Colloquium, University of
Amsterdam, December 1993. The latter is reported in (Glasbey 1994a).
4.1 Introduction
The motivation behind the work presented in this chapter is to give a more satis¬
factory and complete account of 'at the time' and 'at the same time', which were
briefly discussed in Chapter 2. In order to try to understand the distribution and
meaning of these phrases, we will begin by looking at 'the X' and 'the same X',
where X is a relational noun such as 'colour'. We will then attempt to apply our
findings for the non-temporal cases to the temporal examples.
Before we begin, we should make it clear that in this chapter we will be expressing
our account in terms of STDRT (Cooper 1993b, 1993c), not in the DSTG we
developed in Chapter 3. Although the two are related, there are some important
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differences which were discussed in Chapter 3.
First, let us recall our observations about the distribution of sentence-final 'at the
time' and 'at the same time', made in Chapter 2. We saw that a sequence of two
sentences where the second ends in 'at the time' requires that the second sentence
is either a stative or a progressive. For example:
(4.1) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. * Fiona climbed Snowdon at the time
c. Fiona was a young girl at the time
d. Fiona was climbing Snowdon at the time
(4.la,4.lb), where the second sentence is neither stative nor progressive is not
acceptable. By contrast, (4.la,4.1c) and (4.la,4.Id) are both acceptable.
We saw that 'at the same time', on the other hand, requires that if the first
sentence describes an event then the second must also describe an event as opposed
to a state. Thus (4.2a,4.2b) is acceptable and (4.2a,4.2c) is not.
(4.2) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. Fiona climbed Snowdon at the same time
c. * Fiona was a girl at the same time
We also noted that either 'at the same time' or 'at the time' is acceptable if the
second sentence is a progressive. Thus:
(4.3) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. Fiona was climbing Snowdon at the time
and:
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(4.4) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. Fiona was climbing Snowdon at the same time
are both acceptable.
In order to account for these observations, we will look first at 'the X' and 'the
same X', where X is a relational noun such as 'colour'. We will then apply the
account we develop for the non-temporal cases to the temporal examples.
We will begin by making some observations about the distribution of 'the X' and
'the same X' in discourse, presenting examples of two-sentence sequences like:
(4.5) a. Emily has a new coat
b. Fiona likes the colour
and:
(4.6) a. Emily has a new coat
b. Fiona's scarf is the same colour
We will use these to identify the conditions in which 'the X' and 'the same X'
are appropriate. We are therefore concerned here with what Carlson (1987) calls
sentence-external uses of 'the same', where the referent of 'the same X' was
introduced by the preceding sentence (as in (4.6) above). Initially, we give an
informal account which employs the notion of role anaphora taken from the
psycholinguistic and AI literature (see, for example, Garrod and Sanford 1990).
From this we develop a formal account expressed in the EKN notation developed
by Barwise and Cooper (1993), using the situation theoretic DRT framework of
(Cooper 1993b, 1993c) (see Chapter 3 for details of both of these).
We will then move on to consider non-relational uses of 'the same', such as:
(4.7) a. Emily watched a film
157
b. Fiona recorded the same film
We call this use 'non-relational' because 'the same film' in (4.7b) refers to an entity
that was explicity introduced in (4.7a). This contrasts with (4.6a,4.6b), where 'the
same colour' in (4.6b) refers to an entity which was not explicitly introduced by
the previous sentence.
We also examine sentence-internal examples such as:
(4.8) Emily watched and Fiona recorded the same film
and non-acceptable examples such as:
(4.9) *Emily watched and Fiona liked the same film
In attempting to extend our initial analysis to the non-relational cases we show
that it is inadequate in some respects. This leads us to develop a modified account
which accommodates both relational and non-relational cases and, in addition,
deals with the examples that were problematic for the initial account.
Finally, we turn to the temporal expressions 'at the time' and 'at the same time'.
We show how our account for the non-temporal examples can be used to ex¬
plain the distribution of these phrases, and how this points towards a theory of
discourse backgrounding.
Our analysis will demonstrate the important part played by accommodation and
inference in the interpretation of these constructions, and the need to take into
account the distinction between information directly conveyed by an utterance
and information that may be inferred from it.
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4.2 'The same X' and 'the X5
4.2.1 Observations
Consider the following two-sentence sequences, where (4.10a) is followed by one
of (4.10b), (4.10c), (4.10d) and (4.10e).
(4.10) a. Emily has a new coat
b. Fiona likes the colour
c. * Fiona's scarf is the colour
d. Fiona's scarf is the same colour
e. % Fiona likes the same colour
A single asterix indicates that the sequence is judged unacceptable. The '%' sign
before (4.10e) means that (4.10a,4.10e) is acceptable only under certain conditions,
to be explained below.
How can we account for the fact that 'the colour' is acceptable in (4.10a,4.10b) but
not in (4.10a,4.10c), where we must use not 'the colour' but 'the same colour'?1
First, we need to consider what exactly is conveyed by the use of 'the colour' in, for
example, (4.10a,4.10b). In ordinary (non-relational) uses of definite descriptions,
'the X' refers to an entity already present in the discourse context. In DRT (Kamp
1981, Kamp and Reyle 1993), this is formalized by requiring the referent to be
a discourse referent present in the universe of discourse of a currently accessible
discourse representation structure (DRS). In the situation theoretic approach of
Cooper (1993a), a resource situation supports the fact that the referent is the
unique object meeting the description.
But in (4.10a,4.10b), something different is going on. Suppose that (4.10a) is
the first sentence of a discourse. Then, at the time that (4.10b) is uttered, there
has been no mention of any 'colour', and thus no suitable discourse referent is
Hndeed, it appears that not only is the sequence (4.10a,4.10c) unacceptable, but there seems
to be something wrong with (4.10c) in itself. We were unable to think of any context in which
(4.10c) is acceptable. The explanation which we propose below will allow us to explain the
unacceptability of (4.10c), as well as that of the sequence (4.10a,4.10c).
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present in the current DRS. Yet we have no difficulty in interpreting (4.10a,4.10b)
as a coherent piece of discourse. Clearly, some kind of inference is being made
in order to allow us to interpret the phrase 'the colour'. The inference that we
make, apparently without undue effort, is that 'the colour' in (4.10b) refers to the
colour of Emily's new coat. Of course, this can be expressed more explicitly by
the paraphrase:
(4.11) a. Emily has a new coat
b. Fiona likes the colour of Emily's new coat
Or:
(4.12) a. Emily has a new coat
b. Fiona likes its colour
Nouns like 'colour' are often referred to as relational nouns because of their abi¬
lity to be used in this way. The notion is very similar to that of role anaphora in
the psycholinguistics literature (see Garrod and Sanford 1990 for details, and our
brief introduction to role anaphora in Chapter 2). To recap briefly on that discus¬
sion: role anaphora is distinguished from what is normally thought of as anaphora
(individual or pronominal anaphora) as follows. Individual anaphora involves
reference by pronouns2 to entities that have already been explicitly introduced by
the preceding discourse. Such entities can be thought of as roughly corresponding
to discourse referents in DRT. An example is the sequence:
(4.13) a. Mary has a new car
b. It is very reliable
where the pronoun 'it' in (4.13b) refers to the entity introduced by 'a new car' in
(4.13a).
2Or by definite descriptions.
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Role anaphora, on the other hand, involves reference to entities which have not
been introduced by explicit mention in the preceding discourse. Such entities may
sometimes be referred to by using a definite noun phrase, as in:
(4.14) a. Mary drove to London
b. The car broke down on the motorway
Here, 'the car' in (4.14b) is understood to refer to the car that Mary drove to
London, although there is no mention of a car in (4.14a). Just as in (4.10a,4.10b),
we have no difficulty in understanding (4.14a,4.14b) — we appear to make without
effort the required inference that the car was the one that Mary drove to London.
Of course if (4.14b) had been preceded by (4.15a):
(4.15) a. Mary wrote a report
we would have difficulty in making any sense of the sequence. Clearly, mention
of a drive in (4.14a) in some way makes available the entity referred to by 'the
car' in (4.14b). Intuitively, this is because we readily associate a car with a drive.
Consider:
(4.16) a. Mary went for an interview
b. The car broke down on the motorway
This is easier to interpret than (4.15a,4.14b), although it requires rather more
effort than (4.14a,4.14b) We appear to have little difficulty in making the necessary
inference to the effect that Mary travelled to her interview by car, and that it was
this car that broke down on the motorway.
Thus we see that mention of certain kinds of event (e.g. a driving event in (4.14a))
serves in some way to make available a "car" role,3 which may be referred to by a
3Or perhaps, more generally, a "vehicle" role.
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definite NP in the next sentence. (From now on we will use capitalised 'Role' to
refer to the role anaphora kind of role, in order to avoid confusion with situation
theoretic roles, which we will be using shortly.)
We have also seen from (4.16a,4.16b) that the car Role may be made available
less directly, in cases where we are able to infer that a drive constituted part of
the described event. We saw too from (4.10a,4.10b) that the mention of a coat
makes available a 'colour' Role.4
Such a Role could be seen in situation-theoretic terms as a two-place relation hold¬
ing between an object (the first argument) and its colour (the second argument).
We can use this relation to form an infon such as:
colour-of(X,Y)
where the argument roles of colour-of would have minimal appropriateness con¬
ditions specifying that X is a physical object and Y is a colour.5
Thus EKN gives us a straightforward way to formalize the notion of Role used in
role anaphora. Note, however, that at the point in the discourse where (4.10a)
has just been uttered, there is no reason to introduce the colour-of Role. Indeed,
the idea of doing this seems very implausible. If we were required to introduce
all the possible Roles resulting from the mention of a given object, we might well
require an enormous number of Roles. This might well present problems for a
formal account. In addition, if we consider Roles to be in some way psychologically
"real"6 (e.g. as mental entities present in some way in the current focus of speaker
''Indeed, we could perhaps see this as a general constraint applying to the class of "physical
objects", the mention of one of which makes available a colour Role. However, it appears that
'colour-of' is a more relevant attribute for some objects than for others. Consider, for example:
(4.17) a. Mary bought a new engine
b. John admired the colour
which sounds rather odd, presumably because we are not used to thinking of engines as having
colours, or, at least, the colour of an engine seems somewhat irrelevant or unimportant.
5See Chapter 3 for an explanation of the box notation (known as EKN) used here.
6As Garrod and Sanford do, for example.
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and hearer), then the idea of such a multiplicity of possible Roles becomes more
unlikely than ever. It appears much more sensible to introduce the appropriate
Role only after utterance of the sentence which picks out this Role.
A more plausible account would be one where the hearer after the first utterance
does not explicitly believe that the coat in question has a colour, but where she
believes that C is a coat and that coats have colours. This allows her to move,
after the second utterance, into a new mental state where she has the explicit
belief that C has a colour. Such a view of reasoning as transitions between mental
states ties in with work by Cooper and Ginzburg (1993), and could be expressed
in their framework. This matter also relates to what has been called "tacit belief",
as discussed in (Crimmins 1992), for example. Clearly, there are issues here which
should be explored further.
Let us attempt to represent (4.10a-4.10e) in EKN notation, using the ideas deve¬
loped above.
4.2.2 EKN representations
We will ignore temporal information in this section.
First, consider (4.10a,4.10b). For (4.10a), we would obtain the representation {1}
below.7
7We use here the DRT treatment of indefinites, and Cooper's treatment of proper names in
situation theory (Cooper 1993a).
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Note that we should strictly treat the adjective 'new' as a predicate modifier.
We express it as above for simplicity, and our account does not depend on this
treatment in any way.
A first attempt at a representation for (4.10b) would give us:
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Now we combine the two with the © operation of (Cooper 1993c) (see Chapter
3, Section 3.4.3 for explanation). Assigning new parameters and abstracting over
these gives us the conjoined DRS {3}:
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ri -» Si, r2 —> X, 13 -> Y, r4 -> Ri, rs —> Bi,


















There is nothing here, however, to link the colour that Fiona likes (corresponding
to the discourse role r8) with the colour of Emily's coat. We must add a colour-of
Role to the type/DRS {1} corresponding to the inference we make while or after
processing (4.10b). This incorporation of extra information into {1} while/after
processing a later sentence is a kind of accommodation process (see Lewis 1979).
It is not that the hearer needs to infer, presumably, that a coat has a colour.
What is involved is something more akin to a focusing upon the colour attribute
of the coat. The colour becomes relevant to the interpretation of the discourse,
and we represent this by incorporating information about the colour-of role into
{I}-
But where should we put this information? Perhaps it should go not in {1} but
in {2}, in order to reflect the order of processing? In situation theoretic terms
it makes no difference whether we add this information to the restrictions of {1}
or to those of {2}. This is because restrictions distribute over conjunction (see
166
Barwise and Cooper 1993. However, in DRT terms it seems to make more sense
to add this information to {1}. This would allow us to explain:
(4.18) a. Emily did not buy a new coat
b. * Fiona liked the colour
in terms of the inaccessibility of the "colour" referent resulting from the negation
in (4.18a).
Thus our second attempt at EKN representations for (4.10a) and (4.10b) is as fol¬
lows. (We will drop the information that the situation and infon are of type KEY
from now on, in order to save space, and take this information to be understood.)
(4.10a):



















We have still not expressed that the object of Fiona's liking is the same as the
colour of Emily's coat. Gawron and Peters (1990) use parameter sharing in order
to express sentence-internal anaphora in situation semantics. However, things are
a little complicated here in that we have abstracted over the parameters to form
a type. Once we have abstracted over a parameter, that parameter is no longer








represent exactly the same object.
Hence the sharing of parameters across types where these parameters have been
abstracted over is meaningless. For this reason, Cooper (1993c) uses the sharing
not of parameters but of roles in order to capture anaphoric relations. Using this
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approach we can express the required anaphoric relation by merging the roles r6
and r9. Having done this, we assign new parameters to the roles of the conjoined
type. Cooper's © operation (see the definition in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3) ensures
that the result of merging roles r6 and rg is that the same parameter will now be
assigned to the role that is the colour of Emily's coat and to the role that is the
thing that Fiona likes. This gives us the conjoined type:













Note that we have dropped the proposition:
B"
colour(C)




Now that we have found a way to express the meaning of (4.10a,4.10b) in our
chosen notation, let us move on to try to explain why it is not possible to follow:
(4.10) a. Emily has a new coat
with:
(4.10) c. Fiona's scarf is the colour
There is nothing obvious here to get in the way of our constructing a similar
representation to the one for (4.10a,4.10b). Suppose we try to do this. (4.10a)
would give the same representation as before, of course (see {1}). For (4.10c) we
would obtain the type:








Conjoining {1} and {4} using © as in the previous example gives us:
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Vl —> S', V2 —^ X, r3 —> Y, r4 —> R', T5 —> B', rg —> C,
















In exactly the same way as before, the merging of roles results in the same pa¬
rameter C being assigned to the role corresponding to the colour of Emily's coat
and the role corresponding to the colour of Fiona's scarf. How, then, can we ex¬
plain the unacceptability of (4.10a,4.10c) and the fact that we must follow (4.10a)
with (4.10d) in order to convey the desired meaning? We propose the following
explanation.
4.2.3 Proposal
The difference between this example and the previous one is that here we have
not one but two colour-of Roles. This suggests that if more than one Role of the
same kind is present, we must use 'the same X' rather than 'the X'. Let us test
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this suggestion by looking at (4.10a,4.10e).
(4.10) a. Emily has a new coat
e. % Fiona likes the same colour
This sequence is only acceptable under certain conditions. In order to interpret
it, we must make the inference that "Emily likes the colour of her new coat".
But what happens when we make this inference? It seems that the effect is to
introduce a second like Role, giving:











Thus it appears that the introduction of a second like Role is what makes the
use of 'the same colour' acceptable in sequence (4.10a,4.10e). But of course this
ties in with what we suggested above — that more than one instance of the same
Role requires us to use 'the same X' rather than 'the X'. And it looks as though,
conversely, the presence of exactly one instance of a Role allows us, and indeed
constrains us, to use 'the X' rather than 'the same X'.
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We have presented a preliminary analysis of the distribution of 'the X' and 'the
same X' (where X is a relational noun). In our account as it stands at present, a
Role corresponds at least roughly to a relation expressed by a verb or a predicate
nominal. We have reason to modify this notion of a Role shortly.
We will now consider some problematic examples for the analysis.
4.2.4 Some counterexamples
Our proposed analysis works for the examples given so far, but consider:
(4.19) a. Mary drove to London
b. Sally crashed the same car (a week later)
Note that (4.19a,4.19b) does not force us to make the inference that Mary crashed
the car (although we are required to infer that Sally drove the car).8 Yet our
analysis predicts the necessity of this inference.
Consider also:
(4.20) a. Mary cleared the snow
b. Sally broke the same spade digging the garden later that year
It seems possible here to get a reading where Mary did not necessarily break the
spade, whereas our analysis predicts that Mary broke it. We are reluctant to say
that these examples are perfect (without the inferences), however. They feel like
rather hard work to interpret. However, it is possible to construct other examples
which are better. For example:
8Actually it appears that there is a certain intonation which does require us to infer that
Mary crashed the car. But there is another intonation (with heavier stress on 'crashed') which
does not require us to infer that Mary crashed. Our point is that (4.19b) does not necessarily
require us to make this inference.
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(4.21) a. Emily bought a new coat
b. Fiona dyed her scarf the same colour
does not require us to infer that Emily dyed her scarf.
Consider also:
(4.22) a. Jane scored a magnificent goal
b. John incurred a penalty at the same spot a few minutes later
This example sounds perfect. Here we have a Role which we could call 'spatial
location'. Perhaps for some reason it is easier to make inferences regarding place
Roles?
Consider also:
(4.23) a. Emily watched television this afternoon
b. Fiona recorded the same film
There is no need for us to infer here that Emily recorded the film as well as
watching it. (In speech, 'recorded' might well receive intonational stress here in
order to convey the contrast.) Compare:
(4.23) a. Emily watched television this afternoon
c. Fiona liked the same film
which forces us to infer that Emily liked the film. This is similar, of course, to
(4.10a,4.10b) which we looked at earlier (repeated here as (4.24a,4.24b))
(4.24) a. Emily has a new coat
b. % Fiona likes the same colour
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which, as we said earlier, requires us to infer that Emily likes the colour of her
new coat.9
Our earlier explanation clearly needs refining. The examples above show that it is
not necessary to have more than one Role of the same type in order for 'the same
X' to be acceptable in this kind of example — or at least, not with the notion of
Role that we have been using up to now. The examples involving the verb 'like'
appear to behave differently from the rest. Let us look at which other verbs show
the same kind of behaviour as 'like' in this respect.
(4.24) a. Emily has a new coat
b. Fiona loves/adores/admires the same colour
c. Fiona hates/dislikes/detests the same colour
We see from this that 'adores' and 'admires' appear to work the same way as
'likes'. 'Hates', 'dislikes' or 'detests' in (4.24c) sounds a little odd after (4.24a),
but this may be because it is unexpected that Emily would dislike the colour of
her new coat. If we try:
(4.26) a. Emily gave her coat to a jumble sale
b. Fiona hates/dislikes/detests the same colour
this sounds better (although still rather hard work to interpret), presumably be¬
cause the fact that Emily gave her coat away is readily compatible with the fact
that she disliked its colour.
Perhaps we can say that "attitude verbs" group together in forcing what we might
call the repeated Role inference. We will pursue this idea further shortly. First,
9 (4.24a,4.24b) seems to require the inference that Emily likes her coat in the same way that:
(4.25) a. Emily has a new coat
b. % Fiona likes the colour too
does. It would be interesting to investigate further the apparent parallelism between these
examples, but we will not do this here.
175
let us turn to some non-relational uses of 'the same X' and see if we can observe
similar effects with them.
4.2.5 Non-relational uses of 'the same'
We will now consider both discourse examples such as:
(4.27) a. Emily watched a film
b. Fiona recorded the same film
which constitute what Carlson (1987) calls sentence-external uses of 'the same'.
We will look too at the corresponding sentence-internal uses such as:
(4.28) Emily watched and Fiona recorded the same film
Consider (4.27a,4.27b) first. We can interpret this sequence without being requi¬
red to infer that Emily recorded the film. Note too that (4.28) sounds perfectly
acceptable.
Now compare (4.29a,4.29b):
(4.29) a. Emily watched a film
b. Fiona liked the same film
Here, just as in the relational examples, we are required to make the inference
that Emily liked the film. Once again, it is the example with 'likes' that behaves
in this way. Note also that:
(4.30) *Emily watched and Fiona liked the same film
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sounds very odd, in contrast to (4.28). It is interesting, too, that we observe the
same effect if we replace 'the same film' with the name of a particular film. If, for
instance, we say:
(4.31) *Emily watched and Fiona liked 'Back to the Future'
this sounds odd in the same way as (4.30). This suggests that the effect we are
observing is not restricted to 'the same' but applies more generally to coordination
constructions. We will explore this further below.
Now consider what happens if we have "attitude" verbs in both sentences.
(4.32) a. Emily liked a film
b. Fiona hated the same him
This sequence sounds fine, and not at all contradictory, showing that we are not
forced to infer that Emily hated the him. (4.33) also sounds fairly good, although
arguably not perfect (but certainly much better than (4.30) above).
(4.33) Emily liked and Fiona hated the same him
We do not have an explanation for why (4.33) is not (according to some infor¬
mants) completely acceptable. Intuitions appear to vary among native speakers
here, in contrast to the other examples where intuitions are sharp and agree among
different speakers. Interestingly, (4.33) sounds better if 'same' is removed, to give:
(4.34) Emily liked and Fiona hated the him
We will not attempt to explain why this is the case. Notice, too, that 'but' sounds
better than 'and' in the above example:
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(4.35) Emily liked but Fiona hated the film
Presumably this is because 'but' serves to convey the necessary contrast. We will
not enter a discussion of the distribution of 'and' and 'but' here, however.
We can also construct single-subject examples which sound perfectly acceptable:
(4.36) Emily watched and recorded the same film
(4.37) Kate produced and directed the same film
But compare:
(4.38) * Emily watched and liked the same film
and:
(4.39) * Emily watched and hated the same film
We see that in all these cases, where both eventualities involve an attitude to¬
wards something:
1. Coordination is possible in examples like (4.33).
2. In the discourse examples we are not forced into the repeated-Role inference.
Similarly, if both eventualities involve what we might roughly characterize as some
kind of action, then (1) and (2) hold in these cases too. It is in the "mixed" cases,
where one eventuality is an attitude and the other an action, that things get
interesting. In these cases, the single-sentence coordination becomes impossible,
and in the discourse sequences we are forced into making a repeated-Role inference.
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At this point we should note a slight complication in the case of coordination
examples with a shared subject. Notice that:
(4.40) Emily watched and liked the film
is acceptable, in contrast to (4.38) — whereas in the other cases we have looked at,
the 'same' examples and the coordination examples have behaved in the same way.
We speculate that the 'and' in (4.40) conveys something in the way of temporal
sequencing. It introduces a lack of "symmetry" in the sequence, making the order
of the conjuncts matter. Notice that if we reverse the order of the conjuncts to
give:
(4.41) *Emily liked and watched the film
the conjunction sounds very strange. We will not pursue this further, but in order
to avoid this complication we will steer clear of single-subject examples in the
discussion that follows.
The above observations suggest that some kind of generalisation of our earlier
proposal is required. We proposed previously that the use of 'the same X' in
a discourse sequence requires/conveys that we have more than one instance of
the same Role. We employed a very narrow definition of Role, where the Role
corresponds exactly to the verb. We now propose that what is needed is to
generalise this notion of Role. From the examples we have studied so far, it looks
as though we will need at least two Roles — one that we will provisionally call
object-of-attitude and a second that we will call object-of-action. We will
refer to these as generalised Roles (or GRs).
We are thus modifying our initial proposal as follows:
Modified proposal:
'The same X' conveys the presence of more than one instance of the
GR in question. 'The X' conveys the presence of exactly one instance
of the GR in question.
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A possibility we should investigate is that the two Role types reflect simply the
distinction between events and states. This might explain why 'like' (state) does
not coordinate with 'watch' (event) in (4.38), for example. Consider however:
(4.42) a. Emily has/owns a new coat
b. Fiona likes the same coat
'Have', 'own' and 'like' are all generally considered to be stative. Yet:
(4.43) *Emily has and Fiona likes the same coat
sounds extremely odd.
(4.44) ? Emily owns and Fiona likes the same coat
is perhaps marginally better, but still sounds rather odd.
Thus we see that the state/event distinction does not seem to be what is relevant
here. This leaves us with the task of deciding exactly which generalised Roles are
needed in order to explain the data. We will give pointers rather than definite
answers here. Further work is needed, involving the examination of constructions
with a wide range of verbs.
We will settle here for the two generalised Roles, object-of-attitude and object-
of-action so far proposed, and attempt to use them to express some of the non¬
relational examples in the EKN formalism used earlier.
We need to decide, too, what exactly a generalised Role should be, in formal
terms. One possibility is to make it a relation between a situation (eventuality)
and a participant of that eventuality. This would make a GR look rather like a
thematic role in, for instance, (Dowty 1991). Indeed, we will examine the links
between GRs and thematic roles shortly. However, before we proceed along these
lines we need to consider a potential problem. We are thinking of each situation
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having exactly one GR of a particular type. But it is always possible to combine
two situations to make a larger situation, and then there will only one Role. The
answer to this is that Roles are associated with situations "as they are presented by
the discourse". If the discourse presents two distinct situations then the discourse
also presents two roles, and this is what counts, no matter how it is possible to
consider the situations being merged to form larger ones.
Thus we propose to represent GRs as shown below, where a GR is a situation-
theoretic relation holding between a situation (eventuality) and a participant of
that eventuality. For example:
8^
object-of-attitude(S,Y)
In the next section we will develop formal representations incorporating GRs.
4.2.6 Formal representations using generalised Roles
(4.45) a. Emily found an old coat
can be followed by either:
(4.45) b. Fiona liked the same coat
(which, as we have seen, forces the inference that Emily liked the coat)
or:
(4.45) c. Fiona threw away the same coat
(which does not force the inference that Emily threw away the coat).
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The EKN representation for (4.45a) is:10









And for (4.45b), using the new notion of generalised Role:






Merging the roles r3 and r8 and assigning new parameters gives us:
10We ignore tense in all the examples here.
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ri —> S', r2 —> X', r3 —> Y', r4 —> R',














If we say, as proposed above, that 'the same X' forces there to be two instances of
the same generalised Role, then this requires us to a infer an instance of the GR
object-of-attitude in {7}. In order for this GR to be present we must make an
inference regarding the attitude of Emily towards her coat. It seems reasonable to
suppose that we make make the "simplest" inference needed to give the required
object-of-attitude Role, i.e. the one where Emily's attitude is one of liking the
coat. This gives us:
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fi —y S', r2 —> X', r3 —> Y', r4 —> R',
















Now let us consider (4.45a,4.45c). For (4.45c) we get the representation:
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Combining {3} with {1} by merging roles r3 and ri2 and assigning new parameters
gives us:
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fl —>■ S', T2 —> X', T3 —> Y', T4 —> R',















The difference between the representation for (4.45a,4.45c) and the one for
(4.45a,4.45b) is that in the present case we have two object-of-action Roles.
The presence of two instances of the same generalised Role thus licenses 'the
same' without requiring us to make any role-creating inferences.
Now let us see how this works for the relational cases. We will apply it to two
corresponding relational cases: (4.46a,4.46b), where we are required to make a
role-creating inference, and (4.46a,4.46c), where no such inference is required. For






Mary drove to London
Sally liked the same car
Sally crashed the same car
(4.46a) gives:
































Then, combining (13'} and {14} by merging roles and r7, we get:
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ri -> S', r-2 —> X', 13 —> Y', T4 —> R', r4b —> Z',














Note here that the generalised Roles are of different types. Hence, in order to
license 'the same', we are required to infer that Mary liked the car, in order to
supply a second object-of-attitude Role, corresponding to the second eventua¬
lity. Adding this inference gives us for the final representation:
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i'i ~~► S', r-2 —> X', r3 —> Y', r4 —> R', r4b —> Z',

















Now let us look at the representation for (4.46c).
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Combining this with {13} by merging roles and ri2 and assigning new para¬
meters gives us:
191
ri —>• S', r2 —> X', r3 Y', 14 —> R', r4b -* Z',













Here, we have two object-of-action Roles, and so 'the same' is licensed without
requiring any GRCIs to be made.
Finally, let us look at the relational example:
(4.47) a. Emily has a new coat
b. Fiona's scarf is the same colour
which as we have seen does not require us to make a GRCF11
For (4.47a) we get the representation:
11Of course it does require us to make the colour-of inference.
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Here, we have introduced a new generalised Role we call quality-attributed. It
appears that such a generalised Role is needed for attributes such as colour-of.
Thus, so far we have found that we need at least three generalised Roles. It seems
highly likely that additional ones will be required.







for the generalised Role. This gives {18'}:












Combining {18'} and {19} by merging roles r5b and r8 gives us:
194
X\ —> S', i2 ~> X', r3 —> Y', r4 —* R', rs —^ B', rsb —> C,



















Thus we have two quality-attributed Roles — one corresponding to each sen¬
tence/eventuality — and the use of 'the same' is licensed without requiring any
GRCIs to be made.
We have therefore demonstrated that by generalising the notion of Role we can
explain the data that did not fit our original analysis of the relational cases. We
have shown, too, that the revised account covers the non-relational and sentence-
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internal examples too.
Our proposal that 'the same X' requires/conveys two instances of the generalised
Role in question ties in quite well with Carlson's suggestion (Carlson 1987) for
non-relational, sentence-internal cases. He proposes that 'the same' requires the
presence of more than one eventuality, where what is involved is a comparison
between two "comparable eventualities" (p.545). However, he stops short of for¬
malising what exactly he means by "comparable" or "paired" eventualities. The
EKN framework appears to offer a convenient way of formalising this idea, which
we unpack in terms of repetition of generalised Roles.
Moltmann, in her analysis of 'same'/'different' (Moltmann 1992), speaks of 'the
same' conveying a comparison between certain participants in what she calls sub-
events of a complex event. However, she does not consider the constraints on what
type of sub-events may be conjoined in this way — which is the kind of thing we
have tried to do.
Moltmann is interested in giving an account of quantificational cases like:
(4.48) All the students got the same answer
and:
(4.49) Many of the students went to see the same film
where it appears that the quantification is not just over individual students, but
over subgroups of the total group. In order to deal with these examples, she pro¬
poses an analysis involving "parts" of the total group, where "part" is contextually
defined. We are not particularly interested here in this aspect of her treatment,
although we might well want to build something similar into our account in order
to deal with such cases. More relevant to us here is the fact that she considers the
events "under comparison" as being part of a total event which in (4.48) would be
the event of all the students getting their answers. However, although Moltmann's
account is based on the idea of events being part of a complex event, she does
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not consider any restrictions on which events may be combined to give a complex
event. If we were to introduce some restrictions on which type of events could
be combined, we could go some way towards explaining our repeated generalised
Role requirement. For example, in the STDRT formalism we are using, we could
presumably combine two events of type
get (students,answers)
to give a complex event. But suppose that we can only combine eventualities of
certain types — for example, of a type where a quality is attributed to an object,
or a type where some action is performed on an object. These correspond, of
course, to the generalised Roles we identified earlier. And it appears that the
same kind of restrictions apply to coordination — i.e., only events of the same
"generalised type" may be coordinated, as we will see below.
4.3 Generalised Roles, Thematic Roles and Co¬
ordination
4.3.1 Introduction
The proposal we have made about generalised Roles also fits in with another
proposal of Carlson's (Carlson 1984), where he suggests that we use thematic
roles as the basis for individuating eventualities. The idea is that if the same
thematic role is filled twice, then two eventualities must be present.
While our notion of eventuality may differ in some respects from Carlson's, it
is nevertheless interesting to pursue this possible link. If we take our notion of
generalised Role to correspond to Carlson's thematic role (type), we can explain
his suggestion in (Carlson 1987, p.541) that 'the same' requires the presence of
more than one eventuality. We can say that the reason 'the same' requires more
than one eventuality is that 'the same' necessitates at least two instances of the
same thematic role type. If we accept Carlson's (1984) suggestion that each
(singular) eventuality has only one instance of each thematic role type, this in
turn necessitates the presence of more than one eventuality.
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Of course, the link between our account and Carlson's only works if our generalised
Roles are seen to be equivalent to his notion of thematic role type. We mentioned
earlier that it would be interesting to explore a possible correspondence here, and
we will carry out a brief investigation on this below.
4.3.2 Thematic roles in the literature
The first point we should note is that there is no agreement in the literature about
which thematic roles exist and how they should be characterised. Dowty (1991)
explains how various authors have each proposed their own set of thematic roles in
order to account for the data in which they are interested. He points out too that
the notion of thematic role has been used very little in model-theoretic semantics.
One semanticist who has studied thematic roles in detail over a number of years
is Jackendoff (1983, 1987). However, although thematic roles (or 'thematic
relations' as he calls them) play an important part in his semantics (where they
are notions of conceptual structure), they are not defined in formal terms.
Thematic roles (or d-roles) have also been used extensively in GB, where they
have an argument-indexing function.
Dowty points out too that no-one, as far as he is aware, has ever attempted to
produce a complete list of thematic roles. New ones are constantly being added
to the list, and there is disagreement on the "semantic content" of even the most
familiar roles, such as Theme and Patient (see Dowty 1991, p.548-9).
However, even though there is so little agreement on what thematic roles there are
and how they should be defined, Dowty comments that many linguists seem to
assume that linguistic theory should include a finite and fairly short set of them.
4.3.3 Dowty's proposal for thematic roles
Against this background, Dowty proposes (p.561) that, as a first step in mo¬
ving forwards from this position, we should attempt to construct the best theo¬
retical account we can for each domain separately. Such domains might include
argument-selection (Dowty's own topic), acquisition, processing, and many others.
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If our findings in the various domains converge on a single set of thematic roles, so
much the better, and we can conclude that there is a single phenomenon involved
in the various cases. If, on the other hand, the findings do not converge in this
way, we may conclude that while there may be links between the phenomena in
the different domains, we are still some way from discovering what these are.
Dowty focuses on argument selection and argues that in this domain only two
thematic role types12 are needed — which he calls Proto-Agent and Proto-
Patient. These role types are prototypical in the sense that they are not discrete
categories with strict defining criteria for membership, but cluster concepts rather
like the prototypes of Rosch (1978). Dowty gives a list of entailments to be
associated with each prototype, while admitting that these are preliminary lists
and may need further refinement. (See Dowty 1991, p.572.)
These proto-roles work as follows where argument selection is concerned. The
idea is that the argument for which the predicate entails the greatest number of
Proto-Agent properties will be lexicalized as the subject of the predicate. Simi¬
larly, the argument having the greatest number of Proto-Patient properties will
be lexicalized as the direct object. Dowty also considers what happens if two
arguments of a relation have approximately equal numbers of Proto-Agent and
Proto-Patient properties. In this case, either or both may be lexicalized as the
subject, and similarly for the object. He also makes a proposal for three-place
predicates, which we will not go into here. (See (Dowty 1991, p.576) for details.)
He leaves open the possibility that there may be some kind of "weighting" of ent¬
ailments as far as argument selection is concerned — i.e. the presence of a certain
entailment may carry more weight than that of another.
Dowty argues that for the domain of argument-selection, only the thematic role
types Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient are needed. He is not arguing that these
role types are the only ones needed for other domains. As we mentioned above,
he advocates deriving a set of necessary role types for each domain separately and
12Dowty distinguishes between what he calls 'individual thematic roles', which correspond
to particular argument roles of particular verbs — e.g. the 'seen' role of 'see' — and what he
calls 'thematic role types' which are generalisations across these — e.g. the traditional 'agent'
and 'patient'. He refers to the latter strictly as 'thematic role types', although he sometimes
abbreviates this to 'thematic roles'. In order to avoid confusion, we will call these 'thematic role
types' in what follows.
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then seeing how these compare across domains.
We will therefore follow Dowty's advice and investigate whether we can reformu¬
late our generalised Role proposal in terms of thematic roles and, if we can, which
thematic role types we will need. We will also adopt Dowty's idea of trying to
express thematic role types in terms of sets of entailments.
4.3.4 Generalised Roles and entailments
We found that the following generalised Roles were needed for the examples con¬





Let us first investigate whether (1) appears to correspond to Dowty's cluster of
properties for the Proto-Patient role type. These were:
(a) Undergoes change of state
(b) Incremental theme
(c) Causally affected by another participant
(d) Stationary relevant to movement of another participant
((e) Does not exist independently of the event, or not at all).
The reader is referred to Dowty (1991), p.572, where Dowty explains the meaning
of these properties in more detail. He places (e) in parentheses because of his
uncertainty about whether this property should be associated not with thematic
role type but with what he calls "the discourse associations of subjecthood". We
will not worry about this distinction here, and will treat (e) as equal in status
13It is important to note that (3) would not correspond to a thematic role according to the
standard notion of thematic role.
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with the other properties in our investigation, which is only intended to be a
preliminary one.
A final point we should note is that Dowty emphasises that these properties are
associated not with the object "in itself" but with the object as it relates to the
event or state denoted by the verb. Thus an object is an incremental theme
(for example) with respect to a particular event in which it participates. It is
important to bear this in mind when deciding upon entailments.
Now let us look at one of our examples where we proposed that two instances of
the generalised Role object-of-action were involved. An example of this kind
was (4.45a,4.45c), reprinted here as (4.50a,4.50b).
(4.50) a. Emily found an old coat
b. Fiona threw away the same coat
Working through the list of Proto-Patient properties for the objects in (4.50a) and
(4.50b), we get the following results:
Proto-Patient property 4.50a 4.50b
(a) change-of-state yes yes
(b) incremental theme no no
(c) causally affected yes yes
(d) stationary (rel.) yes yes
(e) no indep. existence no no
It is not entirely straightforward to decide whether or not the objects of 'find'
and 'throw away' undergo changes of state. If we allow a change of position to
be a change of state, as Dowty does, then it seems clear that the object of 'throw
away' undergoes a change of state. However, presumably finding something does
not entail that the position of the object changes — this is only the case if the
object is picked up and taken home, for example. We might argue that the context
provided by (4.50a,4.50b) forces us to infer that Emily did something like take
the coat home, however. If we do make this inference, then it seems reasonable to
say that the coat undergoes a change of state in each case. However, this example
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does highlight the need to define very carefully what we mean by properties such
as 'change of state' in the sets of entailments we use. There may also be a problem
in defining exactly what is meant by (d) ('stationary relative to the movement of
another participant').
The fact that neither comes out "totally Proto-Patient" does not matter, because,
as we explained above, Dowty's sets of entailments do not provide sets of necessary
conditions for patienthood. What is interesting is that both examples say yes to
exactly the same subset of the set of entailments. This suggests that we may be
on the right lines in trying to account for our 'same' data in terms of entailments.
Perhaps the entailments are more important than the generalised Roles (or the¬
matic role types) themselves. Dowty suggests this himself, and points out that
by accounting for the data in terms of entailments we are not simply replacing
one theoretical construct by another. What is important about entailments, he
argues, is that they are much more basic to human conceptualisation than the
notion of thematic role type (it is hard to argue with this!). He points out that
the concept of "volition" (one of the properties associated with the Proto-Agent
role type) is something which may be argued about in a court of law. We agree
that it is much harder to envisage a jury being asked to decide on whether the
defendant was a Proto-Agent. Having said this, we must also point out that some
of the properties in Dowty's lists of entailments appear much more natural to
human conceptualisation than others, (d), for example, does not strike us as a
particularly intuitive concept. But of course Dowty does not claim to have pro¬
vided the definitive set of proto-properties, and perhaps this is simply motivation
for trying to improve on the classification.
Let us look now at the entailments for another example involving two instances
of the generalised role type object-of-action, (4.19a,4.19b), repeated here as
(4.51a,4.51b).
(4.51) a. Mary drove to London
b. Sally crashed the same car
There is a slight complication in working out the entailments for the object argu¬
ment of (4.51a) here, because the direct object of the driving event is not explicitly
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realised. No vehicle is mentioned in (4.51a), and the hearer must infer that there
is a car that Mary drove to London in order to interpret (4.51a,4.51b). If we make
this inference, we can work out the entailments for the implicit direct object, as
required.
The entailments are as follows:
Proto-Patient property 4.51a 4.51b
(a) change-of-state yes14 yes
(b) incremental theme no no
(c) causally affected yes yes
(d) stationary (rel.) yes yes
(e) no indep. existence no no
Once again, the subset of entailments is the same in each case (as long as we are
prepared to accept that driving a car changes its state).
Now let us investigated the entailments for 'watch'/'record' in (4.27a,4.27b), re¬
peated here as (4.52a,4.52b).
(4.52) a. Emily watched a film
b. Fiona recorded the same film
Proto-Patient property 4.52a 4.52b
(a) change-of-state no15 no15
(b) incremental theme no no
(c) causally affected no no
(d) stationary (rel.) yes yes
(e) no indep. existence no no
14As long as we are prepared to accept change of position as a change of state, as we did
above. Of course it may be argued that the act of driving a car changes its state anyway (e.g.
wears down the brakes, the engine, etc.) but this seems a very different notion of change of state
from the one in (4.51b), for example. There are clearly issues which need to be addressed more
closely here.
15Once again, the issue arises of what exactly is involved in a change of state. However, it
seems reasonably intuitive in this case to say that the film does not undergo a change in state
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Once again, we have a notable correspondence of entailments between the two
examples. The three examples considered so far are all ones where 'the same X' is
licensed without making a generalised Role creating inference (GRCI). Now let us
try an example where where 'the same X' is not licensed without a GRCI. An ex¬
ample we considered of this type was (4.45a,4.45b), repeated here as (4.53a,4.53b).
(4.53) a. Emily found an old coat
b. Fiona liked the same coat
Let's examine the entailments for the object arguments here.
Proto-Patient property 4.53a 4.53b
(a) change-of-state yes15 no
(b) incremental theme no no
(c) causally affected yes no
(d) stationary (rel.) yes yes
(e) no indep. existence no no
Here, we see that the set of entailments is not identical in each case. The ob¬
ject argument of 'find' may be said to be causally affected by the eventuality in
question, whereas the object of 'like' is not.16
Now let us turn to some object-of-attitude examples. One example we gave
where 'the same' is acceptable without a GRCI is (4.32a,4.32b), repeated here as
(4.54a,4.54b).
when it is watched. Perhaps this depends on whether we interpret a film to as a particular
copy of a film (unlikely in this case) or whether the notion of a film generalises over particular
copies of that film (which seems reasonable here). If the reference to a film abstracts away from
particular copies of that film then it appears correct to say that watching a film does not change
its state.
16This seems intuitively correct, although of course we are not using any formal definition
of 'causally affected'. Dowty does not offer formal definitions of these properties and indeed it
appears that it would be almost impossible to do so. These kinds of properties, it appears, are
no easier to tie down precisely than notions like 'agent' and 'patient'. One advantage over the
former is, however, as we pointed out earlier, that they have strong intuitive content.
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(4.54) a. Emily liked a film
b. Fiona hated the same film
The entailments for the object arguments here are as follows:
Proto-Patient property 4.54a 4.54b
(a) change-of-state no no
(b) incremental theme no no
(c) causally affected no no
(d) stationary (rel.) yes yes
(e) no indep. existence no no
Once again, the set of entailments in each case is the same.
So far, we have seen that our examples where 'the same' was licensed without a
GRCI correspond exactly to those examples where the subset of Dowty's set of
Proto-Patient entailments that are associated with the object argument are the
same in each case. The examples where 'the same' is only acceptable by making
a GRCI correspond to the cases where the subset of Proto-Patient entailments is
not the same in each case.
Thus we can provisionally conclude at this point that the distribution of 'the
same X' (where X is an object argument) seems to be closely related to Dowty's
proposed entailments, and that using entailments appears to be a promising way
forward in accounting for this data. We are not, however, convinced that Dowty's
set of Proto-Patient entailments are exactly the ones we need. For example, as
discussed above, the notions 'undergoes change of state' is particularly hard to
define. We may well find that we need to refine Dowty's sets of entailments as
further work is done on this.
Let us now consider an example where it becomes necessary to introduce a pro¬
perty that is not contained in the set of entailments for Proto-Patient.
Consider, for example:
(4.55) a. Emily owned a hamster
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b. Fiona disliked the same hamster
In order to interpret this sequence, we are forced to make the GRCI that Emily
disliked her own hamster. This makes the sequence sound rather odd, because
it is unexpected for a young girl to dislike her pet hamster. Thus we might, on
the basis of our findings so far, expect the set of entailed properties for the object
argument to be different for 'own' and 'dislike'. Let us see if this is the case.
Proto-Patient property 4.55a 4.55b
(a) change-of-state no no
(b) incremental theme no no
(c) causally affected no17 no
(d) stationary (rel.) yes yes
(e) no indep. existence no no
Thus we see that18 the sets of entailments here are identical. This is interesting
in that it is the first case we have come across where a GRCI is required even
though the set of entailments are the same. If we are to pursue our explanation
in terms of entailments, it looks as though we will need to modify Dowty's list in
order to reflect some distinction between 'own' and 'dislike' in terms of what is
entailed about their object arguments.
What is the intuitive distinction? The one that springs readily to mind is that
a disliking is an "experience" or "attitude" and an owning is neither of these.
Indeed, we reflected this by introducing our object-of-attitude Role earlier.
One way round this would be to introduce another Proto-Role in addition to
Dowty's Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient. This new Proto-Role would involve some
entailment like "stimulates emotional response in another participant".
It is interesting to note that Dowty's set of entailments for the Proto-Agent Role
include a property rather like this. We give his set of Proto-Agent properties
below:
"Is an object causally affected by virtue of being owned? We are inclined to say "no",
although this may be debatable. Once again, the question hinges on what exactly is meant by
'causally affected'.
18If we ignore the uncertainty about causal affectedness for (4.55a)
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(a) Volitional involvement in the event or state
(b) Sentience (and/or perception)
(c) Causing an event or change of state in another participant
(d) Movement (relative to the position of another participant)
((e) Exists independently of the event named by the verb)
(Dowty 1991, p.572).
Thus (c) is similar to our new property. However, we would be reluctant to assign
the object argument of 'dislike' to the role Proto-Agent by virtue of this property
alone, as it has none of the other entailments in Dowty's Proto-Agent list. It seems
much more reasonable to introduce a new Proto-Role as we suggested above. One
possibility is that this might correspond to 'Theme' in those thematic role systems
which assign Experiencer/Theme to the arguments of certain verbs. However, as
Dowty points out, 'Theme' has been used in different ways by different authors,
and for this reason we will avoid it.
Once again, further work is needed to decide exactly what Roles are needed for
our purposes. Once this is done, it will be possible to look at the sets of thematic
roles that have been motivated for other domains, and make comparisons. It
seems entirely possible that sets of entailments will ultimately prove more useful
in explaining the data on 'the same X' than the notion of generalised Role.
We should say something here about locatives, such as the example (4.22a,4.22b),
discussed earlier and repeated here as (4.56a,4.56b).
(4.56) a. Jane scored a magnificent goal
b. John incurred a penalty at the same spot a few minutes later
We saw that this example was acceptable without a GRCI, and explained this
in terms of the same generalised Role 'location-of' being referred to in each case.
But Dowty does not regard spatial and temporal modifiers (or indeed adjuncts of
any kind) as thematic roles. It appears that we need to part company from him
here, too, if we are to explain the above example, and allow a Role corresponding
to 'event-location' or something similar. We will consider time Roles in the next
section.
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Before we conclude this discussion, let us consider some interesting single-sentence
examples. We begin with:
(4.57) John likes and fears the same woman
We can explain the acceptability of (4.57) in terms of 'likes' and 'fears' having
the same subset of Proto-Patient entailments for the object argument (with the
addition of the property 'stimulus of emotional response in another participant').
Now compare:
(4.58) *John likes and amuses the same woman
which is very hard work to interpret (and appears to cause the hearer to experience
mental contortions in trying to understand it). The reason for the difficulty,
intuitively, is that John is the "experiencer" in the first conjunct and the woman
is the experiencer in the second conjunct. Or, in the terms we have been using
above, the woman is the stimulus of the response in the first conjunct, and John
is the stimulus in the second. We can then say that this "role-switching" is the
reason that for lack of acceptability of (4.58).19
But note that the presence of the passive allows us to make precisely this kind of
switch.
(4.60) John likes and is despised by the same woman
This suggests that the passive allows us to convey precisely the kind of role-reversal
that sounded so strange in the non-passive example (4.58). This appears to be an
interesting topic for further study, but we will not pursue it here.
19The discourse example
(4.59) a. John likes Mary
b. Fred amuses the same woman
also sounds extremely odd, for the same reason.
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4.3.5 'The same X' and coordination
We pointed out earlier that the discourse examples involving 'the X' and 'the same
X' appear to parallel very closely the single-sentence examples like:
(4.61) Emily watched and Fiona recorded the same film
and that these are closely related to the corresponding "coordination" examples
without 'the same', such as:
(4.62) Emily watched and Fiona recorded the film
in terms of what we might call 'compatibility of conjuncts'. That is, the examples
involving 'the same' parallel closely the more general examples involving object-
NP coordination. This suggests that we should look at the literature concerning
semantic constraints on conjunct coordination. We give a very brief summary of
this below.
Although a great deal of work has been done on syntactic constraints on co¬
ordination, it appears that relatively little progress has been made concerning
semantic constraints. It was pointed out by Lakoff (1971) that such constraints
exist, and one constraint that she suggested was that events coordinate with events
and states with states but cross-coordination is not allowed. Schachter (1977) also
gave evidence that semantic constraints on coordination are needed in addition
to syntactic ones. He proposed that what is required for coordination is "identity
of semantic function", but he did not say much about what this identity invol¬
ves. Lang (1984) developed the notion of "common integrator" which involves
finding the material that is common to both conjuncts, but he did not specify
precisely what the conjuncts must have in common in order to coordinate. Hud¬
son (1988) admits that the role of semantic factors in coordination is a serious
research problem for all theories of coordination.
The idea has been around for some time that thematic roles/relations may be
involved in the semantic constraints on coordination. It can be traced back at
least as far as Fillmore (1968), who drew attention to examples like:
209
(4.63) *John and a hammer broke the window
where the unacceptability of the NP conjunction is explained by the fact that the
NP 'John' is the Agent whereas the NP 'a hammer' is the Instrument. (Fillmore
uses the term 'case' rather than 'thematic role/relation', but the notions are closely
related.)
The idea that thematic roles are involved in constraints on coordination was ex¬
plored further recently by Johannessen (1990). She proposed that thematic role
constraints may be involved in determining the possibility of coordination and ru¬
ling out certain syntactically-allowable conjunctions. In fact, she followed Dowty
in expressing thematic roles as prototypical sets of entailments, as we did earlier.
She suggested that coordination requires a "unifiable set of entailments" across
the conjuncts. There is an interesting link here with our work on 'the same' de¬
scribed above. It is worth noting, too, that Johannessen found that a larger set of
roles were required than Dowty's Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient, which accords
with our results.
This supports the suggestion that the same phenomenon is involved in the coor¬
dination examples and in our examples involving 'the same'. More work is needed
to follow up this connection further, and, as we noted above, to decide exactly
which sets of entailments are required.
4.3.6 Conclusion
We have investigated the link between our proposed generalised Roles and the
notion of thematic role in the literature. Using Dowty's notion of Proto-Role,
we showed that our findings may be explained at least in part in terms of Dow¬
ty's sets of entailments. We also investigated the link between our data on 'the
same X' and the related coordination examples. In particular, we considered
the connection between our notion of generalised Role, the notion of thematic
role and Johannessen's suggestion that semantic constraints on coordination can
be expressed in terms of Proto-Roles and entailments. Further work is needed
to investigate this connection further and to decide which Generalised Roles are
required and what is the best way to characterise them in terms of prototypical
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sets of entailments.
4.4 Time Roles and Discourse Backgrounding
4.4.1 Introduction
We now turn to some examples involving the temporal expressions 'at the time'
and 'at the same time'. We will show how our analysis of 'the X' and 'the same
X' can be applied to temporal examples. This will involve us in considering the
nature of time Roles, and our conclusions will lead us, in turn, to a means of
formalising the notion of backgrounding in discourse.
In our analysis of sentence-final 'then' in Chapter 2 we briefly considered sentence-
final 'at the time' and 'at the same time', and pointed out that 'at the time'
behaves in a roughly similar way to the PART-OF (or Role) use of 'then'. Here,
we will use the account of 'the X' and 'the same X' developed in the current
chapter to give a more complete analysis of 'at the time' and 'at the same time'.
First, let us recap on what we discovered about sentence-final 'at the time' and
'at the same time' in Chapter 2. First, we saw that a sequence of two sentences
where the second ends in 'at the time' requires that the second sentence is either
a stative or a progressive. For example:
(4.64) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. * Fiona climbed Snowdon at the time
c. Fiona was a young girl at the time
d. Fiona was climbing Snowdon at the time
(4.64a,4.64b), where the second sentence is neither stative nor progressive, is not
acceptable. By contrast, (4.64a,4.64c) and (4.64a,4.64d) are both acceptable. We
saw that 'at the time' behaves like the PART-OF use of sentence-final 'then'
in these examples. However, we also observed that 'at the time' differs from
PART-OF 'then'20 in that 'then' can also be used following an elaboration, as in
20From now on we will drop 'sentence-final' and assume this to be understood.
211
(4.65a,4.65b), while it is not possible to use 'at the time' to follow an elaboration,
as in (4.65a,4.65c).
(4.65) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. She saw an eagle then
c. *She saw an eagle at the time
We saw that 'at the same time', on the other hand, requires that if the first
sentence describes an event then the second must also describe an event as opposed
to a state.21 Thus (4.66a,4.66b) is acceptable and (4.66a,4.66c) is not.
(4.66) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. Fiona climbed Snowdon at the same time
c. * Fiona was a girl at the same time
We noted too that 'at the same time' is not acceptable for a sequence involving
an elaboration. Thus (4.67a,4.67b) sounds strange, apparently forcing us to see
the events as somehow "separate" or "distinct".
(4.67) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. ??She saw an eagle at the same time
Note that this is the case even when the second sentence involves a redescription
of the same event (so that the two event times are identical):
(4.68) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. ??She achieved her ambition at the same time
21We will discuss a complication of this where progressives are concerned, below.
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This again sounds odd, apparently conveying that the events described by the two
sentences were unconnected except by their coincidence of event times.
We provisionally concluded in Chapter 2 that 'at the same time' requires that the
second eventuality is not PART-OF the first. (4.68a,4.68b) shows that we must
add to this the requirement that the second event is not a redescription of the
first. Thus it appears that 'at the same time' requires that the two eventualities
are seen as "distinct".
Thus we have PART-OF 'then', which requires that the second eventuality is part-
of the second, either by virtue of elaboration or backgrounding (see Chapter
2). We have 'at the time' which requires that the second eventuality is part-of the
first, but in this case the relation must be one of backgrounding but not one of
elaboration. Finally, we have 'at the same time' which requires that the second
eventuality is distinct from the first.
We would like to be able to give an explanation of why the above distribution ob¬
tains. Before we attempt to do so, let us note an interesting observation regarding
'at the same time' and 'at the time' when the second sentence is a progressive.
(4.69) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. Fiona was climbing Ben Nevis at the time
c. Fiona was climbing Ben Nevis at the same time
Thus we see that either 'at the same time' or 'at the time' is acceptable if the
second sentence is a progressive. This contrasts with the case where the second
sentence is a (lexical) stative, where we saw in (4.66a,4.66c) that 'at the same
time' is not acceptable. This is an interesting difference between progressives and
(lexical) statives, for which we will propose an explanation below. It will lead
us to challenge the widely accepted idea that the progressive should be seen as a
stativiser.
Let us take the following as the basic set of sequences that we will attempt to
explain. (We will also account for the further restrictions on 'at the time' and 'at
the same time' involving elaborations, discussed above.) In the examples below,
(4.70a) is followed by one or other of (4.70b-4.70g).
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(4.70) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. * Fiona climbed Snowdon at the time
c. Fiona climbed Snowdon at the same time
d. Fiona was a girl at the time
e. * Fiona was a girl at the same time
f. Fiona was climbing Snowdon at the time
g. Fiona was climbing Snowdon at the same time
4.4.2 Times as generalised Roles?
Can we explain the observations for 'at the time' and 'at the same time' using
the notion developed earlier in this chapter of generalised Role? Recall that
we proposed that 'the same X' requires/conveys that we have more than one
instance of the same generalised Role, and that 'the X' requires/conveys that we
have exactly one instance of the generalised Role in question. This leads us to
ask whether we can see time Roles in this way. Can we explain the distribution
of 'at the time' and 'at the same time' by (a) viewing time as a generalised Role
and then (b) showing that only one such Role is present in the 'at the time' cases
while two time Roles are present in the 'at the same time' cases'?
First, is it possible to see the times we associate with eventualities as generalised
Roles? There seems to be no problem with doing this. Recall that in Chapter 3













meaning that T is the "eventuality time" of S, which we can think of as the
duration of the eventuality S.
This allows us to see T as the TIME-OF Role of S. Let us assume that such
TIME-OF Roles of eventualities are generalised Roles, and see how far we get
with this.
We begin by considering (4.70a,4.70b) and (4.70a,4.70c). Firstly, why should
(4.70a,4.70b) be unacceptable? The explanation that suggests itself is that 'at
the time' is unacceptable because more than one TIME-OF Role is present, re¬
quiring us to use 'at the same time' as in (4.70a,4.70c). Let us construct the EKN
representation for this sequence to investigate this.
We can represent (4.70a) in EKN as follows:











It could be argued that as no time is mentioned in (4.70a), the role r4b is super-
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fluous here. If we treat these examples as parallel to the non-temporal ones, we
would not introduce TIME-OF here, but would delay its introduction until the
processing of 'at the time' in (4.70b). It would make no difference to our account
if we were to follow this procedure. However, in the interests of simplicity we will
introduce the TIME-OF Role in the initial processing of (4.70a).
We can represent (4.70b) as:










Now we need to combine {21} and {22} in such a way as to express that the times
for each eventuality are identical. We do this by merging roles r4f, and r9. When
we do so and assign new parameters we get:
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ri —> S', X2 X7, r3 —» Y', V4 —> R', r4b —> T',
r5 S", r6 -+ X", r7 -> Y", r8 -> R"
S'
climb(X',Y',T')
















Thus the representation captures the fact that there are two TIME-OF Roles
in the combined representation, which allows us to explain why 'at the time' is
unacceptable here, and why 'at the same time', as in (4.70a,4.70c), must be used.
Thus what we have said so far amounts to the proposal that each eventuality
described by the discourse has its own TIME-OF Role. We will modify this to
some extent when we consider the examples with progressives and statives.
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It may be thought that associating each situation with TIME-OF Role in this
way may lead to problems in that two situations could be put together to form a
single situation which would presumably have only one TIME-OF Role. But what
is important here are the situations (and associated TIME-OF Roles) that are
actually introduced by the discourse. Ways that these situations might be merged
"in the real world" are in a sense irrelevant to the structure of the discourse.
What explanation can we give for (4.70a,4.70d) and (4.70a,4.70e), where things
are reversed and 'at the time' is acceptable while 'at the same time' is not? An
obvious difference here is that 'Fiona was a young girl' describes a state. The
sequence (4.70a,4.70d) thus describes an (accomplishment) event and a state.
Let us consider for a moment the intuitive meaning of (4.70a,4.70d). The sequence
conveys that at the time that Emily made her climb, Fiona was a girl, and that
Fiona was a girl for some time both before and after the climb. In other words,
(4.70d) is not stating that Fiona was a girl for exactly (or even approximately)
the time that it took Emily to climb her mountain. Instead, it conveys that there
is a relation of temporal inclusion between the two eventualities — the event is
temporally included in the state.
But why should it be the case that only one TIME-OF Role is present in (4.70a,4.70d)?
One way we could get this to happen would be to say that only one situation, as
opposed to two, is described by (4.70a,4.70d). Thus we would be suggesting that
when an event description is followed by a state description, the state sentence
does not cause a new situation to be described, but adds further information about
the first situation.
The fact that no new situation is introduced by the stative sentence means that
there is no second TIME-OF Role introduced into the discourse context. The
presence of only one TIME-OF Role licenses 'at the time' and rules out 'at the
same time' for this kind of sequence, which is exactly what we require.
It is important to note that we are not proposing that stative sentences never intro¬
duce "new" situations. Our proposal is, rather, that a state description following
an event description causes no new situation to be introduced. The important
notion is that of backgrounding. When a stative sentence follows an event sen¬
tence, the discourse relation is one of backgrounding, and we are proposing that
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when the second eventuality backgrounds the Erst, no new situation is introduced
but further information is given about the old situation. We will see below that
stative sentences do not have to background (for example, if they follow another
stative, or if modified by a 'for'-adverbial). Thus the "no new situation" proposal
is one that concerns discourse backgrounding, not primarily the distinction bet¬
ween events and states in themselves, although the two notions can be shown to
interact (see Glasbey 1994a) for discussion).
Definition:
An eventuality e2 backgrounds a previously described eventuality e\
iff e2 introduces no new situation into the discourse context but rather
adds further information to the situation corresponding to e\.
Our proposal thus differs from superficially similar ideas put forward by Galton
(1984), Lobner (1985), Herweg (1991) and Sandstrom (1993). These authors pro¬
pose that stative sentences22 refer to propositions rather than referring to entities
that are occurrences of events in the way that event descriptions do. Seligman
and ter Meulen (1992) propose something similar, whereby a stative adds further
information to a state-of-affairs previously described in the discourse rather than
introducing a new state-of-affairs. Our proposal is different in that, as we have
already pointed out, it relates to backgrounding rather than to stativity in itself.
We argue in (Glasbey 1994a) that the notions of stativity and backgrounding,
although related, need to be kept distinct.
Let us consider how to represent the "no new situation" proposal. Suppose we
have already "processed" (4.70a) to obtain the representation {21}. Now, what
happens when we come to (4.70d)? No new situation is introduced, so we simply




22Which are taken to include progressives and perfects.
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to Si, giving:













Note that the new infon we have introduced is also a key infon of Sx. Thus
we should add this information to the representation, giving as our complete
representation for (4.70a,4.70d):
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In {24} we have exactly one TIME-OF Role, which accounts for the acceptability
of 'at the time' but not 'at the same time' in this sequence.
This representation captures the intuition we have about (4.70a,4.70d) that the
second sentence does not talk about the "whole situation" of Fiona's being a girl
(i.e. the situation which has as its duration the total length of Fiona's girlhood —
if indeed this notion has any meaning) but rather talks about a situation involving
the portion of Fiona's girlhood that coincides with Emily's climb.
We have therefore proposed an analysis of discourse backgrounding whereby the
backgrounded eventuality does not introduce a new situation but adds more in¬
formation to the situation in the current discourse context. This explains why
only one TIME-OF Role is present, which in turn explains the distribution of 'at
the time' and 'at the same time'.
Remember that we pointed out that, unlike PART-OF 'then', 'at the time' is
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not acceptable following an elaboration. We characterised PART-OF 'then' as
conveying that the second eventuality is part of the first, either by virtue of back¬
grounding or elaboration. 'At the time', on the other hand, specifically conveys
backgrounding.
We can explain this as follows. Although an elaboration sequence conveys that
the second eventuality is part of the first, it does not convey that both sentences
describe the same situation. This seems intuitively correct. For example, the
sequence:
(4.71) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. She saw an eagle
(on an elaborative reading) does not convey that the TIME-OF the eagle-seeing
eventuality was the same as the TIME-OF the complete climb, but rather that the
eagle-seeing was temporally included within the complete climb. Thus we need
two separate TIME-OF Roles here, unlike the backgrounding case where only one
was required. But this requires that we have two situations rather than just the
one — where the second situation is part of the first. The two TIME-OF Roles
mean that 'at the time' is ruled out and predict that 'at the same time' is required.
But of course we also noted earlier that 'at the same time' is not acceptable here.
The intuitive explanation is simply that the times of the two events are not the
same. But remember that we also have to explain why:
(4.72) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
b. *She achieved her ambition at the same time
is not acceptable, even though the two times are arguably the same here. (Perhaps
it is better to consider the example:
(4.73) a. Emily reached the top of Ben Nevis
b. *She achieved her ambition at the same time
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if it is considered that the achieving of Emily's ambition coincides with her re¬
aching the top rather than with the climb as a whole. This sequence is equally
unacceptable, of course.)
Thus it appears that we are required to stipulate that the two events must be
"distinct" in order to use 'at the same time'. Perhaps we should say that they
are "conceptually distinct"? Rather than pursue this matter further here, we will
simply include in our representations for 'at the same time' the information that
the two eventualities are of type CONCEPTUALLY-DISTINCT (CD) and leave
it to further investigations to decide exactly what this means.
Let us now consider the examples involving the progressive.
Consider (4.70a,4.70f) and (4.70a,4.70g):
(4.70) a. Emily climbed Ben Nevis
f. Fiona was climbing Snowdon at the time
g. Fiona was climbing Snowdon at the same time
As we remarked earlier, it is interesting to note that both these sequences are
acceptable — that either 'at the time' or 'at the same time' is appropriate where
a progressive follows an accomplishment. We can explain this if we assume that
the progressive may have either a backgrounding or a non-backgrounding function
in a sequence like the one above. In (4.70a,4.70f), the progressive causes Fiona's
climb to be backgrounded with respect to Emily's climb, and according to our
analysis of backgrounding above we obtain the representation:
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Note that we do not attempt to represent the semantics of 'climbing' here. Our
use of the relation 'climbing' is intended to convey that Fiona's climb was not
necessarily completed. In (Glasbey 1994a) we give an analysis of the progressive
which captures how the truth conditions of 'Fiona was climbing Snowdon' relate
to those of 'Fiona climbed Snowdon'.
Now compare (4.70a,4.70g). Here, we have suggested that the progressive does
not convey a backgrounding function. Because this is the case, the representation
for (4.70g) involves two situations, Si and S2.
1 j
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Thus two instances of the TIME-OF Role are present, and 'at the same time' is
appropriate.
Note that our analysis of the progressive as backgrounding in (4.70a,4.70f) but
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not in (4.70a,4.70g) is supported by the intuition that (4.70a,4.70f) conveys the
impression that Fiona's climb took a much longer time than Emily's, whereas in
(4.70a,4.70g) the two climbs could well have taken approximately the same length
of time.
We have seen that a progressive following an event description may convey either
a backgrounding or a non-backgrounding function, shown by the fact that both
'at the time' and 'at the same time' are possible in this case. This means that it is
important that we separate the notions of 'backgrounding' and 'stativity', which
have often been treated as one and the same thing in the literature (although
the term 'backgrounding' has not always been explicitly used). We explore this
distinction further in (Glasbey 1994a).
We saw too that a state following an event description must convey that the state
is backgrounded with respect to the event. We will now examine what happens
in the case of sequential descriptions of states.23
Let us therefore now examine some examples where both eventualities are states:
(4.74) a. Mary was ill
b. She was in London at the time
We can explain the acceptability of 'at the time' in this sequence if we say that
the state described by (4.74b) backgrounds the state described by (4.74a). Thus
we are assuming that states can background other states, which seems reasonable
if the backgrounding state is of considerable longer duration than the other one.
Now consider:
(4.75) a. Mary was in London
b. John was there at the same time
23It might be asked what exactly is the function of the progressive in (4.70a,4.70g), given
that it does not express backgrounding here. One thing that it conveys, of course, is that the
event was not (necessarily) completed. See (Glasbey 1994a) for a more detailed analysis of the
progressive.
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Thus 'at the same time' is acceptable here and it seems that what is conveyed is
that John and Mary were in each London, for at least approximately the same
length of time. This ties in with our analysis of 'at the same time', if we relax
slightly the requirement that the two eventualities coincide exactly (in fact we
need to allow this relaxation for the non-stative examples too, as it is unlikely
that, for example, two climbs even of the same mountain let alone different ones
will take exactly the same length of time). In (4.75a,4.75b), the second state does
not background the first, and this is why 'at the same time' is appropriate. Thus
we see that a stative sentence following another stative sentence need not convey
backgrounding, in contrast to a stative following a non-stative which must convey
backgrounding.
There is a complication for the stative examples, however. Some informants find
that the sequence:
(4.76) a. Mary was in London
b. John was in Paris at the same time
sounds a little odd. They report that it is almost as though we are forced into
inferring that Mary was in Paris too, and that John's stay in Paris coincided (at
least approximately) with hers. This is unexpected, because we were not requi¬
red to make any comparable inferences in the case of the non-stative examples.
This example is reminiscent of the non-temporal examples where we had to infer
another instance of the same generalised Role in order for 'the same X' to be
acceptable. It is as though two instances of the Role TIME-OF is not enough to
license 'at the same time' in this case. But why should the statives work diffe¬
rently in this way? This is an intriguing question, which is further complicated
by the fact that not all informants find this sequence odd or find it necessary to
infer that Mary was in Paris in order to interpret it. We leave this aside as a topic
for further investigation.
We have seen, then, that a state immediately following an event in discourse
conveys backgrounding, which means that 'at the time' but not 'at the same
time' is acceptable in these cases. We discovered, too, that an event described
in the progressive can either act as backgrounding or non-backgrounding with
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respect to an event described immediately before it in the discourse. We can also
make the observation that an event does not background a previous event in the
discourse unless the backgrounding event is described in the progressive.
Our observations highlight the need to keep distinct the notions of backgrounding
and stativity. These two concepts have sometimes been merged in the literature,
where 'state' has been seen as a "classification of narrative function". This is
what is meant, of course, by the claim that the progressive is a stativiser. But we
have seen that this is an oversimplification, and that the progressive may convey
backgrounding but does not always do so.
This leaves us, of course, without a definition of the distinction between
states and events. We pursue this further in (Glasbey 1994a), where we sug¬
gest how the distinction may be formalised in a way that is separate from the
backgrounding/non-backgrounding distinction and hence allows us to express how
these distinct notions interact.
Our proposal that discourse backgrounding involves further specification of the
situation described by the previous sentence has allowed us to explain why 'at
the time' is appropriate in backgrounding cases and 'at the same time' in non-
backgrounding cases. This ties in very well with our account of 'the X' and 'the
same X' in discourse, where the former requires exactly one instance of a generali¬
sed Role and the latter requires more than one instance. The notion of generalised
Role has thus enabled us to formalise the notion of discourse backgrounding which
has been widely used in accounts of discourse structure,24 but has not as far as
we know been formally defined. We have also highlighted the necessity to keep
distinct the notions of stativity and discourse backgrounding.
There may be a problem, however, with our proposal that backgrounding eventu¬
alities do not introduce new situations. Consider, for example, the sequence:
(4.77) a. Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
b. Emily was climbing Snowdon at the time
Now suppose we follow (4.77a,4.77b) with:
24Such as (Mann and Thompson 1987)
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(4.77) c. Mary saw it from a helicopter
What can 'it' in (4.77c) refer to? For some speakers, 'it' can be used to refer
either to the situation that comprises both climbs (which of course is ruled out in
this case by world knowledge, although we can construct other examples where
this is not so), or to Emily's climb alone. Yet, according to our analysis, Emily's
climb is backgrounding and there is no situation that corresponds to her climb
alone, which means that we should not be able to refer to Emily's climb alone
as 'it'. Other speakers, however, report that 'it' cannot be used in this way to
refer to Emily's climb alone, but must refer to both climbs — which supports our
analysis.
Thus here we have what might be seen as some counter-evidence to our proposal.
However, it is far from conclusive, and is particularly hard to interpret owing to
the variations in speaker intuitions. In contrast, the intuitions about 'at the time'
were shared by all our informants, suggesting that the evidence here is far more
reliable than the evidence from 'it' anaphora.
Given that our proposal allows us to explain the distribution of 'at the time'
and 'at the same time' in a way that accords so well with the non-temporal
cases, we will retain it, while noting the problem with 'it' anaphora. We are
left with the problem of finding a way to explain the latter, which we suspect
will not be easy. One way to do this may be to allow the hearer to "construct" a
separate situation corresponding to Emily's climb alone upon hearing the sequence
(4.77a,4.77b,4.77c). This would involve the hearer "unbackgrounding" Emily's
climb and giving it the status of a separate situation, which can then be referred
to by the pronoun. This operation sounds rather complex and unwieldy, which
might explain why it is difficult for some speakers.
4.4.3 Summary
We have shown in this section that our analysis of 'the X' and 'the same X', where
X is a relational noun, can be successfully applied to explain the distribution of
'at the time' and 'at the same time'. This has given us a way to formalise the
discourse relation backgrounding, which has been shown in the literature to be
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a useful notion but which has not previously, as far as we are aware, been formally
defined.
4.5 Conclusion
We began this chapter by asking why the distribution of 'at the time' and 'at
the same time' should be the way it is. In order to shed some light on these
temporal phrases, we turned to what appeared to be related phenomena in the
non-temporal domain, involving the distribution of 'the X' and 'the same X' in
discourse sequences.
We developed an analysis of 'the X' and 'the same X' which explains the distribu¬
tion of these phrases in discourse sequences. Following this, we went on to show
that the account can be generalised to cover non-relational uses of 'the same X'
and single-sentence examples involving 'the same X'.
Our analysis used the notion of generalised Role. The basic idea was that more
than one instance of the same generalised Role requires 'the same X', whereas a
single instance of the generalised Role requires 'the X'. We saw too that the notion
of generalised Role is relevant to object-NP coordination examples in general, not
just to examples involving 'the same'.
We investigated to what extent our notion of generalised Role is related to the
traditional notion of thematic role. We showed that the generalised Roles we
propose may be characterisable in terms of sets of entailments in a similar way to
the Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient Roles proposed by Dowty (1991). We would
however need to distinguish between a larger set of Proto-Roles than the two
proposed by Dowty.
We then applied our analysis to 'at the time' and 'at the same time' and showed
how it explains the distribution of these phrases and how this leads to a way to
give a formal definition of the discourse relation backgrounding.
Our analysis is in some respects broader in scope than those of Carlson (1987) and
Moltmann (1992), in that these authors restrict themselves to sentence-internal
and non-relational uses of 'the same X' and do not consider 'the X'. Our account
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deals in addition with sentence-external (discourse) and relational uses of 'the
same X' and 'the X'. On the other hand, we have not considered in detail the
quantificational and other syntactic contexts that Carlson and Moltmann both
address. Further work is needed to explore how our account might be extended
to include such cases.
It should also be pointed out that we have made no mention of 'different'. We
speculate that our analysis of 'the same' could be applied fairly readily to corre¬
sponding uses of 'different' — perhaps by saying that 'different' precludes rather
than enforces the merging of roles, and forces the roles to be assigned to distinct
parameters. This is, however, an untested speculation.
In general, our account demonstrates the importance of inference in the analysis
of natural language, and highlights the need to distinguish in our formal represen¬
tations between explicitly presented (described) information on the one hand and
inferred information on the other. One way that this distinction might be made
is in terms of updating mental states, as in (Cooper and Ginzburg 1993).
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Chapter 5
Event Structure and Aspect
Note: Material from this chapter and from Chapter 3 has appeared in (Glasbey
1993c).
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we introduced our observations about 'then' and developed a theore¬
tical analysis. We identified various constraints which must be respected whatever
representational framework is used, and developed a DRT fragment which expres¬
ses these constraints by making a formal distinction between events and times.
We explained that this account worked well for the fragment under consideration
and there did not appear to be any immediate problems in scaling it up to larger
fragments. However, we pointed out that there might be instances where it would
become necessary to introduce temporal discourse referents even in cases where
these were not introduced by an explicit temporal referent (ETR). (In fact we
considered some cases like this in Chapter 4, where we expressed the meaning of
'at the time' and 'at the same time' in terms of "time roles".) For this reason,
in Chapter 3 we recast the fragment in a situation theory/DRT framework and
showed how situation theory's ability to encode information about the utterance
enabled us to capture the distinction we need while not restricting the introduction
of temporal discourse referents to cases where an ETR is present. This allowed us
to write a grammar which should be more readily extendable to larger fragments.
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In Chapter 4 we began by turning our attention to 'at the time' and 'at the same
time', which we had considered briefly in Chapter 2. In order to make sense of
the observations and to give a deeper explanation, we considered a range of rela¬
ted non-temporal examples involving expressions like 'the colour' and 'the same
colour'. We developed a theoretical analysis of 'the X' and 'the same X' where
X is a relational noun such as 'colour', and showed how this can be formalised
in situation theoretic DRT (STDRT). Applying our account to the temporal ex¬
amples allowed us to explain the observations involving 'at the time' and 'at the
same time'. It also led us to propose a way to formalise the notion of discourse
backgrounding.
Thus, in Chapters 2-4, our primary focus was at a "discourse" level of analysis,
involving the relations between eventualities conveyed by successive sentences of
a discourse. Of course, in developing grammar rules we were forced to consi¬
der issues such as the progressive which have traditionally be dealt with on an
intra-sentential level. However, such topics as the analysis of the progressive and
aspectual class distinctions were not our main concern, and we gave what we con¬
sider to be a rather perfunctory treatment of these. In the current chapter we will
investigate how the theory we have developed so far can be applied to aspectual
class and aspectual composition, which are traditionally dealt with at a sentential
level of analysis.
In this chapter we discuss the various approaches to aspectual class and aspectual
composition that have appeared in the literature in recent years — in particu¬
lar, those of (Moens 1987), (Verkuyl 1989) and (Krifka 1992). This will enable
us to develop an STDRT account which incorporates insights from these sour¬
ces. We will show how our account could be used as the basis for extension and
improvement of the fragment presented in Chapter 3.
We hope to show that situation theory provides us with a useful framework for
expressing the structure of events. This is not to claim that situation theory is
the only theory in which such an account of events can be expressed. We will
demonstrate, however, that it provides us with some useful tools and concepts for
the task at hand, as well as providing compatability with the DSTG framework
in which the grammar rules are formulated.
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5.2 Aspect and Aspectual Class
Terms such as 'aspect', 'aspectual class', 'aspectual type' and 'aktionsart' are
widely used in the literature, often in subtly different ways. It is important that
we establish at this point which terms we are going to use and how we will use
them.
'Aspect' is often used in a fairly general way to refer to something like "the
linguistic apparatus used to establish the internal temporal structure of a state
of affairs". (See Moens 1987, p.38ff for a detailed discussion of this and related
terminology in the tense and aspect literature.) Such aspectual differences can be
grammaticalized, for example by means of aspectual affixes on verbs (an example
is the progressive 'be' + 'ing' construction in English). This gives rise to the
perfective/imperfective distinction widely used in the literature, and is also used
to cover notions such as duration, instantaneity, frequency and so on (again, see
Moens 1987, p.39 for discussion). Aspectual information is also present (in some
sense, to be discussed shortly) in lexical material. Verbs have sometimes been
classified in order to reflect the aspectual distinctions they express, such classes
being referred to as aktionsarten.
One classification which has been adopted by many researchers is that of (Vend-
ler 1967), who identifies the classes states, activities, accomplishments and
achievements. However, although many have taken Vendler's taxonomy to be a
classification of verbs, it is clear from his paper that Vendler was concerned with
classifying not just verbs but verb phrases such as 'run a mile', according to what
he calls the "time schemata" of the events they describe. Later authors such as
Dowty (1979) have shown clearly that the Vendler classification is better seen as
a classification of the meanings of whole sentences, given that object noun phra¬
ses, subject noun phrases, locative complements and temporal adverbials may all
affect aspectual class. However, we are still left with the fact that the verb "in
itself" contributes something to the overall aspectual class of the state of affairs
described by the sentence. The problem is to decide exactly what it is that the
verb contributes, and how best this may be characterised.
Moens proposes that we regard the Vendlerian taxonomy as "dynamic" in nature,
as opposed to seeing it as a fixed classification. The idea is that a verb like
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'run' is assigned a "basic aspectual class"1 but is capable of changing category
provided that the context (linguistic and non-linguistic) is able to support the
necessary assumptions relating to the transition. We will discuss Moens' approach
to aspectual modification in more detail shortly.
An alternative approach is that of Verkuyl in (Verkuyl 1972) and (Verkuyl 1989),
who argues that it is wrong to adopt an aspectual classification of verbs. He
maintains that aspectual class does not exist at a syntactic level lower than that
of VP, and that a better approach is to assign features to verbs which determine
their contribution to the aspectual class of the VP. The properties of any object
NPs (such as their mass/count nature) also contribute to the determination of
aspect at VP level. 'Sentential' aspect is then formed by a combination of VP
aspect and the properties of the subject NP.
Because Verkuyl rejects the notion of "basic aspectual class/type" for verbs, his
and Moens' accounts look radically different at first glance. However their ac¬
counts are not as dissimilar as they may at first appear, since they share the
idea that the aspectual class of an event as described by a sentence is built up or
derived from the aspectual properties of the constituents. Their accounts differ
in the detail of how these aspectual interactions are represented. We will discuss
Verkuyl's approach in more detail shortly.
Moens (1987) makes it clear that he regards aspectual class distinctions as "sub¬
jective" in nature, insofar as they reflect the speaker's way of describing the world,
rather than being a classification of real world events. He argues that the same
state of affairs can be described in different ways, corresponding to different as¬
pectual classes. For example, the sentences:
(5.1) I wrote two letters last night
and:
1To be more precise, Moens makes it clear that basic aspectual class is a classification not
of a verb but of a sentence containing the verb, in a "null context" where no linguistic or other
factors are present to induce a change in aspectual class. See later for more on this.
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(5.2) I wrote letters last night
may both be used to describe exactly the same state of affairs, while (5.1) is
classified as a culminated process (equivalent to a Vendler accomplishment) and
(5.2) as a process (Vendler activity). This is a very appealing argument, but it
begs the question of what exactly is meant by 'the same state of affairs' — an
intuitive notion which it is not easy to see how to define. We will see shortly how
situation theory helps us to clarify the idea.
Verkuyl (1989), on the other hand, appears to view aspectual class distinctions as
objective properties of events. Because of this, he rejects the distinction between
accomplishments and achievements, arguing that 'draw a circle', traditionally an
accomplishment, becomes effectively an instantaneous action (an achievement)
when done by means of a computer. Thus the real-world distinction between
accomplishments and achievements is blurred and it becomes unnecessary, Verkuyl
argues, to make the distinction at all. Others, such as Smith (1991), see aspectual
class distinctions as pertaining to the way that events are classified by speakers.
Smith argues (p.30) that while no event is "truly instantaneous" in an objective
sense, the accomplishment/achievement distinction is still important in that it
involves the way that the speaker chooses to classify and describe the event in
question. The fact that it is a conceptual notion rather than an objective, speaker-
independent one does not render it a unnecessary distinction to make, and Smith
argues that it is an important linguistic category.
In our situation-theoretic account, we will use the term 'aspectual class' as a
classification of situations of a certain type — those we call 'eventualities'.2 Recall
that in Chapter 3 we defined an eventuality to be a situation which has one or
more key infons.
In regarding Vendler class as a way of classifying situations we follow Cooper
(1985), who similarly used Vendlerian distinctions to classify situations, although
we adopt a more current version of situation theory and we use Moens' aspectual
taxonomy. Situations are not linguistic in nature; they are parts of the world that
2Thus we are not claiming that all situations are eventualities, but rather that all eventualities
are situations. We use the term 'eventuality' as in Chapter 3 to cover both states and events
(Bach 1986).
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language users may describe using linguistic expressions. Thus in our terminology,
'process', for example, does not classify a certain kind of sentence but a certain
piece of non-linguistic reality.3 However, we avoid Verkuyl's claim that such a
classification must necessarily be "objective" in the sense that there is something
about the world that determines, independent of anyone's viewpoint, whether
something is or is not a process. In situation theory, situations are parts of the
world as individuated by agents. Thus a language-using agent discriminates a
part of the world as a situation of type EVENTUALITY, and classifies it as a
process, a culminated process or whatever.
Thus, our seeing aspectual class as applying to situations allows us to account
for the fact that the same bit of reality may be classified in different ways by
different agents (or even by the same agent). That is, what we might intuitively
think of as the "same event" where someone called John eats some apples, may be
described by one agent as 'John ate apples' (a process) and by another as 'John
ate the apples' (a culminated process). In other words, the same event may be
presented in more than one way in terms of informational structure. Situation
theory provides us with an informational perspective on events which gives us a
clear way of characterizing what aspectual class is "about". It allows us a more
fine-grained classification than that of Verkuyl, while at the same time showing
how properties of linguistic objects link up to properties of non-linguistic objects,
which is surely an appropriate goal of linguistic semantics.
However, if we use aspectual class to classify situations, we are left with the
problem of deciding how it is that a particular sentence describes a situation of
a particular aspectual class. We will need to assign some kind of features or
properties to the constituents of a sentence (or to their referents) and then show
how these features combine together in such a way that the sentence describes a
situation of a particular aspectual type. It is clear that some basic property or
properties of the verb, together with properties of subject and object NPs and
any temporal adverbials that may be present, are all relevant here.
We saw above that the approach taken by Moens is to employ the notion of a
"basic" aspectual class associated with a verb. This basic aspectual class may be
3We will however sometimes speak of a 'process sentence', for example, to refer to a sentence
that describes an eventuality that is a process.
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modified when the verb combines with other constituents of the sentence. This
process of aspectual modification Moens calls coercion. Thus, for example, to the
verb 'climb' he ascribes the basic aspectual class process. When 'climb' combines
with certain types of direct object NP (e.g., a count noun plus a determiner), the
process is coerced to a culminated process.4 Moens develops an aspectual
network of permitted coercions, which clearly shows which transitions between
aspectual classes are permitted, and under what circumstances.5 He explains
the various possible coercion using an event nucleus, which we will discuss in
detail shortly. This provides a very clear summary of aspectual modification
and the conditions under which it occurs. It is an approach which lends itself
very well to implementation, and was used by Glasbey (1990) as the basis for a
Prolog system developed to parse a fragment of English sentences with tense and
aspect. There, the author used Moens' coercion network provided the basis for
a compositional analysis of sentences involving progressives, perfects, temporal
adverbials and verbs of various aspectual classes.
There appears, however, to be something rather arbitrary about whether we
choose to call 'climb' a process or a culminated process. 'Climb a mountain'
is a culminated process; 'climb mountains' is a process.6 Of course we could de¬
cide to take the intransitive use of the verb and use that to determine aspectual
class. 'John climbed' can be shown to be a process — so maybe we should take
this to be the basic aspectual class. But it is not clear that all transitive verbs
have intransitive uses. Moens (1987) (p.94) finds a way around this problem by
specifying the exact conditions under which "basic aspectual class" is assigned.
He makes it clear that the aspectual categories actually apply to "propositions
conveyed by sentences in context". In order to determine the aspectual category
of a verb, he specifies that "the subject of the basic proposition should be syntac¬
tically singular [and] ... the object should be a singular count noun and should
only be present in the case of a necessarily transitive verb ...". Thus, in Moens'
words "... the statement that 'run' is a process verb is really a shorthand for the
statement that the basic proposition involving this verb, for example 'John ran',
is typically a process expression".
4A Vendler accomplishment.
5These include general world knowledge, context, and linguistic features such as the presence
of the progressive.
6See (Dowty 1979) for tests to distinguish between these.
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Thus the assigning of basic aspectual class to a verb may be seen as a somewhat
arbitrary decision. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this as long as the
conditions for the assignment are carefully defined, which Moens does. It may
be argued, however, that the arbitrariness arises because there is really no such
property as aspectual class at the verbal level. Verkuyl believes that this is so, and
that what is present at the verbal level are features, which combine with features of
object NPs, for example, to give aspectual class at the VP level. Thus what we are
calling aspectual class (and Verkuyl calls aspect) only comes into being at VP level
and above. Rather than having aspectual class, a verb is specified with regard to
what Verkuyl calls a 'meaning element', which determines its contribution to the
aspect of the VP and ultimately that of the sentence. Thus Verkuyl rejects what
he sees as the Vendler classification of verbs, arguing that the classification is an
ontological one, and he also rejects the notion of basic aspectual class. Verkuyl's
meaning elements, which are responsible for this interaction, are seen in his earlier
treatment (1972) as syntactic features only. They correspond to some intuitive
notions but are not formally defined. However in his later (1989) paper, model
theoretic definitions are given, which somewhat increase the explanatory power
of his account. Verkuyl's treatment of aspectual composition will be compared
later with that of Krifka (1992), who adopts an approach that is similar in some
respects.
We will develop an account of aspectual composition which does not use the notion
of basic aspectual class of a verb. Instead we will assign features to relations,
agents, patients, times, places and so on (i.e., to real world objects as discriminated
by agents). We will show how these semantic features combine together to give
the resultant aspectual class of the described eventuality. To do this we will use
ideas from both Verkuyl and Krifka.
The first thing we need to do is to express formally the difference between the
aspectual classes. We will refer to these, using Moens' terminology, as states,
processes, culminated processes and culminations,7 which correspond to
Vendler's original classes of states, activities, accomplishments and achieve¬
ments respectively.
Moens (1987) proposes a nucleus model for events, where an event consists of
7We will not consider points here.
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a preparatory process, a culmination, and (in some cases) a consequent state.
Linguistic descriptions of events pick out and refer to one or more phases of the
nucleus.
Culmination
Preparatory Process Consequent State
Thus Moens would say that 'Daniel climbed Ben Nevis' refers to a culminated
process consisting of a preparatory process (the climbing) and a culmination (the
arrival at the summit). The perfect 'Daniel has climbed Ben Nevis' refers to the
consequent-state phase of the event. The progressive 'Daniel was climbing Ben
Nevis' refers to the preparatory process (or part of it), but does not refer to the
culmination (which helps to explain why use of the progressive makes no claim
about the event having been completed). Thus Moens regards the function of
the progressive as being to "chop off' the culmination from a culminated pro¬
cess, leaving a process. In his account, the progressive then coerces the process
to a particular kind of state called a progressive state, according to one of the
transitions in the aspectual network.
'Daniel reached the top' refers to a culmination alone and not to a preparatory
process. Of course there is an associated preparatory process, which we might refer
to with the sentence 'Daniel climbed'. We can specify the temporal extent of this
preparatory process by combining the culmination sentence with a (completive)
'in'-adverbial, e.g.:
(5.3) Daniel reached the top in four hours
Note however that the progressive sentence:
(5.4) Daniel was reaching the top
cannot be used to refer to any arbitrary part of the preparatory process we as¬
sociate with the culmination. It appears that (5.4) can only be used to refer to
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some "final part" of the preparatory process. Thus we see that it is important
to distinguish between those parts of an event which are directly referred to by a
sentence, and those which are not directly described but which the hearer is so¬
mehow able to infer. We will consider such examples in more detail shortly. First,
we will consider how to formalize Moens' event structure in a situation theoretic
framework.
5.3 Event Structure in Situation Theory
5.3.1 Situations, infons and aspectual class
We took the decision in Chapter 3 to regard events and states as situations of
type EVENTUALITY. This seems intuitively reasonable. In common parlance,
we use the term 'event' to refer to happenings both large and small. For example,
we speak of an event of Daniel climbing Ben Nevis, or of Mary writing her thesis,
or of John typing a single letter 'k' at the keyboard. We often conceive of events
as consisting of component sub-events. Many events are "temporally connected"
in the sense that there are no temporal gaps in them — but this is not always
the case. Clearly, it is very difficult if not impossible to define in some ontological
sense what is or is not meant by an event, and we will not attempt to do so here.
Situations in situation theory may also be of any size. They may be classified as
supporting a large number of infons or just one. They may be temporally and/or
spatially connected or otherwise. Situation theorists view situations as parts of
the world as perceived or individuated by agents. This appears to fit very well
with the way we use the terms 'event' and 'state'. We do not want to say that all
situations are eventualities, but it seems appropriate to think of an eventuality as
a particular kind of situation.
Let us consider how to express a Moens "event nucleus" in these terms. We




A situation is of type NUCLEUS if it has the structure:
Culmination
Preparatory Process Consequent State
We observe that single clauses (corresponding to single infons) do not appear
to describe situations of type NUCLEUS, but rather they describe parts of such
situations. For example, an utterance of 'Daniel climbed Ben Nevis' describes the
preparatory process plus the culmination, while 'Daniel was climbing Ben Nevis'
describes the preparatory process (or part of it), and 'Daniel has climbed Ben
Nevis' refers to the consequent-state of the event.
We propose to regard each phase of the nucleus as a situation of type EVENTU¬
ALITY. We then introduce binary types such as PREP, CULM and CONS, which
hold between these eventualities. For example:
Si,S2 |
PREP
is the proposition that S\ is the preparatory process of 52 and:
~s77sTl
CULM
is the proposition that S\ is the culmination of ST




in order to capture the fact that what is important here is not some property of a
situation in itself, but rather the way that the situation is related to one or more
other situations. It may be possible, for example, for a given situation S\ to be the
preparatory phase of one event and the consequent state of another. In suggesting
this we follow Mellor (1993), who uses a similar idea to analyse inceptives.
Now we need to decide how to represent aspectual information about situations.
Here, it appears that we may need unary types, for example:
S_
CP
to express the proposition that S is a culminated process (CP). We will explore
this further and give a definition for CP shortly. First, we will recap on what we
said in Chapter 3 about situations, infons and the notion of KEY.
We noted in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2, that in considering eventualities as situations
we need to be clear which situation we are talking about. What we require is a
notion of eventuality which corresponds to the "smallest" situation that supports
the infon in question. We used the notion of 'key infon' presented in (Cooper
1985), and we introduced a binary type KEY that holds between a situation
and an infon, where the time of that infon includes the times of all other infons
supported by the situation.
We saw that:
S, cr(T) : KEY -> S, T : TIME-OF
where we call T the time Role or TIME-OF Role of S.
In order to deal with aspectual class, we will assign an aspectual class (such as
PROCESS or CP) to an infon a, and we will allow that aspectual class to be
"transmitted" to the situation S of which a is the key infon. We need to be
careful here, however, as it is possible for a situation to have more than one key
infon. If a situation S has, say, two key infons, of differing aspectual classes, which
aspectual class does S inherit? In order to avoid this problem, we will define a
special kind of eventuality which has at most one key infon. We will introduce a
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new type, EVY, for eventualities of this kind, and define it as follows:
Definition
WS [5" : EVY iff [Val5 a2[S, : KEY & 5, <r2 : KEY] -> <jx = a2]]
We will also introduce a new binary type of situations and infons, KEY0, where:
VS, a [S, a: KEY0 iff [S, a : KEY & S : EVY]]
Now we need to consider how to define the types STATE, PROCESS, CP, CULM
(culmination) and POINT, corresponding to Moens' aspectual types. We said
above that we will view these as unary types both infons and eventualities.
We will leave aside here the distinction between states and processes (see Glas-
bey 1994a for discussion and a proposal regarding this). To begin with, we will
concentrate on the distinction between processes and CPs.
In the literature, the distinction has been expressed in terms of the subinterval
property or homogeneity (Bennett and Partee 1972, Dowty 1979). The basic
idea is that if an event is a process (or state), all sub-events are of the same type
as the main event. For example, an event of John running, described as 'John
ran', may be divided up into an indefinite number of sub-events, each of which is
also an event of John running, describable as 'John ran'. This is the property of
homogeneity that has been used to characterise process events.8 An alternative
way to express the same idea is to say that if the event 'John ran' had temporal
duration t, then every subinterval of t can also be associated with an event of type
'John ran'. This gives rise to the term subinterval property. Cooper (1985)
uses a related but different notion to distinguish between states and processes on
the one hand and CPs and culminations on the other. He characterises states
and processes as having the property of temporal ungroundedness, which says
that for every event of (say) John running, there is another event of John running
temporally included in it. We will discuss this definition in more detail below.
By contrast, CPs, culminations and points do not in general have sub-events
of the same type as the main event. If a CP, culmination or point occurs at
8See below for a discussion of problems associated with this definition.
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a time interval t, then an event of the same type will not in general occur at
any subinterval of t. Thus the event is associated with a unique time interval,
giving rise to what Cooper calls temporal groundedness. We will adopt the
temporal ungroundedness (TU) / temporal groundedness (TG) terminology to
distinguish in what follows between states and processes on the one hand and
CPs, culminations and points on the other.
Before giving the definitions, however, we need to consider the following point.
It seems mistaken to consider an event "in itself' as being of type TU or TG.
If we consider events as somehow pre-existing in the world as entities prior to
individuation and description by an agent, then we run into problems. Consider,
for example, a scenario or "event" where John runs a certain distance and stops
when he reaches a shop. It is possible to describe this occurrence or happening in
many different ways, including 'John ran' and 'John ran to the shop'. But if we
describe it the former way it is of type TU and if we describe it the latter way it is of
type TG. Another example is an event involving John eating apples. It is possible
to describe the "same event" as 'John ate apples', or 'John ate some apples', or
'John ate three apples'. Yet the first of these described events is TU, whereas
the latter two are TG. Clearly the distinction cannot lie in intrinsic, objective,
speaker-independent features of the event itself, but rather in the way that the
event is individuated and described by the speaker. The TU/TG distinction is
therefore a reflection of the speaker's choice of how to describe the event.
It is for this reason that Krifka (1992) chose to classify not events but what he
calls event predicates (which we would call types of event in our terminology).
We get around this here by classifying infons as TU/TG. We then say that if a
situation S supports an infon a of type TG (say), where:
5, a : KEY0
then S is classified as being of type TG. Thus, by claiming that a situation S is
of type cr where a is of type TG and the type KEY0 holds, a speaker is classifying
S as TG. In other words, the TG property of S is imposed by virtue of the
classification of S as of type a. No claim is being made about any objective,
speaker-independent properties of S.
Let us first try to define what we are calling TU using the Bennett and Partee
245
notion. Thus we define TU (for an infon) as follows:
Preliminary definition of TU for an infon:
Vcr(T) [a(T) : TU iff \4S VT' C T [S f= a{T')})}
where the notation a{T) is used (as earlier) to mean that T is the time argument
of infon a.
We saw above that if cr:TU and a is the key infon of S, then 5":TU. We can spell
out what £:TU means (for S of type EVY) as follows:
Preliminary definition of TU for a situation:
VS [S : TU iff [Ver(T) [S |= a(T) VT' C T [5 \= a(T')]]]]
There are problems with this kind of definition for temporal ungroundedness /
homogeneity that have often been raised in the literature. One is that of "minimal
parts". It may be argued that if the subintervals become sufficiently small, it is
no longer correct to say that a subinterval corresponds to an event of type 'Daniel
runs', but corresponds instead to something like 'Daniel raises his right foot'. If
we believe this to be the case, it becomes necessary to put some restriction on
how small we allow the intervals (or sub-events) to get.
Another problem is that of "interruptions". It may be argued that it is perfectly
reasonable to use the sentence:
(5.5) Daniel played football for three hours
to describe a situation where Daniel takes several short breaks during his long
session of football-playing. Cooper's definition of temporal ungroundedness, which
we mentioned above, was put forward in order to overcome this problem (Cooper
1985). As we saw above, this involves introducing existential rather than universal
quantification into the definition of TU. If we translate this into our formalism,
we get:
Final definition of TU for an infon:
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Vct(T) [a(T) : TU iff [VS [5 |= a(T) ->• 3T' □ T s.t. 5 |= <t(T')]]]
The corresponding definition of TU for situations of type EVY is then:
Final definition of TU for a situation:
MS [5 : TU iff [Ma(T) [S h o{T) -> 3T' UT s.t. 5 h v(T')}}}
This definition also gets around the minimal parts problem. We will therefore use
it as our definition of TU.
Another way we can get round the minimal parts problem is to use the notions
cumulative and quantized employed by Krifka (1992). Krifka applies these
notions to both "object predicates" (e.g. 'apples', 'an apple') and "event predi¬
cates" (e.g. 'eat apples', 'eat an apple'). According to Krifka's definition, the
object predicate 'apples' is cumulative (CUM) because whenever there are two
entities of which 'apples' may be predicated, the predicate also applies to their
collection. Similarly for events: if there two events of which 'eat apples' may
be predicated, then this predicate also applies to the combination of these two
events. Predicates like 'an apple' and 'eat an apple' are quantized (QUA), which
means that the predicate does not apply to combinations of the objects/events
in this way. The object formed by combining one apple with another apple may
not be described as 'an apple', for example. Thus cumulativity for events is a
similar notion to homogeneity, but instead of looking at sub-parts of events it is
concerned with what happens when events are "added together" to form larger
events. If we think of event predicates as event types in our terminology, we can
speak of having an event of a given type, and a second event of the same type.
Now we combine them to produce a third event. If the third event is of the same
type as the other two, then the event type in question has the property CUM.
For example, an event of type 'John ran', when added to another event of type
'John ran', gives a third event of type 'John ran': thus the event type 'John ran'
is cumulative. On the other hand, an event of type 'John ate an apple', when
combined with a second event of type 'John ate an apple', does not give an event
of type 'John ate an apple', but is rather an event of the type 'John ate two
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apples'. The event type 'John ate an apple' is thus QUA.9
Let us try to formalise this in situation theoretic terms. We take events to corre¬
spond to situations and event types to infons. Thus we can say that an infon a
has the property CUM if the following holds:
Definition:
VSi, S"2 [5i (= cr & 52 1= a S"3 f= cr]
where S3 is the situation formed by combining Si and 52.
But using the traditional definition for adding situations (see, for example, Barwise
and Etchemendy 1990), Sz must support (at least) all the infons supported by Si
and S2 individually. Thus S3 (= a unavoidably, irrespective of whether or not a
is cumulative. This problem is not necessarily insuperable, but in order to avoid
the ensuing complications we will continue to use our original definition of TU for
infons. We will, however, use the notion of cumulativity for objects.
We will now define TG for an infon, as follows:
Definition of TG for an infon:
Vcr(T) [a(T) : TG iff [[S \= o{T) -» 3T" C T s.t. S \= a(T')\
->T' = T]]
Just as we did for the TU case, we will say that if a is the key infon of an eventuality
S, and cr:TG, then S:TG. We characterise TG for situations as follows:
Definition of TG for a situation:
VS [5 : TG iff [Vcr(T) [[5 |= o(T) —» 3T" □ T s.t. 5 |= a(T')}
-> V = T}]]
We have now given a formal definition of the TU/TG distinction. Given that TU
covers states and processes, and TG covers CPs and culminations, it is still neces¬
sary to formalize the STATE/PROCESS and CP/CULMINATION distinctions.
9To be precise, Krifka defines the property 'strictly cumulative' — SCUM — which is both
cumulative and non-singular. It is —SCUM that corresponds to QUA. For simplicity we will use
'CUM' to refer to the property that Krifka calls 'SCUM'.
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We will leave aside the STATE/PROCESS distinction here (see Glasbey 1994a
for discussion).
Let us now consider how to express the CP/CULMINATION distinction. The
simplest way to distinguish between CPs and culminations is in terms of their
temporal duration. CPs are temporally-extended and culminations are instanta¬
neous. We are not necessarily claiming that any eventuality is "really" instanta¬
neous. This property is, rather a reflection of the way a speaker chooses to classify
an eventuality, by describing it in a certain way. We will introduce a unary type
INST which holds of an eventuality classified as instantaneous.
Definition:
WS, T [S : INST & S, T : TIME-OF -► T : INSTANT]
where INSTANT is a type of times which holds of a time which is instantaneous
(thus we need both instants and intervals in our temporal ontology).
We will say that if a situation S is of type TG and is also of type INST, then S
is of type CULMIN (i.e., a culmination).
5.3.2 Representation of events and their times
We will digress briefly here on the subject of eventualities and their times, looking
in particular at the differences between processes and CPs in the way that we
describe the event as being related to a time.
Many have observed that processes can readily receive what is called an inceptive
reading. Thus a sentence like:
(5.6) Daniel ran
is thought of as having two readings, the inceptive one which concerns the begin¬
ning of the process and the non-inceptive one which concerns the whole process.
This means that:
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(5.7) Daniel ran at 2pm
is felicitous if we take the inceptive reading of 'Daniel ran', i.e. if we take the
statement to mean that the running event commenced at 2pm. By contrast:
(5.8) Daniel climbed Ben Nevis at 2pm
is not so acceptable. However, we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2 that some CPs
are exceptional in this respect — for example:
(5.9) We will eat dinner at 7pm
so the matter is not entirely clearcut. The exceptions seemed to involve CPs where
some kind of scheduled event like a lecture a meal was involved.
In general, however, processes combine much more readily than CPs with 'at'-
adverbials. Another example is:
(5.10) We sailed at 7pm
which sounds much better than:
(5.11) We sailed across the Channel at 7pm
We can explain the oddness of (5.8) and (5.11) if we take 'at'-adverbials to modify
events which are described as (at least approximately) instantaneous. Then, in
order to explain why (5.7) and (5.10) are acceptable, we need to say something
to the effect that these sentences describe the beginnings of the relevant events.
Why should it be that sentences describing processes can readily be given incep¬
tive interpretations, whereas sentences describing culminated processes in general
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cannot? Suppose we were to say that "a process sentence always describes the
beginning of an event". But this seems clearly wrong. We pointed out above that
process sentences can describe either beginnings or the process as a whole.
One possibility is to say that an utterance of (5.6) describes only the beginning
of Daniel's run, and that we infer the rest. Of course we don't need to infer that
there was very much more in the way of running. It's possible to say:
(5.12) Daniel ran, but almost immediately he tripped and fell
But it seems that we need to infer that at least some running took place. It sounds
rather odd if we say:
(5.13) Daniel ran, but before he actually ran, he tripped and fell
Compare:
(5.14) Daniel started to run, but before he actually ran, he tripped and fell
which sounds much better than (5.13).10
So it seems as though some running is definitely entailed by an utterance of
(5.6). One way to capture the contrast between (5.13) and (5.14) is to say that
(5.13) describes a situation of type run(daniel) while (5.14) describes only the
beginning of such a situation (an "initial slice" of it). We could capture the fact
that (5.6) readily has an inceptive reading by saying that an utterance of (5.6)
refers to the whole event (of type run(daniel)), but focuses upon the beginning
of it. Of course, this requires us to define precisely what we mean by focusing on
a particular part of an event. We will now develop a way to formalize this notion.
First, consider the type Ty below:
10We are not attempting to develop a theory of inceptives here. See (Mellor 1993) for an
account of these.
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So an utterance of 'Daniel climbed Ben Nevis' classifies a situation, two individuals
and a time interval as being related in the above way. (We will take the resource
situation r as some kind of given here.)
Now consider the type Ty', corresponding to an utterance of 'Daniel ran':








Here, note that the parameter T' is the start-time of S.
Thus we are claiming that the sentence 'Daniel ran' relates a situation and the
time at which that situation begins. The sentence 'Daniel climbed Ben Nevis', on
the other hand, is about a situation, and its occurrence-time. This helps explain
why 'Daniel ran' can be interpreted as describing either the beginning of a run
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or a complete run, while these don't seem to constitute distinct readings. It also
explains why, in (5.15):
(5.15) Daniel ran at 2pm
'at 2pm' must refer to the start time of the running event. It can't refer to any
arbitrary time during the event. Compare the progressive:
(5.16) Daniel was running at 2pm
where 'at 2pm' can refer to a time during the event (but not the beginning time)
and the stative:
(5.17) Daniel was happy at 2pm
where 'at 2pm' can specify either the starting time or some time during the state
of happiness. (See Glasbey 1994a for a discussion of statives and progressives.)
We can now explain why process sentences can readily combine with 'at'-adverbials,
even when the described situation cannot readily be seen as happening in a very
short time. E.g:
(5.18) Mary played tennis at 2pm
sounds fine. Compare:
(5.19) Mary played three sets against Sally at 2pm
which sounds rather odd. I.e., it seems natural to use an 'at'-adverbial to specify
the start-time of a process, but much less so to use an 'at'-adverbial to specify the
start-time of a CP. Also, compare:
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(5.20) John chopped onions at 11am
which sounds fine, and can be followed by:
(5.21) He chopped two dozen of them
with:
(5.22) John chopped two dozen onions at 11am
which sounds very odd.
However, there are some interesting exceptions to this, as mentioned above. For
example:
(5.23) Professor Smith gave the lecture at 2pm
followed by:
(5.24) It lasted two hours
sounds fine. So does:
(5.25) We ate dinner at 7pm
followed by:
(5.26) It was a five course meal
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But compare:
(5.27) We ate a five course meal at 7pm
which is considerably less good.
Why is this? One possibility is that (5.23) and (5.25) are describing processes
here. Perhaps some kind of coercion of CPs to processes is taking place. Plowever,
if this were the case, we would expect (5.23) and (5.25) to combine readily with
'for'-adverbials. But note that the following sound odd (at least to some speakers):
(5.28) We ate dinner for two hours
and:
(5.29) Professor Smith gave the lecture for two hours
So it seems that (5.23) and (5.25) are probably not describing processes, and we
must look for an alternative explanation.11 Another possibility is to say that (for
some reason) 'eat dinner' and 'give the lecture' describe types which are naturally
associated with both start-times and occurrence-times. Perhaps there is something
about the nature of these types of events which allow us to readily associate them
with their start-times. This seems intuitively reasonable. Meals and lectures are
both events which we naturally think of as happening at set, predetermined times,
which are particularly salient to the event. It is almost as though (5.23) could be
paraphrased:
(5.30) Professor Smith gave the lecture, starting at 2pm
11Readiness of combination with 'for'-adverbials is a standard test for processes, in the lite¬
rature. See (Dowty 1979), for example.
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This is not true for CPs in general, however. We do not readily associate most CPs
with their start-times, and the combination of a CP and an 'at'-adverbial sounds
odd unless the CP is one of very short occurrence-time. By contrast, we generally
do associate processes with their start-times, and thus processes combine readily
with 'at'-adverbials no matter how long the duration of the process. This makes
sense given that we do not naturally associate a process with its occurrence time,
as a process has no predetermined endpoint or culmination.
So it appears that, in general, PROCESS situations together with their start-times
form "objects of description", as do CP situations together with their occurrence-
times. And we might say that an utterance "presents" a situation, a time and
various individuals, and says how these are related. The situation is a "real one"
(the run actually happened — it's not like the progressive where we need some
conceptual situation that didn't necessarily go to completion) but this formalism
give us a means to mirror what a process sentence does, that is, to focus on the
beginning of the situation.
5.3.3 Formalising the nucleus model for events
An important distinction is made in situation theory between the information
that a situation supports and the information that it carries. See (Barwise
1989, p.51ff), for example. In the discussion that follows, we will use the more
recent terminology of Barwise and Seligman (in press).
Barwise and Seligman speak of the "natural regularities" perceived by agents in
the world around them and used to enable them to reason with limited informa¬
tion. Natural regularities correspond to what we might say is "normal" or "expec¬
ted" . An important point about reasoning with such regularities or "constraints"
is that in particular cases it may fail. Constraints are in sense approximations
to reality. Exceptions to a particlar regularity may exist, with the result that we
sometimes reason wrongly. In general, however, they are reliable enough for us to
use them to interact successfully with our environment.
An example given by Barwise and Seligman is the regularity that exists between
situations of a type where the doorbell rings, and situations of a type where
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someone is standing on the porch. In general, this will be reliable, and we will
usually be right if we infer on hearing the doorbell ring that someone is standing
on the porch. Occasionally, however, things will go wrong and a false conclusion
will be drawn. The bell may be faulty, for example, or a falling branch may
have hit it and caused it to ring. But the existence of such exceptions does not
invalidate the general usefulness of the a constraint.
Barwise and Seligman capture the usefulness and fallibility of constraints by in¬
troducing channels that work on two levels — the level of tokens and the level of
types. Tokens may be, for example, situations, but they are not limited to these
and may be any kind of object. If the tokens are situations, then the types are
situation-types. Types are linked by constraints, denoted as follows:
4* ^ C
where =>■ is pronounced 'indicates'. The subscript 'c' is to show that the constraint
involves a particular channel, c.
Tokens are linked by connections, e.g:
Sj ~^c S2
where in this example Si is said to 'signal' ST
A given channel c contains a number of connections and a number of constraints,
and determines which connections are of the type of which constraints. E.g. c
may tell us that
Si —>c S'2 :c 4> =^c V*
There is a soundness condition which says that if Si : 0 and the information link
between Si and S"2 is of type:
0 ^ c T
then S2 : ip
The soundness condition guarantees that if the connection between Si and S2 is
of the correct type, then S"2 will be of type ip. Thus, by virtue of the channel c, S\
carries information about ST If the connection is not of the expected type, then
no information about S2 can be inferred by virtue of this channel. This would be
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the case in the example we discussed above where the doorbell is faulty — the
connection is an 'exception to the regularity' in this case.
In some cases, there are no exceptions to the regularity, and the constraint is said
to be an "absolute" one. Absolute constraints will be useful to us in our account
of event structure below.
Situation theory speaks of agents being "attuned" to constraints. For example,
an agent attuned to the above constraint and aware of a situation Si of type 4>
can infer the existence of a situation S2 of type tp.
Now let us consider how to apply these notions to event structure. Suppose we
have an utterance of:
(5.31) Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
We proposed above that this utterance describes a situation Sd, which supports
an infon a, where cr:CP. We said, too, that if S^EVY and Sd,c : KEY0, then
Sd:CP.
Now it seems that by virtue of describing Sd, the utterance also carries informa¬
tion about some other situations. These are:
• A situation Sp (corresponding to the preparatory process) which is part of
Sd- This corresponds to the climb minus its culmination. It seems natural
to think of Sp as part of Sd, i.e. Sp < Sd-
It is useful at this point to define a relation between situation which en¬
compasses the PART-OF relation but also requires a relation of (improper)
temporal inclusion.
Perhaps it is difficult to conceive of a situation S' that we would want to
consider as PART-OF a situation S without S' being temporally included in
S. However, there does not seem to be any reason to rule out the possibility
in principle, so for this reason we will introduce a new version of <3 which
is a binary type of situations of type EVY. We will call this relation
(pronounced 'slice-of', and define it as follows:
Definition:
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For any two eventualities S and S' of type EVY:
S' <! si S iff S' <3 S (traditional PART-OF), and: T" \ZT T (where T,
T' are the occurrence-times of S, S' respectively and conveys
temporal inclusion.
Now, because Sp is temporally included in Sd, we can say that:
Sp ^ si Sd
• A situation Scu corresponding to the culmination of Sd- Scu is the situation
we could call "reaching the top of Ben Nevis". Again, it seems appropriate
to consider Scu to be part of Sd, and because Sd temporally includes Scu, we
can say that:
Scu — si ^d
• A situation Sco, which corresponds to the consequent state of climbing Ben
Nevis.12 In contrast to the cases of Sp and Scu, we will say that Sco is not a
slice of Sd- This is because Sco is not temporally included in Sd- Indeed, it
seems that we do not want to say that Sco <3 Sd, either. Aside from temporal
considerations, it is possible in principle to perceive Sco without perceiving
Sd (i.e., to perceive the consequences without perceiving the event). Argu¬
ments like this involving the intuition that situations are parts of the world
that we can perceive were used in early work on situation semantics (Barwise
1981, Barwise and Perry 1983) and in more recent work such as (Cooper
1991).
We propose that the above information is carried by virtue of constraints between
situation-types. We suggest the constraint:
12We might want to call this the state of having climbed Ben Nevis. Of course it is possible
to think of the same event having a number of different consequences. One consequence might
be that Daniel is tired, for example. Another might be that he is happy. However, each of these
consequences may be of limited duration. We prefer the notion of a consequent state that is
simple the state of "Daniel having climbed Ben Nevis" — a state that must hold forever. This













which says that a situation where someone climbs a mountain indicates another
situation where that person reaches the top of the mountain.
We might express this kind of constraint more generally as follows:
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In words, for any situation, infon pair S, o where o is the key infon of S and
Sanda are of type CP, S signals a situation Si, where Si is the culmination of S.





In order to form the constraint, we have abstracted over the parameters S and
Si. But once we have done this, it does not make any sense to express restric¬
tions concerning these parameters. One way round this problem is to express the
constraint as follows:
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We will call the above constraint C\. Now it appears that C\ holds without ex¬
ception — it is what Barwise and Seligman call an absolute constraint. That
is, any and every situation of the former type (which we will call p) conveys the
information that there is a situation of the latter type (which we will call ip). We
can capture this by saying that a situation of type <p is a signal for a situation of









More generally, we can say that any situation of type S is a signal for a situation
of type S', by virtue of C\.
In ci, because Si is a slice of S, we will say that Si has the status of described
information. This means that, in the example above, even though S2 is not
"directly" described by (5.31) but is inferred from it by virtue of ci, the fact that
5*2 is a slice of of Si means that a description of Sx effectively "encompasses" S2,
and S2 is thereby described.




Here again, we decided earlier that S2 should be thought of as part of S. Thus,
S2, like S\, has the status of described rather than merely inferred information.
Once again, the constraint is an absolute one.
Now let us introduce a constraint C3 to deal with the consequent state.
(<*)










Here, as explained above, we do not wish to regard S3 as part of S, but rather
we see both S and S3 as part of some larger situation S4 (of type NUCLEUS).
Because S3 is not part of S, we do not give it the status of described information.
The information about S3 is inferred rather than described.13
13Another possibility is to make CONS a relation rather than a type. Thus the fact that
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The constraint c3 is like c\ and c2 in that it is absolute.
We also need to express the fact that we can infer a CP from the description
of a culmination, using a similar kind of constraint. Note that the culmination
is a temporal slice of the inferred CP, but not the other way round. Thus, in
inferring a CP from a culmination, the CP will not have the status of described
information. The CP is merely inferrred. This will be useful to us in the following
section, when we look at culminations and 'for'-adverbials.
We do not claim to have given here all the possible constraints between parts of
an event. We have presented a number of these in order to show how they capture
the reasoning we may perform on the basis of linguistic information.
We have shown how choosing to model eventualities as situations allows us to
formalize in situation-theoretic terms the nucleus structure of events developed in
(Moens 1987). Constraints between situation-types allow us to tie together the
various components of a Moens event nucleus. However, one important point to
which we have not paid much attention is that Moens argues that the nucleus is
held together not merely by temporal relations but by relations of contingency
and causality, and it is important that our treatment should ultimately capture
this. There seems to be no reason why this could not be done in the kind of theory
we have been using.
We will now show that the ST distinction between described and inferred informa¬
tion enables us to capture the behaviour of the various tense/aspect constructions
with temporal adverbials. We will look at some constructions with 'for'- and 'in'-
adverbials that do not seem to be fully explained by Moens' transition network,
and show how the above distinction can provide us with a more complete account.
one situation is a consequence of another would be seen as "situated"—i.e., supported by some
situation or other. This seems a reasonable way of capturing the idea that the relationship
between an event and its "consequences" is at least to some extent a matter of perspective, or
point of view of the speaker, rather than being a matter determined by the way the world is.
However, it is not clear to us exactly which situation would support facts containing the CONS
relation. I leave this open as a matter for further consideration. The same comment might
apply to the PREP relation too.
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5.3.4 Culminations, 'for'- and 'in'-adverbials
Consider the following sentences involving culminations:
(5.32) ??John reached the top for four hours
(5.33) John reached the top in four hours
(5.34) ??John was reaching the top for four hours
We require an explanation for the oddness of (5.32) and (5.34). According to
(Moens 1987), a 'for'-adverbial can only combine with a process. In the case of
(5.32), one possible route through the transition network is to coerce the culmina¬
tion to a CP, followed by coercion of the CP to a process, which can then combine
with the FOR-adverbial. Moens' explanation of why this is not possible for (5.32)
involves specifying that the transition:
CP ->• PROCESS
is only possible in English when progressive aspect is present.
However, this does not explain why:
(5.35) Daniel climbed Ben Nevis for four hours
although not generally judged completely acceptable, is nevertheless agreed to be
much better than (5.32). There are other similar examples like:
(5.36) Mary played the sonata for a few minutes
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which sounds acceptable even though 'play the sonata' is normally thought of as
a CP (it combines readily with 'in'-adverbials, for example). Another acceptable
example is:
(5.37) John read a book for a few hours
although, again, 'read a book' behaves in other ways as a CP. Compare, however:
(5.38) ??Sally built a house for several days
which sounds extremely odd. It is interesting to consider why some CPs can
readily be modified by 'for'-adverbials while some cannot. There appears to be
a whole range of acceptability here, as well as considerable differences between
intuitions among speakers. One possible line of explanation would be to say that
some expressions, such as 'play a sonata', can be used to describe both CPs
and processes, depending upon the context. Others, such as 'build a house', can
only ever be used to describe CPs. There is some intuitive motivation for this.
Playing a sonata properly involves lots of practice, and it is easy to envisage the
instrumentalist playing half a movement, stopping, going over a difficult passage
several times, and then giving up on the first movement and beginning on the
second. Now compare building a house. Although house-building can also go
on in fits and starts, and most kinds of houses can't be built all in one go, it is
nevertheless hard to imagine stopping and going back to build the same bit several
times over (we are not saying this could never happen. An inexperienced builder
might well find herself making several attempts to fix the ceiling beams, say. But,
somehow, this going over the same bit again is not part of our general conception
of what it means to build a house in the same way as it is to play a sonata). What
can we say about reading a book? Here again, our world knowledge tells us that
it is quite usual to read the same passage more than once, to miss out chunks, to
skip backwards and forwards and to have a quick look to see how it ends. Perhaps
this notion of what it means (or can easily mean) to read a book is related to the
fact that 'read a book' can readily be used as a process expresson.
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These suggestions are very speculative, but it seems clear that our general world
knowledge is playing an important part here. Perhaps an account could be de¬
veloped that explains how our knowledge of "typical scenarios" for events affects
whether it is possible to use an expression that is normally used to describe CPs
to describe a process. We will not consider this further here.
Moens' network also predicts that (5.34) will be acceptable — whereas in fact it
sounds extremely odd. Intuitively, the reason for this is that it sounds as though
Daniel took a very long time to reach the top — as though for some reason the
final stage of the climb was extremely slow. If we make the duration shorter:
(5.39) Daniel was reaching the top for two minutes
this seems to improve things to some extent, although this sentence still sounds
rather peculiar.
But the important point to note is, as we said above, that the time adverbial
seems to specify the duration of some final stage of the climb, not of the climbing
process as a whole. The transitions allowed by the network:
CULM -> CP —>■ PROCESS
suggest that (5.34) can refer to the whole of the preparatory process, but if that
were the case then (5.34) should not sound odd at all, given that it is quite
reasonably for the preparatory process, the 'climbing', to have a duration of four
hours or more.
Also, if:
(5.40) Daniel was reaching the top
referred to the preparatory process as a whole, or an arbitrary part of it, then we
would expect:
(5.41) Daniel was reaching the top when it started to rain
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to be appropriate as long as the rain started some time during the climb. However,
(5.41) must mean that the rain started at some late stage of the climb, when Daniel
was near the top.
Yet, by contrast, (5.33) shows that where an 'in'-adverbial is present, this refers
to the CP as a whole and not to some final part of it.
So why can't the 'for'-adverbial in (5.34) refer to the duration of the whole of the
preparatory process? It seems that we are forced, in interpreting (5.34), to see
'reach the top' as a CP "in its own right", with its own associated preparatory
process that comprises the "last bit of the climb". What we cannot do is to
interpret the progressive + culmination as referring to the preparatory process
corresponding to "climb Ben Nevis".
Moens' account is able to explain the existence of the two alternatives, by allowing
the core event to be taken as either (i) 'climb Ben Nevis' or (ii) 'reach the top of
Ben Nevis'. (Moens uses the idea of being able to choose among alternative core
events in his account of 'when'.)






If (ii) is the core event, the nucleus is:
culm
prep cons
reaching top have reached top
reach top
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where presumably the 'prep' of (ii) is a short period that can be seen as the
preparatory process to 'reaching the top' i.e. it is not the whole climb, but the last
bit of it. So Moens' account predicts that the two interpretations are possible, and
also why (5.34) interpreted according to nucleus (ii) sounds rather odd (because it
is difficult to envisage a preparatory process 'reaching the top' lasting four hours
— indeed perhaps it is difficult to envisage the preparatory process 'reaching the
top' having any significant duration at all).
But Moens does not explain why (5.34) can be associated with nucleus (ii) but
not nucleus (i).
We suggest that what is important is the difference between information that is
described by an utterance, and information that is inferred from the content of
an utterance by virtue of constraints. We described these in the previous section
as described and inferred (or carried) information, respectively. We saw that
a culmination carries information about an associated preparatory process, but
it does not describe the preparatory process. In contrast, a CP describes both
the culmination and the preparatory process.
Suppose we say that a 'for'-adverbial is restricted to specifying the duration of
described information. Then we can explain why, in (5.34), the 'for four hours'
must refer to the last bit of the climb. The preparatory process is inferred, not
described. We have just said that a 'for'-adverbial is restricted to specifying the
duration of a described situation. Thus the 'for'-adverbial forces us to see 'was
reaching the top' as described information. We can only do this if manage to see
'reach the top' describing a CP, i.e. it becomes a CP "in its own right". The
progressive appears to help us to do this — it somehow "stretches" the event and
allows us to read it as a CP. Work on the progressive combined with culminations
that involves similar notions has been carried out by Mellor (1993). Without
the progressive, this "stretching" of a culmination to a CP is not possible. This
explains why (5.32) can't mean the same as (5.34) and why (5.34) has to be
interpreted according to nucleus (ii), and consequently has to mean that the last
stage of the climb, not the whole climb, had a duration of four hours.
In contrast, 'in'-adverbials are able to modify inferred information. Thus we
can interpret (5.33) (indeed we must interpret it) according to nucleus (i). An
'in'-adverbial can refer to either a described CP, as in:
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(5.42) Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in five hours
or to an inferred CP, as in (5.34).
Thus the distinction between described and inferred information gives us a way
to explain these facts about the distribution of 'for'- and 'in'- adverbials.14
The distinction between described and inferred information might provide a way
of formalising Moens' notion of "focusing" on different parts of the nucleus. Moens
(1987) (page 45) explains that his notion of "stripping off a culmination" from a
CP to give a preparatory process (which appears to involve deletion of informa¬
tion) is actually a shorthand way of talking about a "shift in focus" from one part
of the meaning complex to another. Thus, he maintains that the meaning is not
lost — we retain the information that an event like "climb a mountain" has a na¬
tural endpoint, even though we cease to focus on this endpoint when we apply the
progressive. However, Moens does not define 'focus' or 'shift in focus', evocative
as these terms may be. It is necessary to define these terms if the explanation is
to be a satisfactory one.
Thus the ST distinction between described and carried information helps to ex¬
plain "focus" and "shift in focus" — the situation described by a given sentence
being the part of the event that is in focus at the point in the discourse immedia¬
tely after it is uttered.
5.3.5 Summary
In this section we have investigated a way of formalising events and their struc¬
ture, using situation theory. We began by showing how to distinguish between
the various aspectual classes in situation-theoretic terms. We then showed how
Moens' nucleus model of event structure (Moens 1987) may be expressed formally
in situation-theoretic terms using the notions of constraints and channels. These
allow a description of one phase of an eventuality to carry information about ano¬
ther related phase. Formalising things in this way enabled us to express Moens'
14Of course we are not attempting to give a complete account of the semantics of 'for'- and
'in'-adverbials here.
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notion of "focusing" on a particular phase of an event to be precisely expressed.
We were also able to use the distinction between information that it directly de¬
scribed by an utterance and information that is inferred by means of constraints
to explain some observations about 'for'- and 'in'-adverbials and in particular the
meanings conveyed by combinations of 'for'-adverbials, progressives and culmina¬
tions.
In general, we have shown that using situations to model eventualities provides
a fruitful way to express what has been learned over the past decade about the
event structure needed for to formalise the semantics of aspectual class.
5.4 Aspectual Composition
5.4.1 Introduction
In this section, we will attempt to express in situation-theoretic terms some well-
known observations about the contribution of subject and object NP referents to
the aspectual properties of sentences. We will consider in more detail the accounts
of aspectual modification/composition given by Moens (1987), Verkuyl (1989) and
Krifka (1992), which we introduced in Section 5.2. We will compare these accounts
and argue in favour of pursuing an information-preserving analysis along the lines
of Krifka. We will spend some time investigating how Krifka's notion of properties
of thematic roles and their influence on the interaction between properties of
objects and properties of events may be expressed within our situation-theoretic
framework.
As the motivation behind this work is to show how the grammar of Chapter 3
might be improved and extended, we will begin by attempting to formulate some
lexical entries for verbs. We will then extend and modify these lexical entries as
we develop situation-theoretic account of aspectual composition and write rules
to capture the relevant interactions.
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5.4.2 Lexical entries and compositional rules
We will use the formal account of event structure and aspectual class distinctions
developed so far to write some lexical entries for verbs in a grammar extended
from that of Chapter 3. We will restrict ourselves to deal with processes, CPs and
culminations here.
We begin with the transitive 'climb'. Our lexical entry for 'climbed' in Chapter 3
was:
climbed:
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):v
where ty is:












Ui |= cat: {... ,np}
U2 [= cat: {... ,np}
"3 H ev-type: event
out — in U {[ev,u3], [time,utf]}.
The only aspectual information we gave here was to specify that the described
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situation is of type EVENT. We made no distinction between processes and CPs
— i.e., we had no notion corresponding to TU/TG.
We now need to incorporate such information in the lexical entry. However, note
that we cannot identify the described situation as TG or TU in the lexicon, because
this depends on the nature of the subject and object arguments of 'climb'. What
we need instead is to incorporate information in the lexical entry that tells us
how the nature of the arguments help determine the TU/TG properties of the
described eventuality.
We mentioned earlier Moens' approach to the effect of verbal arguments on as¬
pectual class, using the notion of coercion. We also referred to the approaches
of Verkuyl (1989) and Krifka (1992). We will now consider these approaches to
aspectual composition/modification in more detail, and show how they could be
incorporated into a grammar that is an extension of the one given in Chapter 3.
We discussed how in Moens' theory of aspectual modification by coercion, a verb
is assigned a basic aspectual class15, and object arguments and other constituents
(together with non-linguistic factors such as context) may modify or coerce this
type to another type, according to a set of permissible coercions which form an
aspectual network. One of the permitted coercions is from the type PROCESS to
the type CP. Such coercion may occur in the presence of an object NP, if the NP
consists of a determiner plus a count noun. We discussed earlier our reservations
about the non-monotonicity of this type of approach.
We mentioned, too, Verkuyl's argument that aspectual class does not exist at
a syntactic level lower than VP. Instead of assigning a basic aspectual class to
a verb, Verkuyl assigns various features to verbs and NPs. Verbs are classified
as +/—ADD-TO (corresponding, very roughly, to a state/ non-state distinction).
NPs are classified as +/— SQA where SQA stands for 'specified quantity of A'
and is defined model-theoretically using generalised quantifier theory (Barwise
and Cooper 1981). Verkuyl argues that if a +ADD-TO verb combines with a
+SQA object, the resulting VP is of type terminative (equivalent to TG in our
formalism). Any other combination results in a VP which is durative (i.e., non-
terminative or TU). He also describes how the VP combines with the subject to
15Basic aspectual type in Moens' terminology.
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determine the aspect of the whole sentence. Verkuyl's account attempts to be
more explanatory than that of Moens, in that Verkuyl tries to capture model-
theoretically the interaction between the properties of the verb and the properties
of NP arguments. Moens, on the other hand, describes the influence of NP argu¬
ments on aspectual class by means of an arc on the aspectual network, but does
not attempt to capture formally the mechanics of the interaction.
There is a strong intuitive appeal in the notion that what is intrinsic to a verb
is some semantic property which influences how it combines with an NP (depen¬
ding on some semantic property of the NP) — especially if the features are both
intuitively motivated and can be given adequate model theoretic definitions. But
Verkuyl's account suffers from another problem in that it does not distinguish
between cases like 'climb a mountain' — where 'a mountain' (+SQA) combines
with 'climb' (+ADD-TO) to give a terminative VP — and those like 'drive a car'
where 'drive' is similarly +ADD-TO and 'a car' is +SQA, but the resultant VP
is durative. What is missing in Verkuyl's account is a clear characterisation of
the relationship between the verb and the argument in question. Intuitively, we
want to say something to the effect that 'climb a mountain' involves a relation
of "correspondence" between the climbing event and the mountain. As the event
progresses, more and more of the mountain is gradually ascended. A similar and
even more striking type of such correspondence is present in an event of type 'eat
an apple'. As the event proceeds, the apple is gradually consumed. But there is no
such correspondence in the case of 'drive a car'. Nothing intrinsic to the car can
be measured that corresponds to the progress of the event. Of course, if we add
'to Glasgow' we get the graduality effect. We can now measure the position of the
car relative to its destination, and see its distance from Glasgow as corresponding
inversely to the progress of the event.
Krifka (1992) formalizes this notion of the relation between objects and events.
He calls such a relation a 'thematic relation' and he defines various properties of
such relations, such as gradually-consumed patient, gradually-effected pa¬
tient, etc. He introduces algebraic lattices of events and objects and a mapping
between them. Events and object predicates are both classified as CUM/QUA
(cumulative/quantized). The mapping consists of a transfer of CUM/QUA pro¬
perties between objects and events. The mapping is dependent upon the presence
of a thematic relation of appropriate type between object argument and the corre-
274
sponding event. Thus the distinction between 'drive a car' and 'climb a mountain'
can be captured neatly by saying that the appropriate type of thematic relation
is present in the latter case but not in the former.
Krifka's account is similar in some respects to Verkuyl's. Like Verkuyl, he does
not employ a notion of basic aspectual class. In fact he does not use Vendler-
like classes at all. He concentrates mainly on the notions of cumulativity and
quantization. Krifka'a account is very adept at accounting for data from languages
(e.g. Czech) where NPs are unspecified as regards the QUA property, but their
interpretation is influenced by the perfective/imperfective nature of the verb use.
If we are interested in an information-preserving account then the "underspecified"
approaches of Verkuyl and Krifka have an advantage over Moens' non-monotonic
approach whereby information must be withdrawn or "overwritten".16
In addition, Krifka's thematic relations appear to be intuitively well-motivated and
reasonably straightforward to express in theoretical terms. We will therefore use
an approach to aspectual composition that is underspecified like that of Verkuyl
and Krifka. However, we will continue to use Moens' theory of event structure in
our characterisation of situations.
As explained in Section 5.3.1, we will use the CUM/QUA distinction for predi¬
cates of objects (such as 'apples' or 'an apple') and the TG/TU distinction for
situation/infon pairs. We pointed out earlier that there are some problems with
the CUM/QUA distinction involving predicates like 'some apples' which are are
of type CUM but behave like QUA predicates. We will, however, ignore these
problems in what follows. A discussion of the problems and a proposed solution
is given in (White 1993).
We explained above that we don't want to commit ourselves in the lexical entry
to whether S is of type TU or TG, as this will depend partly on, for example, the
nature of the object argument.
Krifka (1992) expresses such information as follows. As we said above, he uses
the notion of thematic relation, which is a relation between a particular object
16Note, however, that recent work by Mellor explores how Moens' account may be re-expressed
in an HPSG format relying on the underspecification of information, in such a way as to capture
Moens' insights without requiring the over-writing of information. See (Mellor 1993.)
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and an event in which that object participates. Thus:
9{e, x)
where 9 is the thematic relation that holds between event e and participant x.
He then defines properties of 9 such as uniqeness of objects, uniqueness of
events, mapping to objects and mapping to events (see below). Such pro¬
perties express information about how the object is related to the event, and are
relevant to the determination of the aspectual properties of that event as described
by a piece of language.
Rather than introduce thematic relations as objects into our situation theoretic
formalism,17 we will express what Krifka calls properties of thematic relations as
binary types of events and individuals. Thus, instead of writing:
9(e, x)
and then ascribing various properties to 9, we will classify e and x as being of a
certain type, e.g.:
e,x : INC-THEME
The type INC-THEME is introduced to try to capture the relationship between
an event and an object in cases where there is a relation of "graduality" between
event and object. Such cases include the ones discussed above like 'eat an apple'
and 'climb a mountain'. There is a clear intuition here that the progress of the
event is somehow "marked out" by what happens to the object during the course
of the event. This is relatively clear in the case of eating an apple — the apple
gradually disappears — we can think of there being a mapping, to use Krifka's
term, between the progress of the event and how much of the apple is left. The
case of climbing a mountain is slightly different, because of course nothing happens
to the mountain here, in the sense that the mountain is not consumed or created
by the climb. What changes throughout the event, and serves to mark out the
course of the event, is the position of the climber on the mountain. Then there
are examples where an object is gradually created during the course of the event,
such as the event of writing a letter or painting a picture. And there are cases
where parts of the object, but not the whole object, are gradually affected (such
17Although there appears to be no reason why this could not be done.
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as painting a house, where only certain parts of the house are painted). Finally,
we mention cases where some property of the object gradually changes during the
course of the event. These include events like dyeing a t-shirt, where the event
is measured out by the intensity of colour of the object (imagine a white t-shirt
being immersed in red dye and gradually changing from white through pink to
red).
Clearly, all these event/object pairs have something in common — some notion
of correspondence or mapping between the state of the object and the progress of
the event. Yet even 'state of the object' does not sound right — we don't think of
a book changing state as it is read, or a mountain changing state as it is climbed
(although note that it is possible to describe a book as 'half-read', whereas one
cannot describe a car as 'half-driven'). Driving a car is an example of an event
where no such relation of correspondence obtains between the event and the direct
object. If, however, we add a destination, and speak of 'driving a car to Glasgow',
then there is a relation of graduality between the event and the distance of the
car from its destination.
How exactly can we characterise the relation we have called 'graduality' or 'cor¬
respondence' between events and individuals? Krifka attempts to do this by defi¬
ning a property of thematic relations that he calls gradual patient.18 He defines
gradual patient in terms of other properties such as 'mapping to objects' and
'mapping to events'. 'Mapping to objects' captures the notion that for every part
of the event there is a corresponding part of the object. This is easy to envisage
in cases like 'eat an apple' where the object is gradually consumed - every part of
an eating of the apple corresponds to a part of the apple. However, this does not
appear to be quite the right notion in the case of events like 'dye a t-shirt' where
there are no parts of the object that can be said to correspond to parts of the
event. A slightly different notion from mapping to objects appears to be needed
in these cases. Somehow, we need to tie in our world knowledge that dyeing a
t-shirt involves a gradual deepening of the intensity of the colour as the event
proceeds. It is not immediately obvious how this can be done. Krifka admits
that there are problems with examples like 'build a house', where the event may
18Krifka defines other related properties, too, such as gradually-consumed patient, but we will
concentrate on gradual-patient for expository purposes here.
277
involve, for example, the erection of scaffolding, but where there is no clear corre¬
spondence between the erection of the scaffolding and any particular part of the
object. He proposes a way round this involving "standard scenarios" for house¬
building, which involve putting up scaffolding. However, it is not entirely whether
standard scenarios exist in all cases, or how this could be used for examples like
dyeing a t-shirt.
Krifka also defines the property 'mapping to events', which is like mapping to
objects but the other way round. It says that for every part of the object there is
a corresponding part of the event. Once again, this is much clearer in some cases
than in others.
Thus, we are left with a highly intuitive notion that we may call 'gradual patient'
(or, after Dowty (1991), 'incremental theme') which nevertheless seems to elude
precise definition. The only way forward appears to be to introduce a binary
type INC-THEME of events and individuals and use it in what follows, while
acknowledging that we have not given a precise formal definition. We should say,
however, that such a lack of precision and formality often seems to be the case
where work involving thematic roles/relations is concerned. (See Dowty 1991 and
the discussion in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.)
We therefore propose that the lexical entry for 'climbed' should be as follows:
climbed:
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):v
where ty is:















U\ |= cat: {... ,np}
U2 h= cat: {... ,np}
Us |= ev-type: event
out = in U {[ev,U3,utt], [time,u£t]}.
By contrast, in the lexical entry for 'drive' we do not require the thematic relation
between S and Y to be of type INC-THEME. Thus the lexical entry for 'drove'
would be:
drove:
(u, utt, ty, /, in, out) :v
where ty is:






[[pred,«] —» drive] C /
use-of: 'drove
cat: {v}




U\ f= cat: {... ,np}
U2 \= cat: {... ,np}
u3 t= ev-type: event
out = in U {[ev,u3,utt], [time,«ii]}.
We are glossing over several important factors in these lexical entries. First, it
should be pointed out that, as Krifka makes clear in his account, thematic relation
types such as INC-THEME only hold for situations/eventualities of type TG. For
example, there is no relation of type INC-THEME between the eventuality and
the filler of the patient role in the case of the eventuality described by "Daniel
climbed mountains". We could enforce this restriction by making the lexical entry
for 'climb' as follows:
climbed:
{u, utt, ty, f, in, out):v
where ty is:











with the proposition that S^TG (see Section 5.3.1 above for the definition of TG
for situations). This is in line with Krifka (1992), who limits the gradual-patient
relation to hold of quantized event predicates only.
Another possibility is to make INC-THEME a situation-theoretic relation rather
than a type. Information about thematic relations would then be situated (i.e.,
supported by a particular situation). Krifka considers examples which suggest
that thematic relation information may well be context dependent. For example,
consider the event described by:
(5.43) John saw seventeen lions in an hour
If this describes a trip round a safari park, it apparently makes sense for there to
be a relation of type INC-THEME between the patient and the event. We would
not normally expect this kind of relation to hold, however, for events involving
the relation 'see'. We might express this as:
inc-theme(S,Y)
It is not immediately clear which situation S' would support the infon. Perhaps
S' — S — but this would need to be carefully thought out. We will leave this
problem aside at least for the time being, and continue to regard INC-THEME
not as a relation but as a binary type.
There are other interesting possibilities too. We discussed above how the fact that
S, IklNC-THEME means that S is, in a sense, "temporally measured out" by Y.
The progress of Y as time passes corresponds in some way to the progress through
time of the eventuality. In an eating event, the patient gradually becomes smaller
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and disappears as the event proceeds. In a climbing event the progress of the
patient (i.e. the mountain) is not quite so straightforward. What happens here is
that the position of the agent with respect to the patient changes over time in a
way that corresponds to the progress of the climb. The involvement of the agent





where 'position-on(X,Y,P)' holds between an individual X who occupies a position
P with respect to an object Y. P would obviously need to be some kind of metric
such as the height of X on Y. We will not pursue this further here, but continue
to characterise the relation between a climbing event and the object climbed as
INC-THEME.
Now we have just said that S can be thought of as "temporally measured out"
by Y. Recall that S is the "smallest" or "minimal" situation that supports the
relevant infon. But it is also possible that a "bigger" situation than S (i.e., a









Now, under what circumstances can we say that S' is temporally measured out
by Y? It is necessary that S' is temporally "confined" to S — i.e., that S' is
temporally included in S. Thus if we introduce a binary type TEMP-MEAS which
holds of a situation and an individual if the situation is temporally measured out
by the individual, we can say that:
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(S,Y):TEMP-MEAS & (S < S') & (A, T):TIME-OF & (5',T'):TIME-0F
& (T' T)
(S", Y):TEMP-MEAS
Actually, it is hard to imagine T' being properly inluded in T, so we could replace
this with:
(S,Y):TEMP-MEAS & (S < 5') & (5,T):TIME-OF & (5",T"):TIME-OF
& (T' = T)
-> (<S", Y):TEMP-MEAS
In general, therefore, the type TEMP-MEAS is not persistent with respect to its
first argument. However, it becomes persistent under the special conditions that
the "larger" situation is temporally coincident with the smaller one.
We can say that:
VS, 9, X [[5, e(X) : KEY0 & A : CP & S, X : INC-THEME]
S, X : TEMP-MEAS]
which says that for any situation S of type CP whose key infon is 6(X) and where
S and X are of type INC-THEME, S is 'temporally measured out' by x (although
once again the notion of a situation being temporally measured out by an object
is not an easy one to make precise).
We can now express the required mapping from the properties of objects to the
properties of situations. We need a rule to say that if the situation and the filler
of the patient role are of type INC-THEME, and the agent and the patient are
both QUA, then the situation will be of type TG. We can write this as follows:19
VS, R, X, Y [[£, R(X, Y) : KEY0 & A, Y : INC-THEME & X : QUA & Y : QUA]
^ A: TG]
This rule ensures that a sentence like:
19Note that the rule is given for transitive verbs. Intransitives may behave differently, in that
in some cases there is a mapping between the agent and the event. Such intransitives are known
as unaccusatives (see Zaenen 1988, for example). We will not attempt to treat them here, but
see no reason why our account could not be extended to deal with them.
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(5.44) Daniel climbed a mountain
describes a TG eventuality — because the situation and patient are of type INC-
THEME, and both arguments are QUA. We also require a rule which says that
if it is not the case that both arguments are QUA, or if the type INC-THEME
is not present, then the described eventuality will be TU. Such a rule might be
expressed as some kind of default. It would ensure that, for example:
(5.45) People climbed a mountain
describes a TU eventuality, because the agent is CUM rather than QUA here. It
would also ensure that:
(5.46) John drove a car
describes a TU eventuality, because INC-THEME does not hold here.
We also want to be able to express the effect of 'for'-adverbials on the temporal
properties of the described eventuality. It has been frequently observed in the
literature (see, for example, Dowty 1979) that 'for'-adverbials are restricted to
combining with sentences that describe TU eventualities, while completive 'in'-
adverbials are restricted to combining with sentences that describe TU eventuali¬
ties. For example:
(5.47) Daniel ate apples for two hours
(5.48) * Daniel ate apples in two hours
(5.49) Daniel ate an apple in an hour
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(5.50) *Daniel ate an apple for an hour
However, as has also been observed, 'for'-adverbials combine with some TG-
sentences to give iterative readings, e.g.
(5.51) Daniel ran round the park for two hours
Iterative readings like these are not available in all cases, however. For example,
(5.50) cannot receive an iterative reading. Krifka points out that this is because it
is not possible to eat a particular apple more than once20 — thus a kind of world
knowledge about the relation between events of eating an apple and the apple
in question is involved. He dubs this property 'uniqueness of events' — meaning
that for a given object there is only one event which corresponds to it. For Krifka,
the uniqueness of events property is another property (like gradual patient)
of the thematic relation that holds between events of eating and their patient
arguments. He is then able to say that iterative readings are possible in cases like
the ones above only if the thematic relation between patient and event does not
have the property uniqueness of events.
We can do something similar in our formalism by defining a type UNI-EV which
holds between a situation and the patient role of the relation if and only if there
is only one possible event for a given object. The possibility of iterative readings
with 'for'-adverbials is then limited to cases where the situation and patient are
not of type UNI-EV.
We will now turn to verbs which express culminations, and discuss the nature of
the lexical entries required for them. For example, consider transitive 'finish', as
20This does not address the interesting related question of why 'for two hours' is not able to
take wider scope than 'an apple', thus allowing Daniel to eat a number of different apples over
the two hour period. Indeed, in some contexts this kind of reading does seem to be possible.
For example:
(5.52) Daniel ate an apple for ten years
can receive this kind of reading if the preceding context has involved a discussion of lunchtime
eating habits. The queston of the nature of 'for'-adverbials and their scoping properties is an
interesting one which, however, we will not pursue further here.
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in 'finish the chapter'. 'Finish' is a culmination verb which means, as we said
above, that it is used to describe an event which is the endpoint or culmination
of another event of type CP. We said earlier that the existence of the CP may
be inferred from the description of the culmination. It is interesting to consider
briefly what the nature of the inferred CP may be, in the case of the verb 'finish'.
Consider:
(5.53) John finished an apple
Presenting (5.53) in an empty context seems to invite us to infer that the related
CP was an event of John eating an apple. However, even if we retain the object
argument 'an apple', alternative contexts may be set up which invite different
inferences. For example, if John is helping to make an apple pie, his father might
well ask him the question:
(5.54) Have you finished your apple yet?
meaning "Have you finished peeling your apple?" Many other similar examples,
giving a range of inferred CPs, can be constructed. The question of what restric¬
tions there are on the CPs we may infer is too complex to go into here. Related
work on the French 'commencer' has been done recently by Godard and Jayes
(1993), where the authors show that the subject must be the "main controller"
of the inferred event. The constraints on English 'begin' appear to be similar
('start', however, behaves differently).
Because of these complications, we will not try to specify here the type of the
inferred CP. The important point for us is that some CP may be inferred from a
culmination. Our lexical entry for 'finish' will need to encode information concer¬
ning this. Krifka does not discuss culminations/achievements, so we will need to
find a way to deal with these.
Culminations behave in a similar way to CPs in that the CUM/QUA value of the
object may be transferred to the event. In the case of CPs, this "mapping" only
occurs when the eventuality and patient are of type INC-THEME. However, in
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the case of culminations such mapping always appears to occur. For example, the
eventuality described by:
(5.55) John finished an apple
is of type TG, because the object is QUA. In a similar way, the eventuality de¬
scribed by:
(5.56) John finished apples
is TU, just as the object is CUM.
We will express this by saying that, for any (transitive) culmination verb, the
eventuality and patient are of type CULM-THEME. Then we can say:
VF, R, X, Y [[5, R(X, Y) : KEY0 & S, Y : CULM-THEME & X : QUA
& Y : QUA]
S : TG & S : CULMIN]
Note that Y may correspond to 'three apples', for example, as well as 'an apple'.
Similarly, X may be 'John' or 'four people', for example. In the non-singular
cases, the inference that the described event is the culmination of a related CP
still appears to be correct. For example, in the case of:
(5.57) John finished four apples
we are taking the described situation to be the culmination of an inferred situation
which corresponds to the "whole situation" where, let us say, John eats four apples.
In addition to this, we would also want to be able to infer the existence of four
eventualities, each corresponding to one apple. Of course, it is not necessary for
any or all of these smaller eventualities to be temporally "connected". We might
think of John taking a bite from each of the apples in turn, for example. We will
not attempt to deal with these complications here.
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We can now write the lexical entry for 'finished' as follows:
finished:
(u, utt, ty, f, in, out):v
where ty is:




















out = in U {[ev,u3,utt], [time,utt]}.
We have provided an outline of how we might develop some lexical entries and
how aspectual composition could be handled by the grammar.21
It should be possible, as we said earlier, to write rules to handle unaccusative
verbs (Zaenen 1988), where the nature of the subject/agent argument affects the
21We would also require some kind of "default" rule which ensures that if the thematic relation
is neither CULM-THEME nor INC-THEME, the result would be that S is of type TU. We will
not include this rule here as we are not attempting to give a complete set of rules but rather to
indicate how such rules may be developed.
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TU/TG properties of the described eventuality. We will not attempt to do so
here, however, but regard this as a topic for further work.
5.4.3 Summary
We have shown how an information-preserving account of aspectual composition
based on that given by Krifka (1992) may be expressed in situation-theoretic
terms.
We discussed how Krifka's properties of thematic relations may be expressed as
binary types of eventualities and argument roles.
We developed lexical entries for verbs that express aspectual distinctions, and
rules that govern how these verbs combine with object and subject NPs to give
descriptions of eventualities whose properties depend on lexical properties of the
verb and properties of the NP arguments.
5.5 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to apply the situation-theoretic theory of events
which we developed from observations regarding 'then', 'at the time' and 'at the
same time' in discourse, to issues that are generally treated on an intra-sentential
level, such as aspectual class distinctions and aspectual modification.
We began by examining the various approaches that have been taken in the lite¬
rature. We discussed the notion of aspectual class and what exactly it classifies,
and settled in favour of viewing it as a classification of eventualities. In our
situation-theoretic treatment, eventualities are situations, which in turn are parts
of the world as individuated and classified by speakers. We used Moens' nucleus
structure for events, combined with situation-theoretic channels and constraints,
in order to define types of eventualities and the information they convey about
related eventualities.
Next, we studied various accounts of aspectual modification and argued for an
information-preserving approach such as those developed by Verkuyl and Krifka.
289
We showed how Krifka's notion of properties of thematic relations may be expres¬
sed in situation-theoretic terms as binary types of eventualities and arguments,
and how this information may be used to specify how the aspectual properties of
the described eventuality are affected by the nature of the NP arguments.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Further Work
In this chapter we give a summary of the thesis, draw a number of conclusions,
and present some ideas for further work.
We began by examining the distribution of sentence-final 'then'. Our analysis
revealed that it is necessary to distinguish between two uses of sentence-final
'then', these being:
1. The ETR use, where 'then' refers back to an explicit temporal referent
(ETR), which may be a frame adverbial (e.g. 'in July') or an instantaneous
adverbial (e.g. 'at 2pm').
2. The PART-OF use, where 'then' requires/conveys that the most recently-
described eventuality is part of the eventuality immediately preceding it in
the discourse.
We saw from this that it is necessary to distinguish in our semantic representations
between discourse referents which have been explicitly introduced (or "named") by
the discourse and those which are inferred by the hearer from the mention of other
entities. This is the case even where such an inference is unavoidable. For example,
we showed that any eventuality may have a "time" associated with it, which the
hearer may infer in order to interpret the temporal structure of the discourse.
However, we showed that sentence-final 'then' may not be used in general to refer
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to such an inferred time. It may only be used if the time was explicitly mentioned
by means of an ETR such as a temporal frame or instantaneous adverbial.
We should point out here that more work is needed to decide precisely what kind
of temporal adverbial constitutes an ETR. It is clear that frame and instantaneous
adverbials meet the necessary requirements, and also that 'for'-adverbials do not
qualify as ETRs. However, there are many other kinds of temporal adverbial
which should be investigated, such as 'until', 'since', 'before' and 'after', 'while'
and 'when' constructions.
For example, there is some evidence that a 'when'-clause may act as what we have
been calling an ETR. We saw in Chapter 2 that a sequence like:
(6.1) a. John went to Paris
b. Mary went to Frankfurt then
only makes sense if there is some connection (e.g. elaboration) between the two
events. On the other hand, in the sequence:
(6.2) a. John went to Paris in July
b. Mary went to Frankfurt then
there need be no connection between the events — it is enough that both events
are linked to the common time, 'July'. Note that a 'when'-clause may act in
exactly the same way as 'in July' here:
(6.3) a. John went to Paris when Jane went to the USA
b. Mary went to Frankfurt then
Here, there need be no link between the John's going to Paris and Mary's going
to Frankfurt. It is sufficient that both of these events are linked to the event of
Jane going to the USA. In other words, (6.3b) simply means the same as:
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(6.4) Mary went to Frankfurt when Jane went to the USA
just as (6.2b) means the same as:
(6.5) Mary went to Frankfurt in July
So it appears that what is important is not that the ETR names a time, but that
it names another entity (which may be a time or an event) to which the main
clause eventuality is related. The presence of such an entity serves to break the
link between the two main clause eventualities described in the discourse — it is
no longer necessary for them to be linked to each other, as both are linked to the
"additional" entity, be it a time or an event.
This suggests a generalisation of the account of 'then' we gave in Chapter 2. The
term ETR should perhaps be replaced by a new term. It is not being an explicit
temporal referent that matters, but being an entity that is somehow external to
the discourse structure — an entity to which events that lie within the discourse
structure may be related.
We realise that much more work is needed here to confirm whether this is the right
way to extend the account, and, if so, to make the new proposal more concrete
and formal. Investigation into the other types of temporal adverbial mentioned
above may well prove illuminating here. We will make some comments on 'after
then' below.
There is also an interesting parallel between sequences with sentence-final 'then'
and sentences containing 'when'-clauses. We saw that a sequence like:
(6.6) a. Mary wrote a paper
b. John took the children to Aviemore then
is acceptable if (b) can be seen as an elaboration of (a). In order to do this, the
hearer must be able to find some link between the two eventualities. For example,
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if the hearer knows that John took the children to Aviemore to give Mary peace
and quiet to write her paper, this would constitute such a link. The discourse
relation can then be seen as one of elaboration, and the sequence is acceptable.
If no such link can be found, the sequence sounds very odd, as in, for example:
(6.7) a. Mary wrote a paper
b. The Labour party held their annual conference then
which sounds very strange if we cannot conceive of any connection between Mary
and the Labour party conference.
Note that we get exactly the same effect with the corresponding 'when' construc¬
tion:
(6.8) John took the children to Aviemore when Mary wrote her paper
Compare (6.8), which sounds perfectly acceptable, with:
(6.9) The Labour party held their conference when Mary wrote her paper
which sounds extremely odd. Moens (1987) discusses examples like (6.8) and (6.9),
and accounts for them by saying that a 'when' construction conveys contingency
between the event in the main clause and the event in the 'when'-clause. In other
words, he proposes that the meaning of 'when' is not merely temporal, but conveys
some kind of connection between the two eventualities.
Of course this is very similar to what we are proposing for 'then'. What Moens
calls 'contingency', we have explained in terms of the PART-OF relation between
eventualities.
Moens notes too that, where statives are concerned, no contingency between even¬
tualities is necessary, and the relation may be purely temporal. For example, in
cases like:
294
(6.10) The Falklands war was in progress when Emily was born
there need be no contingency between eventualities. Once again, this ties in with
our observation that the sequence:
(6.11) a. Emily was born
b. The Falklands war was in progress then
is acceptable. We explained the acceptability of this sequence in terms of the
background relation, which is an instance of PART-OF.
This very clear parallel between 'then' sequences and 'when' constructions merits
further investigation. Perhaps what Moens calls 'contingency' corresponds more-
or-less exactly to what we have called PART-OF? If so, it would be interesting to
look at Moens' observations on 'when' in greater detail, and try to give an account
in terms of the PART-OF relation.
Before we move on we should mention some recent observations we have made
concerning 'after then'. Note how bad 'after then' sounds in the sequence:
(6.12) a. John went to Frankfurt
b. *After then he went to Paris
Here, it seems that we should replace 'after then' with 'after that'. Note, however,
that 'before then' is completely acceptable in a similar sequence:
(6.13) a. John went to Frankfurt
b. Before then he went to Paris
(And, incidentally, note that 'before that' is also acceptable here.)
Why should there be this difference between 'before then' and 'after then' —
when 'before' and 'after' are normally thought of as symmetrical about "now"?
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Perhaps there is something superfluous about 'after then' in (6.12a,6.12b), given
that we could replace 'after then' with 'then'? But in that case why is 'after that'
acceptable?
It is interesting to try to construct sequences where 'after then' is acceptable.
Examples that appear to be generally accepted by informants include:
(6.14) a. Mary won't have finished her book by December 1st
b. She hopes to finish about a fortnight after then
Some speakers expressed reservations about this example, saying that they pre¬
ferred 'after that'. But it was generally felt to be much better than (6.12a,6.12b).
The obvious difference between (6.12a,6.12b) and (6.14a,6.14b) is that the latter
contains an ETR, 'December 1st'. This suggests that 'after then' may require the
presence of an ETR in order to be acceptable, although we still need to explain
why this is so! We also need to explain why some (6.14a,6.14b) is not completely
acceptable to all speakers.
An example where 'after then' appears to generally acceptable is:
(6.15) a. John didn't get married while he was a student
b. It was sometime after then
Although there is no ETR here in the form of a "named time", we have the phrase
'while he was a student'. Recall that we suggested above that perhaps our notion
of ETR should be extended to include 'when'-clauses. If we allow it to include
'while'-clauses too, perhaps we can begin to explain why 'after then' is acceptable
here.
But why does 'after then' require what we previously called an ETR, while 'before
then' doesn't? Can we say that 'after then' must refer to a time and not an
event — that is, it conveys that an eventuality follows some specified time? If
the eventuality follows not a time but another eventuality, we must use 'after
that' instead. But why doesn't 'before then' have these restrictions too? One
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possibility is that 'after that' means something like "the next event that occurs
in our narrative sequence", whereas 'before that' is jumping out of the narrative
seqence. Whenever we "follow" the narrative sequence, we are expressing a certain
kind of relation between eventualities, and such a relation can be expressed by
sentence-initial 'then', 'next', 'afterwards', etc. — but not by 'after then'. In
other words, if what we really mean is 'after that eventuality', we must say 'after
that' and not 'after then'.
But why is 'after then' acceptable in (6.15a,6.15b)? Here, 'after then' is being
used to mean 'after John was a student' and thus refers to an eventuality and not
a time. But there is no ETR, so 'after then' should not be acceptable here. Recall,
however, that we suggested above that 'while' constructions may be included in
what we called ETRs. There is no notion here of narrative progression — John's
getting married is simply being related to some other eventuality. This supports
the idea sketched above that what gets in the way of using 'after then' is narrative
sequencing.
Much more work is needed to develop a complete and formal account from all
this. We have simply tried to indicate that here is an area ripe for further study.
Let us return to the main conclusions of our thesis.
The general conclusion that may be drawn from our analysis of sentence-final
'then' is that no matter what theoretical framework we choose to model the
semantics of discourse, the required distinction between explicit and inferred
entities must be made in some way or other. We showed how such a distinction
can be made in two different frameworks — in DRT (Kamp and Reyle 1993) and
in situation theoretic DRT (STDRT) (Cooper 1993a, 1993b). In DRT we found
that we could make the distinction by allowing a temporal discourse referent to
be introduced into the current DRS only in cases where explicit reference to a
time was made by means of an ETR. Thus, an utterance of:
(6.16) Daniel climbed Ben Nevis in July
would cause a temporal discourse referent corresponding to 'July' to be introduced.
On the other hand, an utterance of:
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(6.17) Daniel climbed Ben Nevis
would cause no such temporal referent to be introduced, because there is no ETR
present in (6.17).
We constructed a grammatical fragment which is a modification and extension
of Kamp and Reyle's temporal fragment (Kamp and Reyle (1993), Chapter 5).
This was achieved by modifying Kamp and Reyle's construction rules to restrict
the introduction of temporal discourse referents in the way described above. In
Kamp and Reyle's fragment no such distinction is made and a temporal discourse
referent may be freely introduced whenever there is mention of an event — no
ETR is required. We pointed out that no previous DRT treatment of temporal
phenomena has, as far as we know, made the kind of distinction we are proposing.
The rules of our fragment generate, we showed, exactly the required readings for
sentence-final 'then'.
We pointed out, however, that there may be problems inherent in making the
distinction in this way. In a bigger fragment we might find cases where it would
be very convenient, if not essential, to introduce temporal discourse referents even
when no ETR is present. Indeed, in Chapter 4 when we looked at 'at the time'
and 'at the same time', we found it was extremely useful to introduce what we
called 'time Roles' corresponding to times inferred from events. Thus we saw that
it would be desirable to make the distinction in some other way. We pointed out
that what is really needed is to be able to include some information about the
utterance in our semantic representation — information about how a particular
temporal referent was introduced: by means of an ETR or as a result of inference.
Conventional DRT does not allow us to include such utterance information in the
representation.1 In Chapter 3 we therefore turned to situation theory, which does
allow such utterance information to be encoded. In order to retain the benefits of
DRT and its facility to express discourse anaphora, we re-expressed our fragment
in STDRT. We showed how the STDRT framework allows us to encode utterance
information about how a discourse referent was introduced, and use this in the
processing of 'then'. Thus we were once again able to generate the required
1Which is not to say that it would be impossible to modify DRT in order to include such
information — but the result would be a far from standard version of DRT.
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readings for sequences containing 'then', without the disadvantages of the DRT
treatment.
We can thereby conclude that it is extremely useful, or perhaps even essential,
for a semantic framework to provide the facility to distinguish between explictly
described and inferred temporal entities, and this requires in turn that the fra¬
mework be able to encode and utilise information about the utterance. STDRT
appears to fulfil these requirements. We suspect, too, that the need to distinguish
between explicit and inferred entities is true of other kinds of entities besides tem¬
poral ones, although we have not carried out a detailed investigation here and
further work is needed to confirm whether this is the case.
In Chapter 3 we also considered the nature of place Roles, and concluded that
further work is also needed on the question of spatial reference in general. It
would be particularly interesting to see a detailed investigation of 'there' along
similar lines to our investigation of sentence-final 'then'. Preliminary work which
we have carried out suggests that there may be constraints on the use of 'there'
that parallel in some respects the constraints identified for 'then'. For example,
the sequence:
(6.18) a. Jane made a parachute landing
b. *John landed there too
is unacceptable, whereas:
(6.19) a. Jane made a parachute landing in a field
b. John landed there too
is acceptable, showing that the presence of an explicit spatial referent (ESR) is
required for 'there', which of course is reminiscent of the explicit temporal referent
(ETR) required for one of the uses of 'then'. We note too that 'at the same place'
does not require an ESR, just as 'at the same time' does not require an ETR.
This is illustrated by the acceptability of (6.20a,6.20b) and (6.20a,6.20c).
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(6.20) a. Jane made a parachute landing
b. John landed at the same time
c. John landed at the same place
Our brief investigation suggests that there is no reading of 'there' which corre¬
sponds to the PART-OF reading of 'then' — which is perhaps not surprising as
PART-OF 'then' involves discourse relations which appear to concern time rather
than place. However, a more detailed investigation is clearly needed to give a
precise semantics for sentence-final 'there' and a fuller account of the nature of
spatial referents and place roles in general.
In Chapter 4 we moved on to examine in greater detail some observations made
in Chapter 2 about sentence-final 'at the time' and 'at the same time' and their
distribution in discourse sequences. We had noted in Chapter 2 that 'at the
time' behaves in a similar though not identical way to PART-OF 'then'. The
difference is that 'at the time', unlike PART-OF 'then', may not be used when
the discourse relation is one of elaboration. We had also noted that 'at the
same time' appears to require that the current eventuality is not PART-OF the
previously described one. This analysis seemed rather superficial, however, and
in order to gain a deeper understanding of 'at the time' and 'at the same time'
we looked at some related non-temporal examples involving relational nouns such
as 'colour'. Our analysis of these led us to develop the notion of generalised Role
(GR). We saw that if more than one instance of a particular GR is present, 'the
same X' is required, whereas if exactly one instance of the GR is present, 'the
X' is appropriate. This allowed us to explain the data for relational nouns like
'colour' in discourse sequences such as (6.21a,6.21b-6.21d):
(6.21) a. Emily has a new coat
b. Fiona's scarf is the same colour
c. * Fiona's scarf is the colour
d. Fiona likes the colour
We were also able to account for similar observations concerning non-relational
nouns and 'the same X', such as (6.22a,6.22b):
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(6.22) a. Emily watched a film
b. Fiona recorded the same film
and for the related single-sentence examples like:
(6.23) Emily watched and Fiona recorded the same film
and:
(6.24) *Emily watched and Fiona liked the same film
We investigated possible links between our notion of generalised Role (GR) and
that of thematic role (or thematic relation) used in the literature. In particular,
we explored whether our GRs could be expressed in terms of sets of entailments
as Dowty does for his Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient roles (Dowty 1991). We
found some interesting correlations here, although these were not exact and more
work is clearly required on investigating the precise relationship between GRs and
thematic roles and/or sets of entailments. For example, it remains to be decided
how many distinct GRs are required and exactly how they should be characterised.
The preliminary work we have done here points to the opening up of a possible
new area of interest, rather than providing any definitive answers. It should be
pointed out, however, that the problem of deciding exactly how many roles there
should be and what they are is one that is shared by all previous work that uses
thematic roles/relations.
We observed too that the single-sentence data for 'the same' is closely related to
that for coordination where 'the same' is not present. For example:
(6.25) Emily Vl-ed and Fiona V2-ed the same X
and:
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(6.26) Emily Vl-ed and Fiona V2-ed the X
(where VI and V2 are verbs and X is a common noun) appear to behave very
similarly with respect to which pairs of VI and V2 are compatible. We drew at¬
tention to the fact that recent studies on the semantic constraints on coordination
have suggested that thematic roles are involved. This ties in with the strong links
we discovered between GRs and thematic roles, and suggests that further work
here may lead to interesting results.
Armed with our analysis of 'the X' and 'the same X', we returned to attempt to
explain the distribution of 'at the time' and 'at the same time'. We found that
by allowing eventualities to have time Roles and treating these Roles as GRs,
we could explain the data. If exactly one time Role is present 'at the time' is
appropriate', whereas if more than one time Role is present 'at the same time' is
required. This left us with the task of explaining why in some discourse sequences
only one time Role is present whereas in other cases there are two.
Consideration of this led us to propose a theory of discourse backgrounding. The
backgrounding eventuality (which is always described by a stative or progressive)
does not, we concluded, introduce a new situation into the representation of the
discourse, but instead adds further information to the situation introduced by the
previous utterance. Because each eventuality (situation) has its own time Role,
the fact that there is no new situation means that no new time Role is introduced
either. This in turn means that 'at the time' rather than 'at the same time' is
appropriate in backgrounding cases.
The idea of discourse backgrounding has been widely used (often with slight va¬
riations) in theories of discourse structure, but has not to our knowledge been
previously formalised. The idea that backgrounding corresponds to a "continua¬
tion" of the previous situation rather than the introduction of a new one at least
puts some meat onto a rather vague concept. However, the proposal is not entirely
unproblematic. We pointed out that observations concerning event anaphora may
indicate the need to introduce a new situation for every eventuality, whether or
not it is backgrounded. Further work is needed here to see if a way can be found
to reconcile the observations from these two areas.
The proposal of a formalisation for discourse backgrounding raises the question
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of whether it is possible to formalise other discourse relations in this kind of way.
As the notion of discourse relation in the literature is a little like that of thematic
role (in that it seems one is always at liberty to introduce a new one whenever the
analysis requires it), it would be very interesting if a theory could be developed
which actually predicts which discourse relations exist and what precisely they
mean. This may be a long way off, but we believe that some progress has been
made here towards that goal.
In Chapters 1-4 we approached temporal phenomena from what can be thought
of as a discourse perspective, looking at how sentence-final 'then', 'at the time'
and 'at the same time' interact with and help to determine the relations between
eventualities and times that are conveyed by the discourse. We were not prima¬
rily interested in matters such as aspectual class and the progressive, which are
generally treated from a "sentence-internal" perspective, although we found that
the analysis of 'then' etc. inevitably involved us in some consideration of these
phenomena.
In Chapter 5 our aim was to further develop the STDRT framework and theory
of events set up in the earlier chapters in order to tackle issues like aspectual
class and aspectual composition in greater depth. Our hope was that the theory
developed so far would provide a useful framework for expressing, comparing and
evaluating known insights about these matters and perhaps giving an improved
treatment of some of them.
We began Chapter 5 by looking at aspectual class. Building on the work of
Cooper (1985), we showed how modelling eventualities as situations enables us
to express formally certain properties of these eventualities such as the homoge¬
neous/heterogeneous distinction that separates states and processes (activities)
on the one hand from accomplishments and achievements on the other. We de¬
veloped an account of the internal structure of events based closely on Moens'
nucleus theory of event structure (Moens 1987). By using the situation-theoretic
notion of constraint we were able to express the way that information expressed
by an utterance about one part of an event can allow the hearer to infer informa¬
tion about another related part of that event. This allowed us to express many of
the ideas present in Moens' theory of event structure and his aspectual network
in a precise and formal way. In particular, it allowed us to formalise the notion of
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"focusing" on a particular phase of an event.
Next we considered aspectual composition. We reviewed the literature on this
subject and argued in favour of an information-preserving approach which does not
involve the overwriting of previously established information. Such an approach
is taken by both Verkuyl (1989) and Krifka (1992), and we showed how a theory
of aspectual composition bsed closely on that of Krifka can be expressed in our
theoretical framework, again using situation-theoretic constraints and channels.
The work of this chapter demonstrates, we believe, the importance of a theory
of information to developing a natural language semantics of events and times.
The fact that STDRT makes available situation theory's informational perspective
allowed us to express notions of information flow, such as inference, with relative
ease. We were able to capture very naturally the distinctions between explicitly
described and inferred information found to be necessary to treat the natural
language phenomena under investigation. It is hard to see how this could be done
without such a theory of information.
In this thesis we stopped short of building the account of aspectual class and as¬
pectual composition into the grammar. Further work is required here to develop
an extension of the STDRT fragment which embodies this account. This is not
envisaged to be problematic, and some preliminary work has been done and de¬
scribed elsewhere on developing a grammar and related implementation in Prolog
that treats both sentence-final 'then' and aspectual composition (Glasbey 1993b).
Future Directions
We showed in Chapter 4 that the progressive may convey either backgrounding
or non-backgrounding in discourse. This has implications for accounts of the
progressive which follow (Vlach 1981) in regarding the progressive as a stativiser.
We show elsewhere (Glasbey 1994a) that our analysis of backgrounding poses pro¬
blems for such accounts. This leaves us with the need for an alternative account of
the progressive. Such an account is proposed by (Smith 1991), employing Smith's
two-component theory of aspect described therein. We show in (Glasbey 1994a)
that such an account, which regards progressive aspect as a speaker viewpoint or
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perspective independent of aspectual class, may be expressed in the STDRT fra¬
mework, and how some problems in Smith's DRT formalisation may be overcome
by using the situation-theoretic notions of event-type and PART-OF. Problems
with the imperfective paradox remain, and we consider that channel theory (Bar-
wise and Seligman in press) may have something to offer here in allowing us to
capture notions like normality, expectation or reasonable outcome, which have
been shown by a number of researchers, including Dowty (1979), Hinrichs (1983),
Cooper (1985) and Landman (1992), to be an essential part of the meaning of the
progressive. In (Glasbey 1994b) we present an initial proposal for an analysis of
the progressive using channel theory.
A constantly recurring theme throughout this thesis has been the need to distin¬
guish between explicitly described and implicit or "inferred" information. The
need for this became apparent in our analysis of 'then', and reappeared as we
studied aspectual class and event structure. It became clear that any theoreti¬
cal framework chosen for a natural language semantics of events and times must
be capable of expressing such a distinction in a form that is readily accessible to
grammatical processing. We showed that the informational component of STDRT
allowed it to fulfil this requirement and thus to express a coherent account of the
various temporal phenomena treated in this thesis. We have not, of course, we
shown that STDRT is the only framework capable of embodying such a distinc¬
tion.
We showed too how the theory of events developed from the analysis of discourse
phenomena such as 'then' trickled down in a useful way to the investigation of
aspectual class and aspectual composition. It seems abundantly clear that none
of these should be thought of as purely sentence-internal phenomena, but instead
should be studied in the context of the discourse in which they are embedded.
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